☢ test - Í

Cal.Rptr.2d 805) (1998). Further, with respect to the assertion that trial counsel was faced with a conflict of interest that required him to withdraw, we note that ‘[i]n every case, an attorney's loyalty to the client is tempered by the rules of professional responsibility. That divided loyalty, however, is not the type of conflict of interest that rises to the presumption of a prejudice.’ State v. McDowell, 272 Wis.2d 488, ¶ 61 (681 N.W.2d 500) (2004).” Davis v. State, 323 Ga.App. 266, 746 S.E.2d 890 (July 16, 2013). Physical precedent only on this point. Aggravated sexual battery and related convictions affirmed (but remanded for resentencing); no actual conflict where defense counsel also represented DFCS “during the same period in which DFCS was involved in the placement of Davis's own children pending a law enforcement investigation of the victim's allegation that she was pregnant with Davis's child.” “‘Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial. Absent special circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.... Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry.’ (Footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.) Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346(IV)(A) (100 SCt 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980).” “This record shows that counsel discussed his dual representation of Davis and DFCS with Davis and his wife and that the dual representation had no effect on any decision he took at trial, including his decision not to introduce evidence of the victim's pregnancy allegation for purposes of impeaching her. In light of this record, including counsel's account of his discussion of the issue with Davis and his wife, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that Davis waived any conflict.” Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 745 S.E.2d 630 (July 1, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on actual conflict of interest where counsel had represented the victim in an unrelated civil matter some years earlier. “There was clearly no simultaneous representation of [victim] Amy and Norton. See Hill v. State, 269 Ga. 23, 24(2) (494 S.E.2d 661) (1998). Nor was there any connection between the representation of Norton and the prior representation of Amy.” Taylor v. State, 320 Ga.App. 596, 740 S.E.2d 327 (March 21, 2013). Drug convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on counsel conflict of interest. Taylor and co-defendant Hargis were separately represented at various times by two attorneys who were sometimes law partners; but Taylor fails here to show that the partnership affected counsel’s representation of her. 1. “‘[T]he critical question is whether the conflict significantly affected the representation, not whether it affected the outcome of the underlying proceedings. That is precisely the difference between ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally, where prejudice must be shown, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims involving actual conflicts of interest, which require only a showing of a significant effect on the representation. A significant effect on the representation may be found, for example, where counsel is shown to have refrained from raising a potentially meritorious issue due to the conflict; where counsel negotiates a plea bargain for more than one defendant in a case conditioned on acceptance of the plea by all such defendants; or where one of the State's witnesses was a current client of defense counsel in an unrelated criminal matter, thereby constraining counsel's ability to cross-examine the witness.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.)” quoting State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 604-605(1) (715 S.E.2d 48) (2011). Accord, Pryor v. State , 333 Ga.App. 408, 776 S.E.2d 474 (May 19, 2015). 2. “ Even assuming that Taylor has shown the existence of an actual conflict arising from Stauffer's representation of her at the same time Cox was representing Hargis, both she and Hargis explicitly waived any conflicts arising from Stauffer's and Cox's prior and simultaneous representations of each of them before proceeding to a consolidated trial. It follows that any error in allowing the joint trial to proceed was induced and thus cannot provide the basis for a claim that counsel was ineffective.” 3. Even if waiver was ineffective because risks weren’t explained to her, as she claims, she “has failed to show that her defense was compromised by that joint representation.” Defenses here were coordinated and not antagonistic. “As our Supreme Court held in Burns [ v. State, 281 Ga. 338, 638 S.E.2d 299 (2006)] , where there was no ‘finger pointing’ between co-defendants, and where ‘both counsel pursued the same defense strategy that their respective clients were innocent[ ],’ no actual conflict of interest arises from a single counsel's co-representation of clients at the same trial. Burns, supra at 340–341.” Johnson v. State, 320 Ga.App. 161, 739 S.E.2d 469 (March 7, 2013). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial counsel had no “actual conflict” based on another public defender’s representation of victims in an earlier, unrelated matter. “Johnson points out that the public defender originally representing him had previously represented [victims] McKeller and Cook and had therefore agreed to the assignment of new counsel in order to avoid ‘a potential conflict’ as to ‘what witnesses were called’ and ‘what information’ might be used to impeach either Johnson or the victims. The record of the hearing on Johnson's motion for new trial shows, however, that the public defender who