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specially to argue for legislative modification of the common-law rule, consistent with the modern practice in use in the federal courts and in civil cases in state courts: giving the court power to reconsider interlocutory rulings at any time. “To avoid fruitless repetition of claims, the trial court must have broad discretion to deny review of its own prior decision. But to hold that the trial court has no authority to do so in a later term is to set in stone some initial rulings that, by the time the case is final and ripe for appeal, are erroneous – perhaps even obviously erroneous. That is contrary both to the interests of justice and judicial economy.” Nahmias also points out “a well-recognized and important exception to that rule, which allows after-term reconsideration, at least of constitutional issues, where the ‘evidentiary posture’ of the issue has changed. This exception is essential to avoid the most obviously unjust, and potentially unconstitutional, results of the general rule, in situations where an interlocutory ruling becomes clearly wrong due to a change in the evidentiary record while the case is in the trial court.” Notes that no new evidence was introduced in this case to obtain the trial court’s reconsideration of the change of venue. Chishti v. State, 288 Ga.App. 230, 653 S.E.2d 830 (November 5, 2007). Trial court granted defendant’s motion for discharge and acquittal based on statutory speedy trial demand. Outside the term of court, State filed a motion reconsideration. Held, trial court erred in granting the untimely motion for reconsideration. “‘ A motion for reconsideration filed within the term of court that a judgment is entered extends the authority of a trial judge to modify its judgment after the term expires; however, such a motion filed after the term in which it was entered, as here, does not, [and] such authority is then lost.’ Masters v. Clark, 269 Ga.App. 537, 539 (604 S.E.2d 556) (2004). See also Tanaka v. Pecqueur, 268 Ga.App. 380, 381-82(1) (601 S.E.2d 830) (2004) (‘(A)lthough a trial judge has inherent power during the same term of court in which the judgment was rendered to revise, correct, revoke, modify or vacate such judgment, even upon his own motion, for the purpose of promoting justice and in the exercise of sound legal discretion, this authority does not extend beyond the same term of court, unless a motion to modify or vacate, et cetera, was filed within the same term of court.’)” Accord, Soloman v. State , 294 Ga.App. 520, 669 S.E.2d 430 (October 28, 2008) (Trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion to reconsider denial of new trial where motion for reconsideration was filed during same term of court, even if ruling made outside term). Thomas v. State, 287 Ga.App. 124, 650 S.E.2d 793 (August 7, 2007). County Recorder’s Court granted defendant’s motion in limine and dismissed his DUI prosecution. State then refiled charges in State Court. Held, State Court prosecution was not barred by double jeopardy or collateral estoppel. “ A motion in limine is a proper pretrial means by which the movant seeks ‘not a final ruling on the admissibility of evidence, but only to prevent the mention by anyone, during [the course of the] trial, of a certain item of evidence or area of inquiry until its admissibility can be determined[, or, as here,] a ruling on the admissibility of evidence prior to the trial.’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) [ State v. Johnston, 249 Ga. 413, 415(3) (291 S.E.2d 543) (1982)]. Inasmuch as such ruling is subject to modification at trial to prevent manifest injustice, (id.), it does not result in a final judgment limiting issues under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or bar another trial. Helton v. State, 217 Ga.App. 691, 693(1)(c) (458 S.E.2d 872) (1995); see also OCGA § 16-1-8(a)(2) (‘A prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted for the same crime based upon the same material facts, if such former prosecution ... [w]as terminated improperly ..., in a trial before a court without a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court.’)” Bradford v. State, 274 Ga.App. 659, 618 S.E.2d 709 (July 27, 2005). “Although the trial court initially granted the motion in limine …, further research led the court to modify its decision and deny the motion. The trial court has the discretion to modify its rulings on a motion in limine at any time under Helton v. State, 217 Ga.App. 691, 693(1)(c) (458 S.E.2d 872) (1995).” RRR. RECONSTRUCTING EVIDENCE (OCGA § 5-6-41) Ruffin v. State, 289 Ga. 87, 656 S.E.2d 140 (January 8, 2008). “After two hearings were held on [defendant’s motion for new trial, the motion was denied and [defendant] timely filed a notice of appeal from that ruling on June 17, 2005. Because the transcription of one of the two hearings was lost, the trial court chose to conduct a hearing to reconstruct the evidence presented. See OCGA § 5-6-41. However, the trial court allowed [defendant] to orally amend his motion for new trial at the hearing in order to raise additional claims of error and subsequently issued another order, filed October 27, 2006, denying [defendant]’s motion for new trial, from which [defendant] timely filed yet another notice of appeal.” Held, trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider matters raised at the hearing after notice of appeal had already been filed. “While OCGA § 5-6-41(f) allows trial courts to retain some control over the record on appeal in certain instances, its purpose ‘is solely for the purpose of making the record speak the truth, not for adding evidence to the record or supplying fatal deficiencies after the fact. [Cit.]’ Wigley v. State, 194 Ga.App. 7, 9(7), 389 S.E.2d 769