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Lewis v. State, 275 Ga. 194, 565 S.E.2d 437 (May 13, 2002). After conviction, defendant filed motion for new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial misconduct, claiming that the court had received and responded to communications from the jury without notifying counsel. Trial judge recused herself from hearing that part of the motion relating to alleged jury communications, testifying at hearing on the motion that no such communications took place. Second judge so found, and returned the case to trial judge for further ruling on the remainder of the motion over defense motions for recusal and disqualification. Held, once she became a material witness, trial judge should have recused herself on all remaining matters in the case. “Although the judge in this case tried to partition the issues on which she was disqualified from the issues on which she did not testify, all these issues arose in the same motion for new trial proceeding. Merely addressing these issues in a piecemeal fashion cannot eliminate the appearance of impropriety. Simply stated, if a judge testifies as a material witness with regard to an issue in a case, the remainder of the case must be heard by another judge.” Trial judge’s rulings on motion for new trial reversed and remanded. 8. PROCEDURE – FORM/TIMELINESS OF MOTION/AFFIDAVIT Post v. State, 298 Ga. 241, 779 S.E.2d 624 (November 16, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by failing to refer recusal motions to another judge. 1. Motion was not untimely where “Post’s counsel verified that the motion was filed ‘within five days of discovery of recusal grounds by defense counsel.’” 2. Affidavit wasn’t insufficient. Attached to the motion was counsel’s “notarized statement under oath verifying that ‘the facts alleged in the above and foregoing Motion to Recuse are true and correct.’” “[I]t is certainly the better practice for a party submitting a recusal motion to file along with the motion one or more separate affidavits stating the specific facts on which the motion is based and showing clearly that the three threshold criteria have been met. Nevertheless, substance prevails over nomenclature, and this Court has previously held that ‘a sworn verification that the facts contained in the foregoing [recusal] motion are true and correct to the best of the movant-affiant’s knowledge and belief’ substantially complies with the accompanying affidavit requirement of USCR 25.1.” Birt v. State, 256 Ga. 483, 484-485, 350 S.E.2d 241 (1986). 3. Counsel’s attempt to amend his affidavit is not permitted by USCR 25.1, which requires “that the affidavit accompanying the recusal motion must present ‘all evidence thereon’ and ‘fully assert the facts upon which the motion is founded.’ USCR 25.1. If new information relevant to recusal becomes known to a party, a new recusal motion should be filed within five days (absent a showing of good cause for delay).” Robinson v. State, 332 Ga.App. 240, 771 S.E.2d 751 (April 17, 2015). Rape and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to recuse, which “was not accompanied by a supporting affidavit ‘clearly stat[ing] the facts and reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, being definite and specific as to time, place, persons and circumstances of extra-judicial conduct or statements ...’ as required by Uniform Superior Court Rules 25.1 and 25.2. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to recuse. See Daker v. State, 243 Ga.App. 848, 855(21) (533 S.E.2d 393) (2000) (A trial judge is authorize to deny a motion for recusal on its face when the motion is untimely and not supported by a sufficient affidavit).” In re: H.J.C., Jr., 331 Ga.App. 506, 771 S.E.2d 184 (March 24, 2015). In delinquency proceeding, juvenile court properly denied State’s recusal motion. Fact that the court itself raised a question about proper procedure under the new Juvenile Code didn’t indicate bias or require recusal; court thus properly held that the motion was “insufficient under Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 27.2.” “This juvenile court merely sought further legal argument on the question of the interplay between OCGA § 15–11–2(19)(B) and 15–11–608(b), both of which were cited in the State's petition and had recently been adopted into law. Even if the State was caught unawares by the court's questions concerning these statutes or was inconvenienced by its eventual ruling that the petition was defective, such circumstances do not warrant recusal, which ‘is not required simply because a judge may have to issue a ruling that might offend an individual or group that could possibly take adverse action against him,’” quoting Jones County v. A Mining Group, 285 Ga. 465, 467 (678 S.E.2d 474) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). Beasley v. State, 328 Ga.App. 96, 761 S.E.2d 509 (July 9, 2014). Following conviction for cocaine trafficking, judgment vacated and remanded for consideration of defendant’s motion for new trial. Defendant’s motion contends, among other things, that “his right to due process was violated when the trial judge failed to disclose and/or disqualify himself for an apparent conflict of interest,” namely that the judge was married to the chief assistant DA for the circuit. No motion for recusal was ever filed. Sometime after defendant’s trial, the JQC ruled that the judge was conflicted from presiding over any criminal prosecutions, and his criminal cases were reassigned. Defense counsel contend that they, as well as defendant, were unaware of the judge’s marriage until after trial, but the record doesn’t show “whether they learned of the grounds after trial but prior to filing the motion for new trial in November 2012, at a later