☢ test - Í

point but prior to Judge Kirby's reassignment, or only after Judge Kirby's reassignment.” Citing Hargis (March 17, 2014), below (dicta: “ If, by the time the grounds for disqualification are known, the allegedly disqualified judge no longer is presiding over the case, we suppose that it might be sufficient to raise the issue in a motion for new trial, inasmuch as a motion to recuse would serve no purpose in such a case.”). Henderson v. State, 295 Ga. 333, 759 S.E.2d 827 (June 16, 2014). Following guilty pleas to murder and related offenses in 2000, trial court properly denied motion to recuse and motion to withdraw pleas in 2013; judge wasn’t required to hold evidentiary hearing on sufficiency of affidavit accompanying motion to recuse. “USCR 25.3 does not direct a trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to decide the legal question whether a motion to recuse meets the threshold requirements of USCR 25.3. See Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah [ v. Batson–Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 119 (728 S.E.2d 189) (2012)] (holding that the threshold requirements of USCR 25.3 ‘present questions of law, for which the appropriate standard of review is de novo’). The Uniform Superior Court Rules governing recusal only contemplate an evidentiary hearing if it is determined that the motion satisfies the three threshold requirements and the recusal motion is assigned to another judge. See USCR 25.6. Even then, an evidentiary hearing is not required: ‘The judge assigned may consider the motion solely upon the affidavits, but may, in the exercise of discretion, convene an evidentiary hearing.’ Id. Accord Horn v. Shepherd, 294 Ga. 468, 472(2)(a) (754 S.E.2d 367) (2014) (‘The judge assigned to hear the recusal motion may decide it solely on the affidavits but also has discretion to convene an evidentiary hearing.’).” State v. Hargis, 294 Ga. 818, 756 S.E.2d 529 (March 17, 2014). Reversing 319 Ga.App. 432, 735 S.E.2d 91 (2012), and reinstating convictions for “several crimes relating to the unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine.” Defendant waived any claim that trial judge should have recused by failing to timely raise the issue. Pretrial, trial court had an ex parte chambers conference with the former attorney of Hargis’s co-defendant, Taylor. Taylor’s former attorney expressed concerns about her safety from Hargis (in light of secret recordings made by Taylor, of conversations between Taylor, her attorney, and the prosecutor – recordings discovered by the police and sought in discovery by Hargis). Hargis apparently didn’t learn of the ex parte conference until after trial, and used it as the basis for a motion for new trial – but never moved for recusal of the trial judge, who proceeded to hear and deny the motion for new trial. “Asserting a disqualification in a motion for new trial before the same judge who is alleged to be disqualified—without also asking the judge to recuse from hearing the motion for new trial—is not a proper means of raising and preserving the issue. See Christensen v. State, 245 Ga.App. 165, 172(11), 537 S.E.2d 446 (2000) (‘An extraordinary motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is an improper vehicle to raise a motion to recuse; a motion to recuse can only be raised pursuant to [Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.1], which incorporates by rule approved by the Supreme Court the procedures to be followed in all cases of recusal.’).” “Even after Hargis learned of the grounds for the potential disqualification of the trial judge, he apparently decided to take his chances with the same judge on his motion for new trial. That was his choice to make, but he could not do so and still preserve the disqualification issue for review in the appellate courts. … The idea that a party could allow a judge whom the party believes to be disqualified to continue to preside over the case without objection, only later to urge the disqualification, is inconsistent with the principles of fair play and judicial economy that are embodied in the requirement that a motion to recuse be filed promptly. Accordingly, the claim of disqualification in this case was not properly preserved for appellate review, and the Court of Appeals ought not have reached the merits of that claim.” See also Beasley (July 9, 2014), above (issue of trial judge’s disqualification could be raised for first time in motion for new trial if previously unknown to defendant and counsel and trial judge no longer presiding over case). Accord, Battle v. State , S15A1510, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085248 (March 21, 2016); Pyatt v. State , S15A1734, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1180124 (March 25, 2016). Hoke v. State, 326 Ga.App. 71, 755 S.E.2d 876 (March 10, 2014). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to sua sponte recuse after ex parte communication with prosecutor regarding unavailability of State’s witness. “Hoke did not move for recusal within five days as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.1. Because ‘appellant did not timely file a motion for [the trial judge] to recuse himself, the matter of recusal is waived.’ In re Adams, 292 Ga. 617, 617(1), 740 S.E.2d 134 (2013), citing Hampton v. State, 289 Ga. 621(4), 713 S.E.2d 851 (2011); Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760, 546 S.E.2d 472 (2001). See also Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 754 S.E.2d 335 (January 27, 2014) (finding waiver of recusal where counsel objected to judge's participation based on an appearance of impropriety but failed to move to recuse the judge). Hoke's reliance on Hargis v. State, 319 Ga.App. 432, 437(2)(a), 735 S.E.2d 91 (2012), is unavailing in this case where the ex parte communication was for the administrative purpose of scheduling. See Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(7)(a).” Hargis reversed, March 17, 2014, above.