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the grand jury in accordance with OCGA § 45-11-4 and § 17-7-52(a). “[T]hese rights have been found not to apply to situations where officers have stepped aside from the performance of their official duties in order to commit crimes. For instance, we have held that officers charged with committing burglary, armed robbery and aggravated assault while on duty are not entitled to these rights inasmuch as the performance of their official duties does not include the commission of such crimes. [Cits.] Likewise, this court has held that the performance of official duties does not include rape. [Cit.] In the instant case, the charges against Galloway arose out of separate instances when he was in uniform and providing security at a club. According to the state, on each occasion Galloway took a woman into custody, threatened to charge her with a crime and then forced her to have sexual intercourse with him in exchange for him not pressing charges.” State v. Allen, 262 Ga.App. 724, 586 S.E.2d 378 (August 12, 2003). Fact that state trooper showed his badge supported finding that alleged assault and battery took place in performance of his official duties, notwithstanding that he was in street clothes and exiting his personal vehicle at his daughter’s school. OCGA § 17-7-52(a) applied and accusation was properly quashed for violating it. State v. Lockett, 259 Ga.App. 179, 576 S.E.2d 582 (January 10, 2003). Accusation charging police officer with traffic offenses committed in the performance of his duties was properly quashed because not presented to grand jury as required by OCGA § 17-7-52. Same would not apply, however, is charges were made by traffic citation in traffic violations bureau pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-60. State’s argument that the offenses here were not committed in performance of duties might work (see Morrill v. State , 216 Ga.App. 468, 454 S.E.2d 796 (1995)), but not supported by record here. OOO. QUASHED ACCUSATION, BAR TO FURTHER PROSECUTION State v. Allen, 262 Ga.App. 724, 586 S.E.2d 378 (August 12, 2003). Bar to further prosecutions upon quashing of two indictments, found in OCGA § 17-7-53.1 is not triggered by quashing of accusation, notwithstanding OCGA § 17-7- 70.1(a)(2) (“All laws relating to rights and responsibilities attendant to indicted cases shall be applicable to cases brought by accusation signed by the district attorney”). PPP. RECALLING WITNESSES Lawton v. State, 281 Ga. 459, 640 S.E.2d 14 (January 8, 2007). Trial court properly allowed State to recall witness who told prosecutor after he took stand that he had “mistakenly testified” about his description of his assailant. “A trial court has broad discretion to allow the State to recall its witness for further direct testimony, and no abuse of that discretion has been shown in this case. Ivey v. State, 277 Ga. 875, 877(4)(a) (596 S.E.2d 612) (2004).” QQQ. RECONSIDERATION See also SEARCH AND SEIZURE – MOTION TO SUPPRESS – RECONSIDERATION, below Pestana v. State, 328 Ga.App. 454, 762 S.E.2d 178 (July 16, 2014). Following negotiated plea to aggravated assault, defendant was sentenced to ten years’ probation under the First Offender Act. Four years later, probation erroneously submitted, and trial court signed, discharge order “indicating that Pestana had fulfilled the terms of his probation.” The court subsequently rescinded the discharge order and reinstated Pestana's original sentence, on motion for reconsideration by State. Held, “the superior court has plenary power to correct its own mistaken ruling during the same term of court.” 1. Because the State had no notice of the discharge order within 30 days of its entry, and no statutory provision required motion to be filed within a certain time, resort to court’s “plenary power” was appropriate. “[U]nder these unique factual circumstances, the State sought to invoke the superior court's authority over its orders and judgments issued within the same term of court. See, e.g., Buice v. State, 272 Ga. 323, 325–326, 528 S.E.2d 788 (2000). The superior court explicitly proceeded under this authority in its reinstatement order; therefore, under these facts, the motion was functionally like a motion in arrest of judgment, which ‘must be made during the term at which the judgment was obtained.’ OCGA § 17–9–61(b). See generally OCGA § 17–9–61(a) (‘When a judgment has been rendered, either party may move in arrest thereof for any defect not amendable which appears on the face of the record or pleadings.’). Also, the motion arose out of a defect appearing on the face of the discharge petition and order. See OCGA § 17–9–61(a). Therefore, the State's failure to take action within thirty days of the discharge order was not fatal to its motion filed in the same term [fn] upon becoming aware of the discharge. Cf. Pope v. Pope, 277 Ga. 333, 335, 588 S.E.2d 736 (2003) (applying Buice and holding that ‘considering all the circumstances, including the lack of notice to [the respondent] of the final hearing, ... the trial court did not err in exercising its inherent power to set aside the [final] judgment’).” 2. Court’s plenary power. “‘Courts of record retain full control over orders and judgments during the term at which they were made, and, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may revise or vacate them ... During the term of court at which a judgment is rendered[,] the [trial] court has power, on its own motion, to vacate the same for irregularity, or because it was