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motion are outside the ambit of Keller’s limited affidavit. We therefore agree that this affidavit was legally insufficient to warrant recusal. See Rice v. Cannon, 283 Ga.App. 438, 444(2) (641 S.E.2d 562) (2007).” Accord, Paul v. State , 296 Ga.App. 6, 673 S.E.2d 551 (February 11, 2009). Overruled based on improper application of ‘abuse of discretion’ standard on appeal, Mayor & Alderman of City of Savannah (May 29, 2012), above. Patel v. State, 283 Ga.App. 181, 641 S.E.2d 184 (December 15, 2006). “Patel argues that the court erred in denying his motion to transfer venue that was based on his allegation that he had filed a judicial complaint against the trial judge and that therefore the trial judge and all judges in the county would be biased against him. This motion, which was in effect a motion to recuse, was unsupported by any affidavit or other evidence showing that indeed a judicial complaint had been filed or that the judge was biased or prejudiced against him. See Gould v. State, 273 Ga.App. 155, 158-160(4) (614 S.E.2d 252) (2005). Accordingly, the court did not err in denying the motion. Id.” Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (November 6, 2006). “Thomason contends that the trial court erred by denying his pro se motion for recusal of the trial judge and the prosecutor. Thomason’s motion, however, was deficient. It was neither verified nor accompanied with the affidavits required by USCR 25.1. Moreover, Thomason’s motion contained only his unverified speculation that the trial judge would be biased against him. The trial court did not err in denying this motion. Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616(2) (340 S.E.2d 891) (1986).” Accord, Horne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012) (no error denying motion to recuse which “contained only the defendant's unverified speculation that the trial judge would be biased against him.”). Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394 (July 28, 2005). Child molestation and aggravated child molestation convictions affirmed. Trial court denied motion to recuse on the grounds that the motion was untimely, the affidavit in support of the motion was legally insufficient, and the grounds urged for recusal were legally insufficient. Trial court did not exhibit bias toward defendant by ordering the jail not to give defendant medication without the court’s approval, based on his attempted suicide and motion was untimely. Trial court subsequently modified the order at defense counsel’s request. Trial court’s contact with jail personnel was not improper ex parte communication under USCR 4.1. Savage v. State, 263 Ga.App. 180, 587 S.E.2d 294 (September 11, 2003). Trial judge properly denied defendant’s motion to recuse based on her federal civil suit against the judge. “Contrary to the requirements of Uniform State Court Rule 25.1, no affidavit accompanied the unsworn, one-paragraph motion to recuse. ‘The absence of the affidavit was fatal since an affidavit is support of a motion to recuse is essential to activate this procedure. [Defendant’s] motion being unsupported, the trial court did not err in denying it.’” Accord, Carter (February 21, 2003), below. White v. Suntrust Bank, 245 Ga.App. 828, 538 S.E.2d 889 (September 8, 2000). Probate judge erred in denying motion to recuse; judge’s ownership of stock in bank which was executor of estate required judge to recuse herself. Motion to recuse was not untimely where filed within 10 days after movant learned of judge’s ownership of stock. Judge erred in ruling that the motion was untimely because movant “should have known” about judge’s stock ownership earlier. “Uniform Probate Court Rule 19.1, which is patterned after Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.1, provides that ‘[f]iling and presentation to the judge [of the motion to recuse] shall be not later than 5 days after the affiant first learned of the alleged grounds for disqualification....’ Nothing in the rule provides that the motion must be filed within five days after the affiant ‘should have known’ of the alleged grounds.” Christensen v. State, 245 Ga.App. 165, 537 S.E.2d 446 (July 14, 2000). Aggravated battery conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to recuse. 1. “The trial court properly ruled that the motion was untimely, because the most recent in time grounds was the order of May 26, 1999, which was entered approximately 48 days prior to filing the motion to recuse. See Quarterman v. Quarterman, 268 Ga. 807, 808–809(4), 493 S.E.2d 146 (1997); Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 88–89(19), 463 S.E.2d 868 (1995); Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 698(2), 494 S.E.2d 530 (1997). Unless the affidavit sets forth facts, reasons, and circumstances for the delayed filing of the motion that constitute good cause shown, such exception in the rule does not arise and would not be considered by the trial court in determining timeliness; the movant must invoke specifically such ‘good cause shown’ exception. See id.; Threatt v. State, 211 Ga.App. 630(2), 440 S.E.2d 61 (1994); Foody v. State, 200 Ga.App. 230, 407 S.E.2d 469 (1991).” 2. “An extraordinary motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is an improper vehicle to raise a motion to recuse; a motion to recuse can only be raised pursuant to USCR 25, which incorporates by rule approved by the Supreme Court the procedures to be followed in all cases of recusal. See in general State v. Fleming, supra at 702–703, 267 S.E.2d 207; Stevens v. Wakefield, 160 Ga.App. 353, 356(2), 287 S.E.2d 49 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, Wakefield v. Stevens, 249 Ga. 254, 290 S.E.2d 58 (1982); Howard v. Dept. of Human Resources, 157 Ga.App. 306, 308(1), 277 S.E.2d 301 (1981). To allow