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eventually represented Johnson at trial had never represented either Cook or McKeller, and that Johnson's first assigned public defender had represented the two men only in other matters. Johnson's trial counsel also testified that he had not shared any information that would have affected his ability to represent Johnson with any other members of the public defender's office. This record is insufficient to show an actual conflict in that there is no ‘substantial risk’ that trial counsel's representation of Johnson in this case was ‘materially and adversely affected’ by the first public defender's representation of McKeller and Cook in other matters.” Perry v. State, 314 Ga.App. 575, 724 S.E.2d 874 (March 5, 2012). Conviction for sale of cocaine affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown based on conflict of interest arising from prior representation of State’s informant. Counsel briefly represented informant in unrelated drug prosecution, but handed the file off to other appointed counsel. “Trial counsel had no conversations or involvement in the informant's case after the reassignment, which occurred over a year and a half before Perry's trial. There is no evidence that trial counsel held any hope of future pecuniary gain from the informant, since trial counsel was a public defender and was not being paid by the informant for representation. Moreover, there was no evidence suggesting that trial counsel obtained privileged information from the informant in the earlier representation that would have been relevant to cross-examination. Nor was there evidence suggesting that trial counsel was prevented from conducting a thorough cross-examination of the informant regarding the drug transaction in this case. To the contrary, the trial transcript reflects that trial counsel did in fact challenge the informant's credibility in a thorough cross- examination by introducing testimony and evidence that she had a pending drug charge and was possibly assisting the prosecutor with a motive toward helping her own case. In addition, the informant's drug charges were wholly separate and distinct from those involved in the instant case against Perry. ‘These factors, considered together with the remoteness of trial counsel's earlier representation of [the informant], lead us to reject [Perry's] claim that [his] trial counsel was impermissibly conflicted.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Hill [ v. State, 269 Ga. 25(2) (494 S.E.2d 661) (1998)].” Robinson v. State, 312 Ga.App. 736, 719 S.E.2d 601 (November 21, 2011). Theft by receiving and conspiracy convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on defendant’s lawsuit filed against him on the first day of trial. “On appeal, [co- defendant] Rogers's ineffectiveness argument rests solely upon his claim that the filing of this lawsuit created an ‘actual conflict’ that should have resulted in his trial counsel's withdrawal. However, even the case authority upon which Rogers primarily relies, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002), required Rogers to show more than the mere existence of an ‘actual conflict.’ That is, he must establish, at a minimum, that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance. Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at 170–172(II). Rogers nevertheless showed nothing more than the mere existence of a lawsuit that he filed pro se against trial counsel. Rogers failed to show that such was anything more than a specious delay tactic, let alone present evidence of a conflict that would warrant counsel's withdrawal from the case. Cf. Williams v. State, 273 Ga.App. 213, 218(3), 614 S.E.2d 834 (2005)] (rejecting defendant's claim of ineffective assistance due to a conflict where defendant's argument was based solely upon trial counsel's failure to withdraw after learning that defendant intended to sue him).” State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 715 S.E.2d 48 (July 5, 2011). Interlocutory appeal; in murder prosecution, trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for new trial. Public defender’s representation was not compromised by prior representation of co-defendant by another lawyer in same office, on same case, which defendant’s counsel was unaware of. 1. “‘[A] defendant ... asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on an actual conflict of interest [must] demonstrate that the conflict of interest existed and that it “significantly affected counsel's performance.”’ (Footnote omitted.) Edwards v. Lewis , 283 Ga. 345, 349(2) (658 S.E.2d 116) (2008).” “In this case, the trial court expressly noted the absence of any evidence that the conflict “colored counsel's actions during the trial.” Indeed, given that [public defender] Brown was completely unaware of [public defender] Smith's brief past representation of [co- defendant/State’s witness] Geren, he neither was privy to any confidential communications between Smith and Geren nor had any reason to temper any aspect of his trial strategy out of concern for Geren. Simply put, ‘[Abernathy] has not shown in this case how his attorney's conflict caused divided loyalties [or] compromised his attorney's representation of him.’ Jackson v. State , 271 Ga. 705, 706(1) (523 S.E.2d 871) (1999). Therefore, the trial court erred in granting a new trial on these grounds.” Accord, Perry v. State , 314 Ga.App. 575, 724 S.E.2d 874 (March 5, 2012) (“counsel from the same public defender's office are not automatically disqualified from representing multiple defendants.”); Taylor (March 21, 2013), above. . 2. Public defender’s role as city attorney, not involved in defendant’s prosecution, presents no ineffectiveness issue. “We have previously held that the bare fact that defense counsel was employed as a solicitor and/or city attorney simultaneous with his representation of the defendant within the jurisdiction he served is insufficient by itself to satisfy this burden of proof. See Wharton v. Thomas , 256 Ga. 76 (343 S.E.2d 694) (1986) (no per se conflict where defense counsel concurrently employed as city attorney); O'Melia v. State , 255 Ga. 476 (339 S.E.2d 586) (1986) (even where defense counsel's simultaneous employment as solicitor did create actual conflict, no