☢ test - Í

revocation hearing had already determined ‘whether Coney had committed aggravated stalking’ and that question should not be relitigated. But a probation revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, and therefore the trial court's ultimate decision in that matter does not constitute res judicata or collateral estoppel. State v. Jones, 196 Ga.App. 896, 898 (397 S.E.2d 209) (1990) (‘This court has previously ruled that a ruling in favor of the accused in a probation revocation hearing does not serve as collateral estoppel to preclude a subsequent trial of the criminal charge which formed the basis of the revocation proceeding. [Cits.]’); Smith v. State, 171 Ga.App. 279, 282 (319 S.E.2d 113) (1984) (‘In summary, a probation revocation hearing is similar to a preliminary hearing, and jeopardy does not attach at a preliminary hearing.’).” Spiller v. State, 282 Ga. 351, 647 S.E.2d 64 (June 25, 2007). While his motion for new trial was still pending, defendant filed habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The habeas court ruled against defendant on the merits of the claim. Defendant then sought to amend his still-pending motion for new trial to add the ineffective assistance claim. Held, trial court properly found that the ruling by the habeas court was res judicata. “This Court has long recognized that the doctrine of res judicata embodied in OCGA § 9-12-40 applies to final judgments rendered by habeas courts. Mitchem v. Balkcom, 219 Ga. 47, 47 (131 S.E.2d 562) (1963); Perry v. McLendon, 62 Ga. 598, 603-05, 1879 WL 2876, at 4-5 (1879).” Accord, Hollins v. State , 287 Ga. 233, 695 S.E.2d 23 (May 3, 2010) (motion for out-of- time appeal properly denied where ineffective assistance claim had already been adjudicated on habeas petition); Davis v. State , 287 Ga. 414, 696 S.E.2d 644 (June 28, 2010) (“[M]atters litigated in a habeas proceeding are collaterally estopped from being re-litigated elsewhere. Spiller v. State, 282 Ga. 351(2) (647 S.E.2d 64)(2007); Simmons v. State, 276 Ga. 525, 526-527 (579 S.E.2d 735) (2003).”). WWW. RESTRAINTS/SHACKLES/PRISON CLOTHING/DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY Campbell v. State, 333 Ga.App. 829, 777 S.E.2d 507 (September 16, 2015). Convictions for riot in a penal institution and obstruction of officers affirmed; no error in use of electronic security belt on defendant during trial. Belt was not visible to jurors. Its operation was explained on the record, and was based on prior violent incidents involving defendant at jail. Defendant contends that it disrupted his ability to focus and participate at trial, pointing to “evidence that during a break, the trial court asked him to lower his voice to a whisper when he was talking to his lawyer. Campbell responded, ‘Yes, sir.... I don’t want to get electrocuted.’ Other than this comment, Campbell has pointed to no assertions he made during the trial in which he asserted that wearing the restraint belt had an adverse effect on him because it prevented him from assisting his attorney. ‘Of course, a party can not during the trial ignore what he thinks to be an injustice, take his chance on a favorable verdict, and complain later. Failure to raise the issue deprives the trial court of the opportunity to take appropriate remedial action and waives appellate review of any alleged impropriety.’ Weldon v. State, 297 Ga. 537, 775 S.E.2d 522 (July 13, 2015). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Campbell to wear the restraint belt.” Weldon v. State, 297 Ga. 537, 775 S.E.2d 522 (July 13, 2015). Affirming 327 Ga.App. 862, 761 S.E.2d 421 (2014); trial court didn’t violate defendant’s “Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by ordering that he appear at trial wearing an electronic shock device as a security measure.” Trial court required defendant to wear a shock sleeve around his arm, not visible to the jury ; “if activated by the deputy certified in its use, it would transmit a shock of 50,000 volts to Weldon, immobilizing him and possibly causing him to urinate or defecate.” Trial court did so after observing defendant, on prior court appearances, looking around the courtroom instead of focusing on court proceedings; trial court concluded that defendant might be thinking about how to escape, and explained on the record that it was using the shock device “in order to conduct a safe and orderly trial in this matter without you making a go for the door.” “A deputy informed Weldon about the operation of the shock sleeve and presented him with an information form that prominently stated: ‘This apparatus will NOT be activated for simply consulting with legal counsel.’” “[I]t is uncontroverted that at no time during the trial was the fact that he was wearing the device apparent to the jury. And, at no time during the proceedings did Weldon assert that the presence of the shock sleeve on his arm had an adverse effect on his ability to confer with counsel or his ability to focus on the trial.” No evidence here that the device caused the jury to be partial in any way, or that the device “interfered with [defendant’s] ability to focus on the trial.” Nahmias concurs , suggesting that more detailed discussion of the device and the need therefor “may have been preferable,” and emphasizing that the decision must be made by the court, not the sheriff ( criticizing Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 354, 359, 490 S.E.2d 75 (1997)). Nahmias also points out that different “security measures may have different potential effects on different rights of the defendant,” such as posing “a greater risk to the defendant's ability to consult with counsel and to focus on the proceeding. Thus, whether a particular security measure should be deemed a ‘less restrictive alternative’ than another measure depends on what rights the defendant asserts as well as the particular circumstances of the case.” Finally, Nahmias notes that the issue with a stun device which can’t be seen by the jury is not jury prejudice, but whether “the shock device also violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel or his due-process-based right to be present at