☢ test - Í

and appellant has pointed to no such requirement. Moreover, on motions to recuse, written findings of fact are only necessary when the motion satisfies the threshold requirements of USCR 25.3 and is assigned to another judge for a ruling, see USCR 25.6 (‘the judge assigned shall rule on the merits of the motion and shall make written findings and conclusions’).” Lacy v. Lacy, 320 Ga.App. 739, 740 S.E.2d 695 (March 25, 2013). In civil custody dispute, no error in denying motions to recuse superior court judges. Judge’s voluntary recusal doesn’t void orders entered by him. “Chief Judge Prior made clear in the order that he was voluntarily recusing himself from “any hearing in this case” because his son “is apparently a witness in the case.” “A voluntary recusal shall not be construed as either an admission or denial to any allegations which have been set out in [a recusal] motion.” Ga. Unif.Super. Ct. R. 25.7. See Moody v. State, 256 Ga.App. 65, 67 (567 S.E.2d 709) (2002). And the Chief Judge's son did not appear as a witness in connection with the rulings made in the May 31 order. Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848, 734 S.E.2d 1 (November 5, 2012). Convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; no error where defendant waived any objection to judge (defendant’s former attorney) presiding over trial without colloquy on record. “A month before her murder trial, appellant signed a document in which she acknowledged having been advised of the judge's prior representation of her and of her right to request another judge to preside over her trial. In the document, she stated her desire to have the judge continue to preside over her murder case. The document was signed by appellant and her trial counsel. Appellant now contends her express written waiver was insufficient, asserting that the trial court was required to question appellant about the waiver to ensure the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Such a judicial inquiry is necessary in order to ensure that the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights satisfies due process. See Boykin v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 328, 343(n.5), 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (constitutional rights to trial by jury, confrontation of accusers, and against compulsory self-incrimination). See also Redd v. State, 264 Ga. 399, 401, 444 S.E.2d 776 (1994) (effective assistance of counsel in dual representation situations). There is no evidence that the trial judge's former representation of appellant affected her right to effective assistance of counsel in defending the murder charges and, while a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process, the issue of judicial disqualification does not rise to the level of a constitutional issue in most matters, in light of Georgia's adoption of statutes and the Judicial Code of Conduct that provide more protection than due process requires. See Mayor, etc. of City of Savannah v. Batson–Cook, 291 Ga. 114, 115, 728 S.E.2d 189 (2012). Appellant's waiver of her ability to have the judge disqualified from presiding over her murder trial not being the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, the trial court did not err when it did not conduct an on-the-record inquiry concerning whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Wilson v. McNeely, 295 Ga.App. 41, 670 S.E.2d 846 (December 1, 2008). Civil judgment reversed; superior court judge should have recused himself when one of the parties was a judge sitting in another court in the same judicial circuit (here, a part-time municipal court judge). Based on Smith v. Guest Pond Club , 277 Ga. 143, 586 S.E.2d 623 (2003), where “counsel for one of the parties was also a judge on the same court as the presiding judge. Id. at 145(2). The Supreme Court of Georgia observed that ‘our Judicial Qualifications Commission has opined that a judge of a particular court should never preside over a matter involving another judge from the same circuit,’ Id. at 146. ‘Simply stated, the public must believe in the absolute integrity and impartiality of its judges.... Consequently, even without a showing of actual bias, prejudice or unfairness, and regardless of the merits or timeliness of a Motion to Recuse, this Commission concludes that it is inappropriate for any trial court judge to preside in any action wherein one of the parties holds a judicial office on the same or any other court which sits in the same circuit [ ].’ Id., quoting Judicial Qualifications Commission, Opinion 220. … Having determined that the trial court erred by denying the motion to recuse the judge and that the judge should not have presided over or ruled upon the matter, the Court held that ‘the orders entered by [the judge] in this case must be declared void and ordered vacated.’” White v. Suntrust Bank, 245 Ga.App. 828, 538 S.E.2d 889 (September 8, 2000). Probate judge erred in denying motion to recuse; judge’s ownership of stock in bank which was executor of estate required judge to recuse herself. 1. Motion to recuse was not untimely where filed within 10 days after movant learned of judge’s ownership of stock. Judge erred in ruling that the motion was untimely because movant “should have known” about judge’s stock ownership earlier. “Uniform Probate Court Rule 19.1, which is patterned after Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.1, provides that ‘[f]iling and presentation to the judge [of the motion to recuse] shall be not later than 5 days after the affiant first learned of the alleged grounds for disqualification....’ Nothing in the rule provides that the motion must be filed within five days after the affiant ‘should have known’ of the alleged grounds.” 2. Bank’s interest as executor, with expectation of compensation for services, was sufficient to create a pecuniary interest in the estate requiring judge’s recusal.