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trial,” contrary to some language in Brashier v. State, 299 Ga.App. 107, 108, 681 S.E.2d 750 (2009). See also Campbell (September 16, 2015), above. Funck v. State, 296 Ga. 371, 768 S.E.2d 468 (January 20, 2015). Malice murder, armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no error where defendant strategically elected to be tried wearing jail jumpsuit. “A criminal defendant may waive the procedural right to wear civilian clothing during trial. Choi v. State, 269 Ga. 376, 377(4) (497 S.E.2d 563) (1998); Gay v. State, 258 Ga.App. 854, 857–858(4)(b) (575 S.E.2d 740) (2002). As Funck chose to wear prison garb, there was no objection at trial, and inasmuch as there was no objection, the trial court was not given the opportunity to rule on this issue, and take any action. See, e.g., McClarin v. State, 289 Ga. 180, 183(b) (710 S.E.2d 120) (2011).” Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648, 763 S.E.2d 453 (September 22, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no prejudice shown in this case in failure to remove defendant’s shackles before bringing him in the courtroom. “Although, ‘[a]bsent justifying circumstances, the defendant normally should not be seen by the jury handcuffed in the courtroom or courthouse’ (Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 593(2) (261 S.E.2d 349) (1979)), ‘[t]he failure, through an oversight, to remove shackles from a prisoner for a short time after proceedings have commenced, or any technical violation of the rule prohibiting shackling, not prejudicial to him, is not ground for a new trial....’ Starr v. State, 209 Ga. 258, 260(5)(a) (71 S.E.2d 654) (1952). Here, before the jury was selected, Geiger entered the courtroom in civilian clothes that obscured the view that any of the prospective jurors may have had of his leg irons, and the leg irons were removed outside of the view of the prospective jurors. Although Geiger's counsel moved for a new jury panel to be appointed, he did not inquire during voir dire about whether any of the prospective jurors had seen Geiger's shackles, and he ‘made no effort to determine on voir dire whether[, if they had seen the defendant's shackles,] the momentary “technical violation of the rule prohibiting shackling may have had any prejudicial effect on the [prospective] jurors. [Cit.]”’ Rhodes v. State, 264 Ga. 123 (441 S.E.2d 748) (1994) Furthermore, despite the fact that the trial court offered to give a curative instruction, which would have been the appropriate remedy here (see Starr , supra, 209 Ga. at 260(5)(b)), Geiger declined the trial court's offer to give curative instructions. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Geiger's motion have a new jury panel appointed. See Rhodes, supra.” Daniels v. State, 310 Ga.App. 541, 713 S.E.2d 689 (July 6, 2011). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; no error where defendant dressed in jail clothes and visibly restrained with shackles during trial. “‘[E]very court has the power to preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence, and as near thereto as is necessary to prevent interruption, disturbance, or hindrance to its proceedings. And, where the court is familiar with the defendant's background of violent and disruptive behavior, it is within its sound discretion as to the necessity and extent of restraint to be imposed upon a disorderly defendant to prevent disruption of orderly court proceedings.... [Thus, a]t trial, where there is good and sufficient cause, the court has discretion in requiring a defendant to be handcuffed or shackled for security reasons. Abuse of discretion is the test on appeal where restraining devices have been used in the trial court.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dennis v. State, 170 Ga.App. 630, 632(3), 317 S.E.2d 874 (1984). Here, Daniels was accused of shooting the victim in the head, and there was evidence that he attempted to shoot the employee in the subsequent robbery; he had threatened to kill his previous counsel in this case; he was involved in a physical altercation at the jail, and he repeatedly destroyed and removed his clothes in the holding cell during the trial, despite his assurances that he would stop doing so. [fn: At a previous bond hearing, the prosecutor advised the trial court that Daniels was arrested and charged with escape in 1984 and twice in 1986. ] And the trial court properly instructed the jury to disregard Daniels's appearance and to reach a decision based solely on the evidence. See Allen v. State, 248 Ga.App. 79, 83(3), 545 S.E.2d 629 (2001) (‘The decisions of this court make it clear that when physical restraints are necessary and are observed by the jury in a criminal case, the trial court must instruct the jury that the use of physical restraints on the defendant has no bearing on the defendant's guilt or innocence and should not be considered by them during their deliberations.’) (punctuation omitted). Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's requirement that Daniels be shackled during the trial.” Mathis v. State, 299 Ga.App. 831, 684 S.E.2d 6 (July 31, 2009). Extra courtroom security did not require mistrial. “Mathis argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial on the grounds that his trial was ‘permented [sic] with both uniformed and plain clothes law enforcement officers such that there was a fog of law enforcement present surrounding [him] in court and going to and from court [to the] extent that it denied [Mathis] due process [ ] and a fair trial.’ We find no reversible error. Decatur County Sheriff Wiley Griffin testified at the hearing on the defendants' motions for new trial, explaining that because there were three defendants, the Sheriff's Department ‘basically tripled [its] security.’” “‘Although it is well settled that a defendant is entitled to a trial free of partiality which the presence of excessive security measures may create, it is also as well established that the use of extraordinary security measures to