☢ test - Í

310 Ga.App. 878, 714 S.E.2d 242 (2011); civil case remanded to trial court for reconsideration of motion to recuse trial judge. Trial judge erred by failing to refer recusal motion to another judge, as motion and supporting affidavits satisfied the requirements of USCR 25. Motion was filed within five days of learning of grounds for recusal (omitting weekends, pursuant to OCGA § 1-3-1(d)(3)); affidavit stated specific facts, not bare conclusions; and facts stated, if true, would warrant recusal. Facts here included “the familial relationship between the judge and an attorney who had represented one of the parties in the underlying dispute that resulted in the litigation and who was employed by a firm, a partner of which was general counsel to a party in the case, who acted at times as if counsel of record, and whose conversation with the trial judge advising him of the existence of the case was followed by the trial judge's assignment of the case to himself , are objective facts which we conclude would cause a fair-minded and impartial person to have a reasonable perception of the trial judge's lack of impartiality.” Morgan v. Propst, 301 Ga.App. 402, 688 S.E.2d 357 (November 6, 2009). Trial court erred in summarily dismissing defendant’s motion to recuse the trial judge “based upon the alleged personal bias of the trial judge against Morgan’s attorney.” “In his affidavit, Morgan's attorney stated that he previously had been the county's District Attorney and that, in that role, he had personally directed the investigation and prosecution of the judge's husband for corruption, which led to the husband's incarceration. In the course of this prosecution, the attorney also investigated the judge, subpoenaing and reviewing her personal and business financial records. As part of a guilty plea agreement, Morgan's attorney terminated the investigation of the judge. He delegated subsequent prosecutions before the judge to his assistants. Morgan argued in the recusal motion that, based on these facts, the judge's impartiality toward Morgan and Morgan's attorney might reasonably be questioned.” Bias against attorney. “Although, as Propst asserts, there is no per se rule that a judge's personal bias against an attorney, rather than a party, is grounds for disqualification, see Houston v. Cavanagh, 199 Ga.App. 387, 388 (405 S.E.2d 105) (1991), we find that the facts set forth in the affidavit submitted by Morgan in support of her motion, if true, raised a reasonable question about the judge's impartiality in this case. See Gillis [ v. City of Waycross, 247 Ga.App. 119, 122 (543 S.E.2d 423) (2000)]; Canon 3(E)(1)(a) [of the Code of Judicial Conduct]. Under these circumstances, USCR 25.3 required the motion to be assigned to another judge, and the court abused its discretion in ruling on the motion.” Adams v. State, 290 Ga.App. 299, 659 S.E.2d 711 (March 14, 2008). Trial court properly denied recusal motion. “The record shows that the trial court held the hearing on Adams’ motion for new trial on July 18, 2005. At the conclusion of that hearing, defense counsel agreed to file a brief on the issues within ten days after receipt of the transcript. The transcript was completed in August 2005. Defense counsel, however, never submitted a brief, and the trial judge telephoned him in approximately May 2006, accusing him of abandoning his client. On August 18, 2006, the judge telephoned counsel again, repeated the abandonment accusation, and stated that he intended to enter an order adverse to Adams. Three days later, Adams moved to recuse the trial judge. In his motion and supporting affidavit, Adams asserted that the trial judge (1) indicated before the new trial hearing that he had ‘pre-judged’ the merits of the motion for new trial; (2) directed unnecessary rage towards defense counsel at the new trial hearing; (3) improperly accused counsel of abandoning his client in May 2006; and (4) repeated this accusation in an August 2006 telephone message. As an initial matter, any effort to recuse the trial court based on conduct occurring before August 2006 was untimely. See Thurman v. State, 249 Ga.App. 390, 390-391(1) (547 S.E.2d 715) (2001); Unif. Superior Ct. R. 25.1. We are left, therefore, with Adams’ allegation regarding the August 2006 telephone call. And we agree with the trial court that, even if true, this allegation does not demonstrate the requisite bias. Counsel failed to file a brief supporting the motion for new trial for over one year, and he did not ask for relief from the filing requirement. In response to this failure, the trial court legitimately expressed concern that counsel had abandoned his client. Although the trial judge also stated that he intended to issue an order adverse to Adams, nothing in this statement reveals any bias. And neither the trial court’s overall conduct nor ultimate ruling in the case evidences bias or partiality. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion to recuse. See Vaughn [ v. State, 247 Ga.App. 368, 370(2) (543 S.E.2d 429) (2000)].” Overruled based on improper application of ‘abuse of discretion’ standard on appeal, Mayor & Alderman of City of Savannah (May 29, 2012), above. 2. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS Lue v. Eady, 297 Ga. 321, 773 S.E.2d 679 (June 15, 2015). In civil action seeking removal of mayor from office, trial court properly denied motion to recuse based on alleged “improper ex parte communications with opposing counsel with respect to scheduling the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order” and failure to respond to a “letter requesting either that the judge recuse or that he provide counsel with information relating to how the request for a hearing was made and scheduled.” Ex parte communication regarding scheduling hearing was not improper. “The practice of communicating ex parte to a judge or the judge's staff for administrative and scheduling purposes is