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authorized as an exception to the rule prohibiting ex parte communications with a judge, as noted in the trial court order. Canon 3(B)(7)(a) [Rule 2.9(A)(1(a) and (b) in new Code effective January 1, 2016] expressly authorizes such communications so long as: ‘(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and (ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond.’ With respect to the scheduling of hearings, we do not construe this Canon to require the judge to notify the opposing party personally so long as, as here, the party requesting the hearing provided adequate reasonable notice. The manner in which the hearing in question in this case was scheduled does not require the disqualification of the trial judge because it does not present a situation in which the judge's ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ Nor does the trial judge's alleged refusal to respond to counsel's letter demanding either voluntary recusal or an explanation of the manner in which the request for hearing was handled. The motion to recuse was duly considered and ruled upon based upon the motion and affidavit in support of the motion.” Hoke v. State, 326 Ga.App. 71, 755 S.E.2d 876 (March 10, 2014). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to sua sponte recuse after ex parte communication with prosecutor regarding unavailability of State’s witness. “Hoke did not move for recusal within five days as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.1. Because ‘appellant did not timely file a motion for [the trial judge] to recuse himself, the matter of recusal is waived.’ In re Adams, 292 Ga. 617, 617(1), 740 S.E.2d 134 (2013), citing Hampton v. State, 289 Ga. 621(4), 713 S.E.2d 851 (2011); Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760, 546 S.E.2d 472 (2001). See also Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 754 S.E.2d 335 (January 27, 2014) (finding waiver of recusal where counsel objected to judge's participation based on an appearance of impropriety but failed to move to recuse the judge).” Braddy v. State, 316 Ga.App. 292, 729 S.E.2d 461 (June 20, 2012). In burglary and forgery prosecution, trial judge erred in failing to refer recusal motion to another judge, as motion met the threshold requirements of USCR 25.3. “[T]he threshold inquiries concerning the motion to recuse are: ‘was the motion timely filed, were the affidavits supporting the motion legally sufficient, and did the affidavits aver facts that, when assumed to be true, would warrant the trial judge's recusal from hearing the case? If all three conditions precedent were met, the trial judge was required to refer the motion to another judge.’ Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Batson–Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (May 29, 2012).” Affidavit here alleged that trial judge had had ex parte communication about defendant’s case with someone and had formed and expressed opinions about defendant’s guilt; but rather than referring the motion, trial judge disputed the allegations. Jenkins v. Smith, 308 Ga.App. 762, 709 S.E.2d 23 (March 25, 2011). In civil case, trial court properly denied motion to recuse, as both untimely and lacking merit. Motion was filed in September based on unfavorable rulings made in July. “Based upon the assertions in the recusal motion and the affidavit, the trial court correctly concluded that the motion was untimely. See Wall v. Thurman, 283 Ga. 533, 535(5) (661 S.E.2d 549) (2008). Moreover, Jenkins's mere dissatisfaction with the trial judge's rulings and bare allegations that the trial judge engaged in ex parte communications with opposing counsel as to scheduling matters were insufficient to warrant a belief that bias existed. See Rice v. Cannon, 283 Ga.App. 438, 442-443(2) (641 S.E.2d 562) (2007); Stephens v. Ivey, 212 Ga.App. 407, 408(2) (442 S.E.2d 248) (1994).” Accord, Lue v. Eady (June 15, 2015), above. Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394 (July 28, 2005). Child molestation and aggravated child molestation convictions affirmed. Trial court denied motion to recuse on the grounds that the motion was untimely, the affidavit in support of the motion was legally insufficient, and the grounds urged for recusal were legally insufficient. Trial court did not exhibit bias toward defendant by ordering the jail not to give defendant medication without the court’s approval, based on his attempted suicide and motion was untimely. Trial court subsequently modified the order at defense counsel’s request. Trial court’s contact with jail personnel was not improper ex parte communication under USCR 4.1. 3. JUDGE AS FORMER PROSECUTOR/ RELATIONSHIP WITH PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE Post v. State, 298 Ga. 241, 779 S.E.2d 624 (November 16, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by failing to refer recusal motions to another judge. Judge’s prior employment in District Attorney’s office when the case was pending wasn’t grounds for recusal, absent allegation that the judge himself “was personally involved in some aspect of the criminal matter or served in a supervisory role over another lawyer while that lawyer was personally involved in some aspect of the criminal matter,” quoting Gude v. State, 289 Ga. 46, 49, 709 S.E.2d 206 (2011).