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Pierce v. State, 274 Ga.App. 670, 618 S.E.2d 700 (July 27, 2005). “Pierce urges that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to reopen the evidence when Pierce’s co-defendant offered to testify against Pierce after the State had rested but before the defendants had presented any evidence. Pierce argues that this ruling was ‘not in the interest of justice.’ ‘The trial court is vested with broad discretion in allowing a party to reopen its case and present evidence.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Painter v. State, 263 Ga.App. 407 (587 S.E.2d 867) (2003). Indeed, ‘[o]ur courts have been quite liberal in this regard.’ Page v. State, 249 Ga. 648, 651(2)(c) (292 S.E.2d 850) (1982). ‘A trial court’s ruling in this regard will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.’ Carruth v. State, 267 Ga. 221 (476 S.E.2d 739) (1996). Here the new witness was Pierce’s co-defendant and house mate, and thus he was always aware of her potential appearance as a witness. Since Pierce could have anticipated that she would testify, he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the court’s decision to reopen the State’s case and allow her testimony. See Painter, supra at 408. We discern no abuse of discretion here. Id.” Accord, Ramey v. State , 288 Ga.App. 800, 655 S.E.2d 675 (December 7, 2007). Ayoluwa v. State, 271 Ga.App. 424, 609 S.E.2d 749 (January 26, 2005). “Ayoluwa also complains that the trial court erred in permitting the State to reopen the evidence after a directed verdict was granted with respect to several counts of the indictment. The directed verdicts were granted with respect to counts pertaining to victims who did not testify, and the State requested that the evidence be reopened in order to explain the unsuccessful efforts the State made to locate the victims, who had moved out of state…. Allowing the State to reopen the evidence for the purpose of clarification of its case in chief rather than rebuttal is not an abuse of discretion, ‘even though this was done after the State had closed its case and defense counsel had moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. [Cit.]’ Davis v. State, 127 Ga.App. 76, 81(3) (192 S.E.2d 538) (1972). ” Buckley v. State, 270 Ga.App. 493, 606 S.E.2d 581 (October 21, 2004). “‘Even after jury deliberations have begun, the trial court, in the sound exercise of discretion, may reopen the evidence and allow the admission of new evidence. Gardner v. State, 263 Ga. 197(2), 429 S.E.2d 657 (1993).” Painter v. State, 263 Ga.App. 407, 587 S.E.2d 867 (September 25, 2003). “‘The trial court is vested with broad discretion in allowing a party to reopen its case and present evidence.’” That discretion was not abused where the State was allowed to reopen and call a witness who was on the witness list but not available earlier in the day. “‘In the absence of a showing that the [defendant’s] ability to present a defense was prejudiced by the court’s action, we find no abuse of that discretion in this case.’” Barnett v. State, 244 Ga.App. 585, 536 S.E.2d 263 (June 23, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing State to re-open evidence after defendants moved for directed verdict. “[I]t is well settled that a trial court has discretion to reopen the evidence after the State has rested and the defendant has moved for a directed verdict. See Porter [ v. State, 224 Ga.App. 276, 480 S.E.2d 291 (1997)]; Jackson v. State, 230 Ga.App. 292, 296- 297(7), 496 S.E.2d 315 (1998).” Potter v. State , 272 Ga. 430, 530 S.E.2d 725 (May 30, 2000). Felony murder conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in reopening evidence to allow the State “to introduce newly discovered evidence obtained during the lunch break after Potter's testimony. The state sought to introduce three photographs showing Potter holding a gun to rebut his testimony that he had not held a real gun for four or five years. … We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the evidence and allowing the state to introduce the three photographs as rebuttal evidence. See Mooneyham v. State, 251 Ga. 404, 306 S.E.2d 272 (1983). The evidence did not become relevant until Potter had presented his defense; the photographs directly contradicted his testimony that he had not held a gun for four or five years; and the evidence was reopened before all of the documentary evidence had been admitted. Given that the victim's relatives gave the photographs to the state only after hearing Potter testify about his unfamiliarity with guns and the state immediately notified the defendant about the photographs, the prosecution did not violate the criminal discovery statute by failing to give prior notice of the photographs. ” VVV. RES JUDICATA Rollf v. Carter, S15A1505, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 854987 (March 7, 2016). Habeas court properly denied relief from conviction for attempted murder; defendant’s rule of lenity argument is barred by res judicata, although the Court of Appeals’s denial of relief on that basis on direct appeal was error. Rollf claimed on direct appeal that he should have been sentenced for aggravated assault (maximum sentence: twenty years) instead of attempted murder (maximum sentence: thirty years). Court of Appeals disagreed based on case law holding that the rule of lenity