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Schlanger v. State, 297 Ga.App. 785, 678 S.E.2d 190 (May 12, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to recuse, based on improperly-timed entry of sentence (entered before return of remittitur on appeal). “[T]he only evidence to support [the recusal motion] was the trial court's premature reimposition of sentence before the remittitur had been returned. Because a merely erroneous order cannot by itself justify the grant of a motion to recuse, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Schlanger's motion. See Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga.App. 368, 370(2) (543 S.E.2d 429) (2000).” English v. State, 290 Ga.App. 378, 659 S.E.2d 783 (March 19, 2008). Trial judge properly denied motion to recuse, filed in amended motion for new trial over a year after trial (which began July, 2005). M otion was untimely. “Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.1 provides that such motions must be made ‘not later than five (5) days after the affiant first learned of the alleged grounds for disqualification,’ unless good cause is shown. … Instead, the issue was not raised until English filed an amended motion for new trial in September 2006. If English was aware of a possible basis for recusal, he had no right to sit back, hope for a favorable ruling or sentencing, and then raise the issue for the first time in an amended motion for a new trial. See generally id. at 884(2)(b).” Accord, Wall v. Thurman , 283 Ga. 553, 661 S.E.2d 549 (May 19, 2008) (recusal motion in August based on judge’s actions in February and May was untimely); Lemming v. State , 292 Ga.App. 138, 663 S.E.2d 375 (May 23, 2008); Horne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012) (defendant delayed filing motion to recuse for over two months); Lacy v. Lacy , 320 Ga.App. 739, 740 S.E.2d 695 (March 25, 2013) (in custody dispute, father waited until after hearing to raise claimed grounds for recusal); Bickel v. State , 323 Ga.App. 902, 749 S.E.2d 1 (September 24, 2013) (recusal motion untimely when filed more than a year after defendant was aware of the alleged grounds – his legal consultation with the judge on the same subject matter before the judge took the bench); Sallee v. State , 329 Ga.App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (November 13, 2014). Gray v. Manis, 282 Ga. 336, 647 S.E.2d 588 (July 13, 2007). 1. Pro se plaintiff filed civil suit against several county officials, alleging that they were part of a conspiracy against him. Plaintiff then moved to recuse trial judge for being part of the same conspiracy. Trial judge denied the motion, and Plaintiff filed this mandamus action to compel her to recuse herself. Plaintiff then moved to recuse the judge assigned the mandamus action. Held, mandamus judge properly denied the motion to recuse himself, as the affidavit supporting the recusal motion “did not suggest any reason why Judge Baxter was a material witness related to whether mandamus would lie against Judge Manis. Instead, it contains rambling conclusions and opinions alleging that Judge Baxter was somehow implicated in the racketeering scheme of which Gray believed himself to be the victim. ‘An affidavit is insufficient if it contains mere conclusions rather than showing facts indicating the judge’s personal (rather than judicial) bias. [Cit.]’ Stevens v. Morris Communications Corp., 170 Ga.App. 612, 613 (317 S.E.2d 652) (1984). ‘“To warrant disqualification of a trial judge the affidavit supporting the recusal motion must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.” [Cit.]’ Turner v. State, 280 Ga. 174, 175 (626 S.E.2d 86) (2006). An affidavit ‘which stated no facts and merely accused the trial court of bias, [is] legally insufficient to necessitate a hearing on the motion. [Cits.]’ Jarallah v. Pickett Suite Hotel, 193 Ga.App. 325, 327(3) (388 S.E.2d 333) (1989). See also Stephens v. Ivey, 212 Ga.App. 407, 408(2) (442 S.E.2d 248) (1994). A recusal motion supported by an affidavit containing completely unsubstantiated allegations of judicial bias cannot be used as a tool ‘for delay and to judge shop. [Cit.]’ Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 697(1) (494 S.E.2d 530) (1997). In determining the sufficiency of the affidavit, a trial judge must bear in mind that ‘it is as much the duty of a judge not to grant the motion to recuse when the motion is legally insufficient as it is to recuse when the motion is meritorious; nor does the simple filing of an affidavit automatically disqualify a judge.’ [Cits.] Alexander v. State, 276 Ga.App. 288, 291(3)(a) (623 S.E.2d 160) (2005). Because the motion to recuse was clearly insufficient on its face, Judge Baxter correctly concluded that it should be denied summarily without any need to assign it for a hearing before another judge. See Dodson v. Dean, 256 Ga.App. 4, 6 (567 S.E.2d 348) (2002).” Accord, Crosbie v. State , 304 Ga.App. 613, 697 S.E.2d 278 (June 25, 2010). 2. “The proper remedy for challenging Judge Manis’ denial of the motion to recuse herself was an appeal, not a mandamus action against her. Whitley v. Schwall, 279 Ga. 726 (620 S.E.2d 827) (2005).” Keller v. State, 286 Ga.App. 292, 648 S.E.2d 714 (June 28, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to recuse. The affidavit supporting the motion “did not set forth specific details of the basis for his claim of bias; rather, it referenced the motion to recuse and averred ‘[t]hat to the best of his recollection, [Keller] related the remarks by the Judge contained in the Motion to Recuse or similar remarks’ and ‘[t]hat the trial records in each case referenced in the Motion to Recuse reveal verbatim statements by the judge.’ [fn] While ‘“all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,”’ Keller’s affidavit stops far short of certifying that all facts in the motion to recuse are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge. In re: J.E.T., 269 Ga.App. 567, 571 (604 S.E.2d 623) (2004). Most of the facts alleged in the