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improvidently or inadvertently entered. The plenary control of the court over orders and judgments during the term at which they were rendered extends to all orders and judgments save those which are founded upon verdicts. The power of the court, during the term, is described as plenary, to be used for the purpose of promoting justice, but the court's discretion, although broad, is not unbounded and should be exercised only upon sufficient cause shown. Hence, [courts] have recognized that this inherent power should not be used unless some meritorious reason is given therefor. However, the right to determine what is a meritorious reason is also addressed to the sound discretion of the [trial] judge, and this [C]ourt will not reverse his or her decision unless such discretion is manifestly abused.’ (Punctuation and citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Buice, 272 Ga. at 324–325, 528 S.E.2d 788, citing Jones v., 223 Ga.App. 277, 278, 477 S.E.2d 411 (1996), Pledger v. State, 193 Ga.App. 588, 589(2)(a), 388 S.E.2d 425 (1989), Giddeons v. State, 156 Ga.App. 800, 801, 275 S.E.2d 370 (1980). Here, the superior court revisited a discharge order which, on its face, contained an internal inconsistency based on what the court later learned was an inadvertent data entry error in the probation office. As a result, the discharge order incorrectly stated Pestana had ‘fulfilled the terms’ of his ten-year sentence less than four years into it. This is precisely the type of error that a trial court should have discretion to correct. Further, the discharge order was not a final judgment founded on a jury verdict such that it violated double jeopardy principles or was unreviewable by the trial court absent a timely motion for new trial. See generally Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 416, 746 S.E.2d 95 (2013) (The “‘plenary control of the court over orders and judgments during the term at which they were rendered extends to all orders and judgments save those which are founded upon verdicts.’”), quoting Buice, 272 Ga. at 325, 528 S.E.2d 788.” Miller, joined by Phipps, dissents. State v. Ross, 293 Ga. 834, 750 S.E.2d 305 (October 21, 2013). In murder prosecution, trial court, having denied plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial grounds, couldn’t then grant same plea in bar on reconsideration outside the term of court absent “a material change in the evidentiary posture” of the case. “The general rule in criminal cases is that a trial court's inherent power to revoke interlocutory rulings ends with the expiration of the term in which the order was entered. Moon v. State, 287 Ga. 304 (696 S.E.2d 55) (2010). There is ‘a well-recognized and important exception to that rule, which allows after-term reconsideration, at least of constitutional issues, where the “evidentiary posture” of the issue has changed.’ Id. at 309 (Nahmias, J., concurring). Thus, ‘a court retains broad discretion over interlocutory evidentiary rulings which may be modified at any time until entry of final judgment.’ Ritter v. State, 272 Ga. 551, 553(2) (532 S.E.2d 692) (2000).” “In its order granting the plea in bar, the trial court applied the changed-evidence exception to reconsider the merits of Ross's speedy trial claim. It found that Ross had revealed gaps in the evidence due to the passage of time and shown that the evidence was more degraded than previously believed. Under certain circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the passage of time and resulting degradation in evidence may constitute a change in the evidentiary record permitting the out-of-term reconsideration of an interlocutory ruling on a speedy trial claim. If, for example, a defendant files a constitutional speedy trial claim after his arrest and files a renewed motion five years later after his indictment and extradition, then the passage of time alone may be sufficient to permit trial court reconsideration of the speedy trial claim, especially if the defendant articulates specific ways in which the evidence has changed. In this case, however, the trial court did not refer to any new evidence that would permit the out-of-term reconsideration of its order denying Ross's speedy trial claim. The record does not show any change in the evidence between the first hearing on Ross's motion to dismiss the indictment in October 2011 and the second hearing on his motion for reconsideration in December 2012. The State had presented all of its discovery to Ross prior to the 2011 hearing, and Ross did not introduce any additional documents or witnesses at the 2012 hearing. Indeed, Ross acknowledged at the second hearing that he was ‘not actually presenting any more evidence’ and asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling by reviewing the evidence presented at the earlier hearing.” Moon v. State, 287 Ga. 304, 696 S.E.2d 55 (June 7, 2010). In defendant’s murder prosecution, trial court erred by reconsidering its order for change of venue beyond the term in which the original order was entered. 1. “In civil cases, ‘“an interlocutory ruling does not pass from the control of the court at the end of the term if the cause remains pending.” [Cits.]’ Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, 258 Ga.App. 51, 56(3) (572 S.E.2d 664) (2002). This principle is required by the Civil Practice Act (CPA). OCGA § 9-11-6(c). In criminal cases, however, the pre-CPA rule continues to apply, and a trial court's inherent power to revoke interlocutory rulings still ceases with the end of the term. Pledger v. State, 193 Ga.App. 588, 589(2)(a) (388 S.E.2d 425) (1989). Compare Rooney v. State, 217 Ga.App. 850, 852 (459 S.E.2d 601) (1995) (involving reconsideration of a bond order and distinguishing Pledger ).” 2. “ Contrary to the trial court's order, any supersedeas during the State's appeal from the suppression order did not affect the time for filing a motion for reconsideration.” While State’s appeal acts as supersedeas generally under OCGA § 5-6-45 “in all cases where a sentence of death has been imposed or where the defendant is admitted to bail,” this isn’t one of those cases, and in any event, “‘[f]iling a notice of appeal may deprive a court of its power to execute the sentence but it does not supersede every other activity of a trial court.’ Strickland v. State, 258 Ga. 764, 766(1) (373 S.E.2d 736) (1988).” Nahmias concurs