☢ test - Í

statements. I don't know what was said[,]’ Gawlak still did not make a detailed proffer of the purported hearsay statements and anticipated testimony. … In support of his motion for new trial, Gawlak testified about specific statements Burt's former wife had made in his presence. ‘However, [Gawlak] should have offered that evidence at trial, [during the motion in limine hearing], so that the trial judge could have conducted the analysis required [.]’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 239, 242(4), 539 S.E.2d 914 (2000). Because Gawlak failed to make a sufficient proffer of the excluded hearsay evidence at trial, there is nothing for us to consider. See Holder v. State, 242 Ga.App. 479, 482(5), 529 S.E.2d 907 (2000) (no proffer after ruling); Dent v. State, 220 Ga.App. 147, 149(3), 469 S.E.2d 311 (1996) (defendant failed to make adequate proffer after state's hearsay objection was sustained).” Holton v. State, 269 Ga.App. 808, 605 S.E.2d 619 (September 30, 2004). “[A]n attorney’s mere allusion to the substance of excluded evidence is not the equivalent of an offer of proof,” citing Pittman v. State, 208 Ga.App. 211, 430 S.E.2d 141 (1993). Smart v. State, 277 Ga. 111, 587 S.E.2d 6 (September 22, 2003). “Generally, when a party is prevented from introducing objectionable evidence, the party should be allowed to put that evidence into the record through an offer of proof outside of the jury’s presence. In this case, however, the trial court had already properly ruled that the evidence Smart sought to proffer was inadmissible. Smart’s attempt to continuously proffer testimony on the same subject was duplicative and futile. The trial court summarized the testimony that Smart was attempting to proffer for the record and reiterated that such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. Because the evidence Smart attempted to proffer had already been ruled inadmissible, it was not error for the trial court to refuse Smart’s continuous attempts to proffer the same type of evidence.” MMM. PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION See PLEAS – COMPETENCY and PLEAS – INSANITY/MENTAL ILLNESS, above NNN. PUBLIC OFFICIALS, CHARGES AGAINST Worthy v. State, 307 Ga.App. 297, 704 S.E.2d 808 (November 4, 2010). Indictment for false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and related offenses wasn’t invalid for failure to allow defendant, a certified police officer, to attend and give statement at grand jury proceeding; “OCGA § 17-7-52(a) applies where a peace officer has been charged with a crime ‘which is alleged to have occurred while he or she was in the performance of his or her duties.’ The indictment did not allege that the crimes occurred while Worthy was performing his duties.” “Although Worthy states that ‘he had a duty to arrest a person whom he believed to be violating the law in his presence,’ he has cited no authority (legal, job-related, or otherwise) supporting that contention. The record does not show that Worthy's official duties as a campus police officer included the commission of the acts at issue, while he was off duty and engaged in leisure activities outside of his jurisdiction.” Worthy was police chief for Morehouse College; offenses here allegedly occurred in Lamar County. State v. Smith, 286 Ga. 409, 688 S.E.2d 348 (January 25, 2010). Affirming 297 Ga.App. 300, 676 S.E.2d 750 (2009) , police officer defendant’s conviction for theft reversed based on denial of his right to appear before the grand jury pursuant to OCGA §§ 17-7-52 and 45-11-4. Contrary to State’s contention, “notice of the specific time and place of the grand jury presentment is required to be provided to the accused by the State.” “[T]he required notice of the date, time, and location of the expected grand jury presentment implicit in OCGA § 45-11-4(g) is that of reasonable notice, that is, notice calculated to provide the accused a fair and full opportunity to exercise the rights provided by OCGA § 45-11- 4(g).” Brandeburg v. State, 292 Ga.App. 191, 663 S.E.2d 844 (June 25, 2008). 1. Trial court properly denied defendant’s demurrer and motion to quash his indictment for theft by taking by a police officer; contrary to defendant’s contention, district attorney did not commit misconduct by refusing to draw an indictment for misdemeanor theft by taking at grand jury’s request. “ According to Brandeburg, this violated OCGA § 45-11-4(h) [relating to charges against public officials], which states in part that, ‘[a]t any time during the presentation of evidence or during deliberations, the grand jury may amend the indictment or instruct the district attorney to cause a new indictment to be drawn as in any other case.’ The record shows that the grand jury asked the district attorney why the State had ‘dropped’ the misdemeanor theft by taking charge and whether it could change the felony charges to misdemeanors. The district attorney explained to the jury why the State had charged Brandeburg with a felony and that a misdemeanor charge was not an option. The grand jury subsequently directed the district attorney to separate the three felony counts into two separate indictments, one charging Brandeburg with theft by taking and violation of his oath of office, and the other charging him with a separate count of violation of his oath of office, and the district attorney complied.” Contrary to