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Dunn v. State, 325 Ga.App. 888, 756 S.E.2d 17 (March 3, 2014). Battery conviction affirmed; defendant waived any claim of judicial bias by failing to move for recusal. “Dunn claims that the trial judge was not impartial based on two comments he made before the trial, one a reference to a prior case in which the judge had found Dunn guilty of an offense and the other a statement that during a bench trial the judge would ‘hear the evidence and give it my best shot.’ However, Dunn never objected to the comments or moved for recusal, and by failing to do so he ‘waived any objection to the judge's presiding in this case. [Cit.]’ Parker v. State, 226 Ga.App. 462, 466(8)(b), 486 S.E.2d 687 (1997). See Lacy v. Lacy, 320 Ga.App. 739, 744(4), 740 S.E.2d 695 (2013) (issues regarding trial court's alleged bias not preserved for appellate review where there was no motion for recusal or mistrial on those grounds).” In any event, comments didn’t indicate bias. Hampton v. State, 289 Ga. 621, 713 S.E.2d 851 (July 8, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant’s post-trial motion to recuse judge based on professional relationship with victim’s attorney was untimely. “Here, letters that Hampton filed with the trial court show that he and his attorney knew of the purported ground for recusal at least two months before the January 12, 2010, amended motion for new trial that summarily raised the issue. … Thus, the issue was not raised in a timely fashion, even assuming that an enumeration of error in an amended motion for new trial, rather than a motion to recuse with accompanying affidavits, is a proper method by which to raise a recusal issue. But see [ Christensen v. State, 245 Ga.App. 165, 172, 537 S.E.2d 446 (2000)] (holding that ‘[a]n extraordinary motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is an improper vehicle to raise a motion to recuse’ ).” Jenkins v. Smith, 308 Ga.App. 762, 709 S.E.2d 23 (March 25, 2011). In civil case, trial court properly denied motion to recuse, as both untimely and lacking merit. Motion was filed in September based on unfavorable rulings made in July. “Based upon the assertions in the recusal motion and the affidavit, the trial court correctly concluded that the motion was untimely. See Wall v. Thurman, 283 Ga. 533, 535(5) (661 S.E.2d 549) (2008). Moreover, Jenkins's mere dissatisfaction with the trial judge's rulings and bare allegations that the trial judge engaged in ex parte communications with opposing counsel as to scheduling matters were insufficient to warrant a belief that bias existed. See Rice v. Cannon, 283 Ga.App. 438, 442-443(2) (641 S.E.2d 562) (2007); Stephens v. Ivey, 212 Ga.App. 407, 408(2) (442 S.E.2d 248) (1994).” Crosbie v. State, 304 Ga.App. 613, 697 S.E.2d 278 (June 25, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s recusal motion. “Crosbie moved to recuse based on a general allegation that the judge ‘has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the Defendant’ and that the judge ‘has presided over two previous hearings involving the Defendant unrelated to the present case’ in which the judge's ‘bias against him was demonstrated when he was precluded from presenting crucial evidence, that the Court improperly exercised jurisdiction over him, and that improper statements were directed to him.’” “As noted by the trial court in its order, Crosbie did not move for recusal until four months after his criminal case was assigned to the same judge who had previously presided over his other two cases . The affidavit submitted in support of his motion fails to provide any explanation for the delay in filing the motion. Based on this delay and the lack of any good cause shown for the delay, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to recuse. Id. (affirming denial of motion to recuse based upon 48-day delay in filing motion to recuse). See also Walker v. Walker, 248 Ga.App. 177, 179(5) (546 S.E.2d 315) (2001).” Accord, Long v. State , 324 Ga.App. 882, 752 S.E.2d 54 (November 20, 2013). Morgan v. Propst, 301 Ga.App. 402, 688 S.E.2d 357 (November 6, 2009). Trial court erred in summarily dismissing defendant’s motion to recuse the trial judge “based upon the alleged personal bias of the trial judge against Morgan’s attorney.” “In his affidavit, Morgan's attorney stated that he previously had been the county's District Attorney and that, in that role, he had personally directed the investigation and prosecution of the judge's husband for corruption, which led to the husband's incarceration. In the course of this prosecution, the attorney also investigated the judge, subpoenaing and reviewing her personal and business financial records. As part of a guilty plea agreement, Morgan's attorney terminated the investigation of the judge. He delegated subsequent prosecutions before the judge to his assistants. Morgan argued in the recusal motion that, based on these facts, the judge's impartiality toward Morgan and Morgan's attorney might reasonably be questioned.” Motion was not untimely. Trial court held that the motion was untimely although filed within four days of the filing of the lawsuit, because the suit was the renewal of a previous suit in which recusal was not sought. “But a renewal suit is an action de novo, see Cleveland v. Skandalakis, 268 Ga. 133, 134 (485 S.E.2d 777) (1997) and Morgan could not have been expected to file her motion to recuse the judge before the action was filed and assigned to the judge. And a motion to recuse can be based upon allegations of the judge's conduct and relationships that occurred before the action was assigned to the judge. See Wakefield v. Stevens, 249 Ga. 254, 256 (290 S.E.2d 58) (1982) (considering motion for recusal based on past conduct and relationships, but denying motion as untimely because it was filed several weeks after case was assigned to judge and was filed after motions hearing occurred). The court abused its discretion in holding that Morgan's motion to recuse was untimely.”