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(1989).” SSS. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS See also POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – APPEAL, RECORD/TRANSCRIPT, above Mosley v. Lowe, 298 Ga. 363, 782 S.E.2d 43 (January 19, 2016). Under OCGA § 35-3-37, superior court properly granted Lowe’s motion to restrict access to the record of her 1996 simple assault arrest, which was nolle prossed for want of prosecution. 2012 law providing for record restriction, effective July 1, 2013, applies to records created prior to that effective date. “[O]nly rights that are private in nature are capable of vesting so as to implicate the prohibition on retroactive laws,” citing Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 178-181 (751 S.E.2d 337) (2013). “As we also made clear in Deal v. Coleman, legislative schemes under which citizens are afforded access to public information generally create public rather than private rights. Id. at 183–184. Accordingly, such schemes may be modified retroactively with no constitutional impediment. Id. at 184. The effect of the amendments to OCGA § 35–3–37 is to expand the right of individuals to restrict access to their criminal history record information and, concomitantly, to limit the right of the general public to gain access to such information. The only right that has been impaired in any way is the public’s right to access information.” Accord, Woodhouse v. State , A16A0358, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1577176 (April 20, 2016). Gibbs v. Bright, 330 Ga.App. 851, 769 S.E.2d 590 (March 2, 2015). Following reversal of defendant’s convictions for child molestation and related offenses, trial court properly denied petition to restrict access to the criminal history pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37. District Attorney nolle prossed the case rather than try it for a third time because the victim and similar transaction witnesses didn’t want to testify yet again. 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the situation is governed by subsection (j) (defendant may petition for records restriction where conviction vacated, no retrial within two years), not subsection (h) (records “shall” be restricted where charges “dismissed or nolle prossed”). Court of Appeals finds that the more specific subsection (j) controls over the general subsection (h). “While the General Assembly could have carved from such specific parameters an exception, so as to exclude from that paragraph's purview instances where a nolle prosequi was entered within the referenced two-year period, it did not. Where, as here, a statute contains both a general provision and a specific one, ‘the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular provision.’ Mayor & c. of Savannah v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 205 Ga. 429, 436–437, 54 S.E.2d 260 (1949) (punctuation omitted); see generally Drake v. State, 170 Ga.App. 846, 847(1), 318 S.E.2d 721 (1984) (noting various usages and effects of an order of nolle prosequi). In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not err in determining that OCGA § 35–3–37(j)(2) governed Gibbs's petition.” 2. No abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s petition. Under OCGA § 35-3-37(j)(2), “[t]he court shall hear evidence and shall determine whether granting an order restricting such criminal history record information is appropriate, giving due consideration to [1] the reason the judgment was reversed or vacated, [2] the reason the prosecuting attorney has not retried the case, and [3] the public's interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available.” Here, the conviction was reversed based on ineffective assistance of counsel, not actual innocence; the DA elected not to retry the case because the victims didn’t want to go through another trial; and the court properly held that the public had an interest in the information. TTT. RECUSAL OF JUDGE See also subheading EX PARTE COMMUNICATION , above 1. BIAS TOWARD ATTORNEY Price v. Reish, 335 Ga.App. 491, 780 S.E.2d 745 (December 23, 2015). Physical precedent only. In civil case, trial court erred by vacating counsel’s entry of appearance rather than addressing counsel’s motion to recuse. Trial judge had previously recused on numerous cases due to a conflict with counsel, but in this case, denied the motion to recuse and instead found that counsel had improperly “hired into a conflict.” Held, once the recusal motion was filed, “‘USCR 25.3 does not authorize a discretionary determination on the part of the trial judge presented with a motion and affidavit to recuse-the Rule states that another judge shall be assigned to hear the recusal motion if the motion is timely, the affidavit legally sufficient, and the facts set forth in the affidavit, when taken as true, would authorize recusal.’ Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Batson–Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 119(1), 728 S.E.2d 189 (2012). If the criteria of USCR 25.3 have been satisfied and the motion to recuse is assigned to another judge, the assigned judge has the discretion to decide the motion based solely on the affidavits or conduct an evidentiary hearing, and the assigned judge’s ultimate ruling on the merits of the motion must be accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law. See USCR 25.6; Batson– Cook Co., 291 Ga. at 116, 728 S.E.2d 189.” The judge considering the recusal motion, however, would be empowered to consider whether counsel’s appearance in the case violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. “A motion for recusal can be denied on the merits if an attorney or client is found to have engaged in intentional misconduct in an effort to compel the judge to recuse,” citing Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 695(1), 494 S.E.2d 530 (1997). “Additionally,