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disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to serve.”’ Cummings, 2009 WL 2058845 at 4 citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 56. See also Manning v. State, 259 Ga.App. 794, 797(3), 578 S.E.2d 494 (2003) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to reopen evidence prior to closing argument to allow defendant to testify); U.S. v. Byrd, 403 F.3d 1278, 1287-1288(II) (11 th Cir., 2005) (no abuse of discretion in denying defendant's request to testify made before closing arguments, but after State's witnesses had been released).” Accord, Danenberg v. State , 291 Ga. 439, 729 S.E.2d 315 (June 25, 2012) (court not required to re-open evidence to allow defendant to testify). Sirmans v. State, 301 Ga.App. 756, 688 S.E.2d 669 (December 18, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for marijuana possession affirmed; trial court did not abuse its discretion in re-opening evidence. The defense presented a witness who testified, among other things, that she didn’t know defendant. After her testimony, the evidence was closed and court was recessed for lunch. During the lunch break, the State learned that the witness did know defendant – very well, in fact. The court granted State’s motion to re-open, and the State presented evidence of several prior interactions between police, defendant and witness, plus a call witness made to DFCS about her child in which she identified defendant as father of her child. “The Supreme Court of Georgia has adopted a liberal rule in this regard, granting trial courts ‘very broad discretion in permitting parties to offer additional evidence at any stage of the trial. It has been noted that leniency in this area is very unlikely to constitute an abuse of discretion, as the appellate courts are guided by OCGA § 24-1-2, which provides that ‘[t]he object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth.’ Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 502, 504(3) (651 S.E.2d 715) (2007) (footnotes and punctuation omitted). Granting the state's request to permit the evidence was not an abuse of discretion.” Nelms v. State, 285 Ga. 718, 681 S.E.2d 141 (June 29, 2009). No abuse of discretion where trial denied defendant’s motion to re-open evidence so defendant could testify: “After the State rested its case, the court addressed both defendants and ascertained that they had sufficient time to discuss with their attorneys their decisions not to testify. The defense then presented its case, all parties rested, and the evidence was closed. The following morning, Nelms asked the court to reopen the evidence to allow him to testify. The State objected noting that all its witnesses had been excused from their subpoenas and the State would have no rebuttal testimony available if needed. The discharge of all the witnesses for one side after the case has been announced closed is good ground for refusing to reopen the case at the instance of the other party. Bundrick v. State, 125 Ga. 753(3) (54 SE 683) (1906).” Burnette v. State, 291 Ga.App. 504, 662 S.E.2d 272 (May 13, 2008) (physical precedent only). No abuse of discretion shown where trial court refused to re-open evidence to allow defendant to testify that she acted in self-defense. “‘Whether to reopen the evidence is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. A trial court’s ruling in this regard will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Whether there has been a reversible abuse of discretion requires a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Peeples v. State, 234 Ga.App. 454, 458(5) (507 S.E.2d 197) (1998). We discern no abuse of discretion in the case at bar. ‘No proffer was made as to [Burnette’s] testimony at the trial level; therefore, we are unable to ascertain how [s]he was harmed by the court’s ruling.’ (Citation omitted.) Tweedell v. State, 218 Ga.App. 518, 520(2) (462 S.E.2d 181) (1995).” Accord, Danenberg v. State , 291 Ga. 439, 729 S.E.2d 315 (June 25, 2012); Young v. State , 291 Ga. 627, 732 S.E.2d 269 (October 1, 2012) (no abuse of discretion in allowing State to re-open to present two witnesses taken into custody overnight). State v. Gravitt, 289 Ga.App. 868, 658 S.E.2d 424 (February 29, 2008). No abuse of discretion where trial court refused State’s request to re-open evidence at suppression hearing. Trial court scheduled second hearing on motion to consider issue of legality of search of curtilage of house. State demanded right to present new evidence on the issue, but trial court correctly determined that the issue was fairly raised by the motion and State had opportunity to present evidence on the issue at first hearing. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 502, 651 S.E.2d 715 (October 9, 2007). “Taylor contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to reopen the evidence after it had presented its case-in-chief and rested. This Court, however, has adopted a liberal rule in this regard, and grants trial courts very broad discretion in permitting parties to offer additional evidence at any stage of the trial . Page v. State, 249 Ga. 648, 651, 292 S.E.2d 850 (1982); State v. Roberts, 247 Ga. 456, 456-58, 277 S.E.2d 644 (1981). It has been noted that ‘leniency in this area is very unlikely to constitute an abuse of discretion,’ as ‘[t]he appellate courts are guided by OCGA § 24-1-2,” which provides that ‘“[t]he object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth.”’ Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 13.4, p. 228 (2d ed., 2002). In the present case, we conclude that Taylor has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State, after it concluded its case-in-chief, to play portions of Taylor’s videotaped statement to the police or to present testimony from the victim’s mother.”