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prevent dangerous or disruptive behavior which threatens the conduct of a fair and safe trial is within the discretion of the trial court.’ Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478, 479(2) (499 S.E.2d 60) (1998). Under the circumstances of this case, particularly given the security concerns regarding the three defendants on trial, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mathis's motion for mistrial on the grounds asserted. See id.; Brown v. State, 240 Ga.App. 321, 323-324(2) (523 S.E.2d 333) (1999); Thrasher v. State, 204 Ga.App. 413, 414(3) (419 S.E.2d 516) (1992). Compare McKenzey v. State, 138 Ga.App. 88, 90(1)(b) (225 S.E.2d 512) (1976) (physical precedent only) (judgment reversed because the jury saw the defendant-who presented no apparent security risk-in handcuffs and the trial court did not instruct the jury that the fact that he was handcuffed was to have no bearing on its deliberations).” Accord, Krause v. State , 286 Ga. 745, 691 S.E.2d 211 (March 22, 2010) (“jurors had to be placed under uniform guard to keep them from interacting with spectators and the trial had to be stopped several times for sidebars about allegations of witness tampering and intimidation.”). Brashier v. State, 299 Ga.App. 107, 681 S.E.2d 750 (July 14, 2009). Requiring defendant to wear stun belt at trial didn’t deprive defendant of fair trial; “there was no indication that the jury was in any way affected by the utilization of this device or that they even knew that he was wearing such a device until Brashier testified to that fact at trial. The RACC belt was completely covered by Brashier's pant leg, and Brashier provided no evidence that the jury was initially aware of it.” Ciriticized, see Weldon (July 13, 2015) (Nahmias, concurring), above. Williams v. State, 297 Ga.App. 723, 678 S.E.2d 95 (April 9, 2009). Defendant had no right to testify free of handcuffs at bench trial. Council v. State, 297 Ga.App. 96, 676 S.E.2d 411 (March 26, 2009). No prejudice to defendant for having to wear leg shackles at trial, absent any evidence that jury became aware of them. “While in the presence of the jury, a defendant ‘should be free of indicia of guilt such as wearing shackles or prison garb, or being surrounded by uniformed security personnel, or anything else that might infringe upon the presumption that he is innocent.’ Collins v. State, 164 Ga.App. 482, 484(4) (297 S.E.2d 503) (1982).” Distinguishing Allen v. State , 248 Ga.App. 79, 81-82(2) (545 S.E.2d 629) (2001) (conviction reversed; “even the state did not dispute that ‘the jurors would have an easy view of Allen’s feet, legs and hands.’”). “Here, in contrast, the evidence showed that the jurors were not able to see Council's leg shackles from the jury box, and the trial court took steps to keep the jurors unaware of the shackles. As a result, pretermitting whether the trial court correctly determined that the use of leg shackles was warranted by the threat that Council posed, Council has failed to show that the shackles interfered with his ability to receive a fair trial.” Hampton v. State, 294 Ga.App. 857, 670 S.E.2d 502 (November 25, 2008). “Hampton charges his attorney with ineffectiveness in failing to object to him being tried in prison garb. The record, however, reflects that Hampton appeared for trial in a jumpsuit without any distinguishing markings. Therefore, it would appear that his clothing, though issued by the jail, was not so suggestive as to have created a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if he had been dressed in less institutional attire. See Gay v. State, 258 Ga.App. 854, 857-858(4)(b) (575 S.E.2d 740) (2002); see also Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga.App. 835(1) (270 S.E.2d 61) (1980).” Smith v. State, 294 Ga.App. 692, 670 S.E.2d 191 (November 19, 2008). No mistrial required where jurors saw defendant in custody outside courtroom. “The trial transcript reveals that Smith's lawyer reported to the court, ‘Smith has indicated that yesterday and today coming and going from the court the jurors have been present while he is being transported, that some of the jurors may have seen him being escorted by the deputies.’ The lawyer thus requested that ‘Smith be allowed to wait – or at least in the back five or ten minutes to give a reasonable time for the jurors to leave.’ The court responded that it would do so, and there is no assertion that the court thereafter did not. Smith's complaint to this court that such setting may have cast aspersions upon him falls short of showing reversible error by the trial court. We have held: ‘Although a defendant has the right to be free of the atmosphere of partiality created by the use of excessive guards or shackles in the courtroom, the mere fact of seeing an indicted accused in custody – not in the courtroom, as in the instant case, is not grounds for an automatic mistrial, but is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ Hill v. State, 193 Ga.App. 401, 405(8) (387 S.E.2d 910) (1989) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion here, where the trial court granted the relief requested by the defense. See Lyon v. State, 262 Ga. 247, 248-249(3)(a) (416 S.E.2d 523) (1992) (trial judge's ruling will not be reversed for not going further than requested).” Accord, Hight v. State , 302 Ga.App. 826, 692 S.E.2d 69 (March 12, 2010) (juror denied seeing defendant outside courtroom, where he was in shackles); Littlejohn v. State , 320 Ga.App. 197, 739 S.E.2d 682 (March 8, 2013) (mistrial not automatic where jurors saw defendant in shackles; no prejudice shown). Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 668 S.E.2d 651 (October 6, 2008). “The Supreme Court of the United States decided in