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only applied when the same acts constituted a felony and a misdemeanor. Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals on this point in McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 285, 745 S.E.2d 282 (2013), expressly overruling Rollf v. State, 314 Ga.App. 596, 598(2)(a), 724 S.E.2d 881 (2012). Rollf then filed this habeas petition. Held , the Court of Appeals decision is res judicata, even though incorrect. “In habeas proceedings … the doctrine of res judicata ordinarily poses a procedural bar to the reconsideration of issues already decided on direct appeal, and to overcome that procedural bar, a petitioner must point to a change in the applicable law or material facts of his case. [FN5: That the Court of Appeals may have erred in its resolution of the direct appeal is not enough, absent a change in the law or facts, to overcome the procedural bar. See Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353, 354(1), 466 S.E.2d 837 (1996). ] Hall v. Lance, 286 Ga. 365, 376(III), 687 S.E.2d 809 (2010).” Contrary to Rollf’s argument, McNair didn’t “mark[ ] a change in the applicable law” because it was based on prior precedents of the Supreme Court. “[T]he decisions of the Court of Appeals on which Rollf relied never were binding precedents” because they contradicted prior binding precedent from the Supreme Court. “A decision of the Supreme Court disapproving decisions of the Court of Appeals that were inconsistent with earlier decisions of the Supreme Court— McNair was that sort of decision—is no change in the law. Cf. Bruce v. Smith, 274 Ga. 432, 434–435(2), 553 S.E.2d 808 (2001) (overruling of earlier decisions of this Court was a change in the law).” Beasley v. State, 298 Ga. 49, 779 S.E.2d 301 (November 2, 2015). Following guilty pleas to murder and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion for out-of-time appeal. Defendant couldn’t relitigate issues already decided adversely to him in habeas petition, or which could have been raised in his habeas petition. “‘Where a convict seeks post-conviction relief based upon grounds previously litigated in a habeas proceeding, i.e., were raised in a habeas proceeding and resolved by the final judgment of the habeas court, this Court has determined that the convict is collaterally estopped from pursuing those grounds in his effort to obtain post-conviction relief.’ Wiggins v. State, 288 Ga. 169, 170(1), 702 S.E.2d 865 (2010) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) … [T]he doctrine of res judicata precludes not only re-litigation of claims that were actually adjudicated in the prior cause of action, but those which could have been adjudicated therein. Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God v. Brinson, 287 Ga. 485, 486, 696 S.E.2d 667 (2010). In the habeas court, Beasley asserted in connection with his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that counsel should have moved for a competency hearing, and he could have also raised the issue of whether the trial court had a duty, sua sponte, to order such a hearing. However, he did not do so and thus, in his amended motion for an out-of-time appeal, consideration of this issue is precluded on the basis of res judicata.” Tyner v. State, 289 Ga. 592, 714 S.E.2d 577 (June 20, 2011). Guilty plea to malice murder was invalid based on trial court’s failure to advise defendant of his right against self-incrimination. Contrary to State’s argument, defendant’s appeal on the merits of this point is not precluded by prior habeas petition where the issue was raised but, dismissed, not on the merits but based on procedural default. “See Wiggins v. State, 288 Ga. 169, 170 (702 S.E.2d 865) (2010) (holding that claims raised on direct appeal are not barred by denial of a prior habeas petition raising the identical claims where the habeas court ruled that the claims were procedurally defaulted instead of denying the claims on the merits).” State v. Mizell, 288 Ga. 474, 705 S.E.2d 154 (January 24, 2011). In defendant’s murder prosecution, trial court granted defendant’s motion for new trial, finding that the State acted in bad faith in destroying possibly exculpatory evidence – cigarette butts that could have been tested for DNA, but weren’t. Trial court then granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on grounds of destruction of the evidence. On State’s appeal, defendant contends that State’s contentions are barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the law of the case doctrine. Held, “[c]ollateral estoppel and res judicata are inapplicable because both require a previous action between the same parties, and the trial court's orders came in the same action now on appeal. See Slakman v. State, 280 Ga. 837, 841 (632 S.E.2d 378) (2006). Moreover, the law of the case doctrine applies only when the same issue has been actually litigated and decided. See State v. Lejeune, 277 Ga. 749, 756 (594 S.E.2d 637) (2004); Perez v. State, 263 Ga.App. 411, 412 (588 S.E.2d 269) (2003). Here, Mizell did not file the motion to dismiss the indictment until after the trial court granted the new trial. Consequently, whether the lost cigarette butts were constitutionally material and whether the State acted in bad faith, as defined in the Trombetta and Youngblood line of cases, were not put in issue until that time, and in granting the motion for new trial, the trial court clearly did not decide those issues. Instead, the new trial order relies solely on the State's failure to comply with the court's order to test the cigarette butts, regardless of their ‘exculpatory or inculpatory nature,’ and the order does not mention whether the State acted in good or bad faith. Accordingly, Mizell's law of the case claim is without merit.” Coney v. State, 304 Ga.App. 346, 696 S.E.2d 73 (May 6, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking affirmed; the decision not to revoke defendant’s prior probation based on the stalking offense did not support a plea in bar to prosecution of the stalking offense. “Coney argues that collateral estoppel should apply here, because the probation