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defendant’s assertion, ‘[t]he hearing transcript does not show that the grand jury ever directed the district attorney to produce an indictment charging Brandeburg with a misdemeanor. Moreover, if the grand jury had disapproved of charging Brandeburg with felony theft by taking, it could have refused to indict him pursuant to the proposed indictment, but it did not. Thus, Brandeburg has failed to show that the State violated OCGA § 45-11-4(h) or that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash based on such alleged violation.” 2. Defendant was not entitled to “waive the protections of OCGA § 45-11-4(g) and answer questions from the [grand] jurors.” [A]s the trial court recognized, allowing such questioning ‘would be tantamount to creating an adversarial atmosphere before the Grand Jury,’ and would create the problem of deciding ‘who would have the authority to preside over the questioning by grand jury members and what, if any, limits on such questions would exist.’” 3. No violation of OCGA § 45-11-4(g) where, after defendant’s statement to grand jury, and he and counsel had left the room, the district attorney returned to answer legal questions at the grand jury’s request. 4. “Brandeburg also complains that the State violated OCGA § 45-11-4(h) when it failed to provide him with a copy of the ‘new’ indictments after the grand jury asked the State to divide the three charges between two separate indictments. OCGA § 45-11-4(h) provides in part that, if the grand jury instructs the district attorney to draw up a new indictment, ‘a copy of the ... new indictment, if it relates to the accused public official, shall be provided to the accused public official and his or her counsel.’ It is undisputed that Brandeburg received a copy of the proposed indictment before it was presented to the grand jury, as required by OCGA § 45-11-4(f), [ fn] and that the ‘new’ indictments to which he refers repeated verbatim the same three charges as in the proposed indictment he had received. The only difference was that the three charges were split between two separate indictments. Under these circumstances, Brandeburg has failed to show that the State violated his rights under OCGA § 45-11-4(h) or that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash.” State v. West, 283 Ga.App. 302, 641 S.E.2d 289 (January 25, 2007). OCGA § 45-11-4, giving mayors and other public officials the right to a copy of a proposed indictment for “malpractice, misfeasance or malfeasance in office” and other enumerated offenses, “at least 15 days before [the indictment] is presented to the grand jury,” by its express terms does not apply to indictments for other offenses, even those committed in the course of the official’s duties, and even if the offenses could have been brought under OCGA § 45-11-4. “[S]uch interpretation would render meaningless the subsection’s language specifying that ‘[t]his Code section shall not apply when a public officer is charged with any other crime alleged to have occurred while such official was in the performance of an official duty.’ OCGA § 45-11-4(d).” Wiggins v. State, 280 Ga. 268, 626 S.E.2d 118 (January 30, 2006). Defendant police officer was charged with “rape, sodomy, false imprisonment, sexual battery, cruelty to children, false writings and statements, and violation of oath of public office,” arising from an incident where he forced a 16-year-old female to have sex with him to avoid bringing charges against her and advising her parents of the meth party where she was found, then falsifying reports about the incident. Defendant contends that the charges should have been dismissed because, as a police officer, he was entitled to attend the grand jury, with counsel, and to make a statement without being subject to cross, all pursuant to OCGA §§ 17- 7-52 and 45-11-4, and he was denied that opportunity. Court of Appeals found that none of the charges in question were undertaken ‘in the performance of his duties,’ and thus defendant was not entitled to notice of their presentation to the grand jury. Supreme Court reverses in part: “In this case, Wiggins stepped aside from the performance of his official duties when he committed the crime of cruelty to children . [Citing Galloway , below] (police officer who took women into custody and forced them to engage in sexual intercourse was not in the performance of his official duties); Morrill v. State, 216 Ga.App. 468, 470, 454 S.E.2d 796 (1995) (police officer who committed burglaries and robberies was not performing his official duties). With regard to the count alleging a violation of oath of public office, it appears that it too arose from matters unconnected with the performance of Wiggins’ duties. That is because it was predicated on threats that Wiggins made to the victim [ citing Galloway ] and false responses that he gave to outside investigators when he was the subject of the investigation. However, the crime of false writings and statements did arise when Wiggins was in the performance of his official duties , at least insofar as it pertained to the completion of his daily activity sheet. See, e.g., State v. Lockett, 259 Ga.App. 179, 181, 576 S.E.2d 582 (2003) (on duty police officer charged with speeding and driving too fast for conditions was entitled to rights under OCGA §§ 17-7-52 and 45-11-4); State v. Roulain, 159 Ga.App. 233, 234(2), 283 S.E.2d 89 (1981) (correctional officers who were charged with involuntary manslaughter because they confined a prisoner under conditions which led to his death by heat prostration did not step aside from the performance of their duties). Thus, Wiggins was entitled to the protections afforded by OCGA §§ 17-7-52 and 45-11-4 with regard to the false writings and statements count.” Conviction on this count reversed, others affirmed. Reverses in part Wiggins v. State , 272 Ga.App. 414, 612 S.E.2d 598 (March 23, 2005). State v. Galloway, 270 Ga.App. 184, 606 S.E.2d 273 (October 26, 2004). Officer charged with rape, sexual assault, and violation of oath as a public officer was not entitled to be present during grand jury presentment, or to make a statement to