☢ test - Í

“OCGA § 15-1-8(a)(1) provides that no judge of any court shall sit ‘in any case or proceeding in which he is pecuniarily interested.’ Judicial Qualifying Commission Op. No. 76 (December 6, 1985) provides that a judge who holds stock in a corporation that is a party to a suit should recuse herself from the case. ‘A stockholder has a property interest in the corporation and the judge would, therefore, have a pecuniary interest and would be disqualified in any case to which the corporation was a party.’ Id.” 3. “[E]ven without a motion to recuse, the probate judge should have volunteered to disqualify herself or, at a minimum, disclosed her interest to the parties.” “[J]udges are required to avoid not just impropriety, but the appearance of impropriety in their activities. Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct.” “Moreover, Canon 3 requires that ‘[j]udges shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: ... the judge ... is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Canon 3(E)(1)(c)(iii), Code of Judicial Conduct.” “The Code of Judicial Conduct provides a broader rule of disqualification than that contained in OCGA § 15-1-8. Stephens v. Stephens, 249 Ga. 700, 701, 292 S.E.2d 689 (1982).” Barlow v. State, 237 Ga.App. 152, 513 S.E.2d 273 (March 2, 1999). Judge was not required to recuse himself on hearing on direct contempt. “[A]lthough recusal may be required in some contempt proceedings, this requirement generally does not apply in cases of direct contempt. Cf. In re: Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 668(1), 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985).” “[D]irect summary criminal contempt that occurs ‘in the presence of the court and tends to scandalize it and hinder or obstruct the orderly processes of the administration of justice, the preservation of order and decorum in the court, etc. is exempt from the due process requirements of notice and hearing . [Cits.]’ (Emphasis in original.) In re: Hasty, 215 Ga.App. 349, 350, 450 S.E.2d 848 (1994). [Attorneys] Callahan and Harvey moved for a continuance, but failed to substantiate the grounds for it. Consequently the motion was denied, and they were directed to proceed to trial. Instead of proceeding to trial and then pursuing their appellate remedies, they chose to disobey a direct, lawful order of the court. The court warned counsel their behavior was contumacious and gave them an opportunity to be heard and to make a record. The court even gave counsel one last chance to redeem themselves and go forward to trial. They refused. Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court was entitled to enter a summary order of direct contempt without a further hearing.” UUU. RE-OPENING EVIDENCE Tarpley v. State, 298 Ga. 442, 782 S.E.2d 642 (February 8, 2016). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in refusing “to re-open the evidence to allow the defense to adduce photos, that had not been previously provided to the State, showing the lighting conditions outside of Estes’ residence. … ‘Whether to reopen the evidence is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the trial court,’ and this Court considers the totality of the circumstances in evaluating the exercise of that discretion. Carruth v. State, 267 Ga. 221, 221, 476 S.E.2d 739 (1996). The photographs here were not taken until sometime during trial, they were not provided to the State, and Tarpley sought to adduce the photos only after the jury had been informed that the evidence had been closed. In light of these facts, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion here.” State v. Cooper, 324 Ga.App. 32, 749 S.E.2d 35 (September 26, 2013). Finding of immunity in aggravated assault prosecution affirmed. Following immunity hearing at which State declined to present evidence or question defense witnesses, trial court didn’t abuse discretion by denying State’s motion to re-open. “‘Whether to reopen the evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. The failure to include in the record a proffer of the testimony for which a party seeks to have the evidence reopened precludes the reviewing court from ascertaining whether harm resulted from the decision not to reopen the evidence.’ Danenberg v. State, 291 Ga. 439, 443(5), 729 S.E.2d 315 (2012) (citations omitted).” Young v. State, 292 Ga. 443, 738 S.E.2d 575 (February 18, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in reopening evidence after defense closing argument had begun. Defense closing seemed to violate parties’ stipulation about the type of gun used in the murder when counsel argued that “the State ‘could’ have known from ballistics testing whether Bowers was shot with a Glock. The State objected, arguing that Young previously had stipulated that the ballistics report concluded that Bowers was killed with bullets fired by a Hi–Point .40–caliber pistol and that the State, therefore, had no reason to present evidence about whether ballistics testing had ruled out the possibility that Bowers was killed with a Glock. The trial court ruled that the State could reopen the evidence so that its ballistics expert could testify about his findings.” “[W]hether to reopen the evidence is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Carter v. State, 263 Ga. 401, 402(2) (435 S.E.2d 42) (1993); Britten v. State, 221 Ga. 97, 101(4) (143 S.E.2d 176) (1965) (‘It is within the discretionary power of the court to allow a witness to be sworn after the evidence on both sides has been announced closed and the argument has been commenced ....’) (citation and punctuation omitted).”