☢ test - Í

2005, well after Whatley's trial and direct appeal, that visibly shackling a defendant during the sentencing phase is unconstitutional unless the record shows ‘“an essential state interest” – such as the interest in courtroom security – specific to the defendant on trial.’ Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953) (2005) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-569 (106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525) (1986)).” “ On direct appeal where unconstitutional shackling has occurred, there is a presumption of harm that can be overcome only upon a showing by the State that the shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, where, as here, the issue is the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object to such shackling, the petitioner is entitled to relief only if he or she can show that there is a reasonable probability that the shackling affected the outcome of the trial. See Marquard [ v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1312-1314(IV)(B) (11 th Cir., 2005)] (addressing a visible shackling claim and finding no reasonable probability of a different outcome in the sentencing phase). In view of the balance of the evidence presented at his trial, we conclude as a matter of law that Whatley cannot show that his trial counsel's failure to object to his shackling in the sentencing phase in reasonable probability affected the jury's selection of a sentence.” Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 655 S.E.2d 813 (January 8, 2008). “[A] defendant has the right to be tried in an atmosphere free of visible restraint except in special circumstances which, in the trial court’s exercise of its sound discretion, dictate otherwise. See Allen v. State, 235 Ga. 709, 711-712 (221S.E.2d 405) (1975). See also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953) (2005) (extending this rule to the sentencing phase of a capital case).” Defendant’s feet were shackled at trial, but no ruling on propriety thereof because of reversal on other grounds. Davis v. State, 279 Ga.App. 628, 631 S.E.2d 815 (June 5, 2006). “[W]here defendant is visibly restrained during trial, court must instruct jury that use of restraints has no bearing on defendant’s guilt or innocence, even without a request for such instruction,” citing Allen v. State, 248 Ga.App. 79, 82-83(3), 545 S.E.2d 629 (2001). Nance v. State, 280 Ga. 125, 623 S.E.2d 470 (December 1, 2005). At defendant’s first death penalty trial in 1997, the court ordered that defendant wear a stun belt under his clothes after he threatened the prosecutor. Trial court continued the same condition at defendant’s 2002 re-trial without opportunity for hearing on the issue. Held, trial court did not abuse its discretion in so doing. “It is ‘well established that the use of extraordinary security measures to prevent dangerous or disruptive behavior which threatens the conduct of a fair and safe trial is within the discretion of the trial court.’ Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478(2) (499 S.E.2d 60) (1998). The trial court conducted a hearing in this case to determine the necessity of a stun belt and concluded the use of a stun belt was warranted by the threat and would not interfere with the ability of the defendant to receive a fair trial. See id. The trial court did not err by failing to hold a second hearing in 2002; the only change in circumstance since the 1997 hearing offered by Nance was the passage of time and this was obvious to the trial court without the need for a second hearing. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its ruling on this issue.” Accord, Brashier (July 14, 2009), above . Stanford v. State , 272 Ga. 267, 528 S.E.2d 246 (March 27, 2000). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no error “in requiring him to wear a stun belt, and in failing to instruct the jury that the belt had no bearing on Stanford's guilt or innocence. … Stanford never interposed an objection to the wearing of the belt. Furthermore, the record does not reflect that the jury could see the belt or that Stanford was prejudiced by it in any way. See Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478(2), 499 S.E.2d 60 (1998) (use of electronic security measure is permissible where it is shielded from view and defendant is not harmed by its use).” Corbin v. State, 240 Ga.App. 788, 525 S.E.2d 365 (November 15, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault upon a correctional officer affirmed; no abuse of discretion in ordering courtroom restraints placed on defendant inmate who “had threatened the judge and everyone with whom he came into contact the day before. Corbin's conduct had been video recorded, and the tapes were introduced at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge ruled, based on the testimony at the hearing and his own observations of Corbin's conduct the day before, that ‘restraints [were] necessary to maintain order and provide for the safety of persons in the courtroom.’ During its charge to the jury, the court instructed the jury to ignore the restraints in weighing the evidence and deciding Corbin's guilt or innocence.” “‘[D]etailed, demonstrable evidence [must be] set forth in the record to support the infringement by the court on the defendant's presumption of innocence.’ Martinez v. State, 189 Ga.App. 69, 72(2), 375 S.E.2d 123 (1988); accord Pace [ v. State, 212 Ga.App. 489, 442 S.E.2d 307 (1994)]. … [W]e … find sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate the necessity of placing restraints on Corbin. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Corbin to wear restraints during the trial. See Dennis v. State, 170 Ga.App. 630, 632-633(3), 317 S.E.2d 874 (1984) (court recited facts that defendant had struggled with guards at arraignment and insulted court officials, and court gave curative instruction regarding restraints).”