☢ test - Í

Hardy v. State, 240 Ga.App. 115, 522 S.E.2d 704 (September 21, 1999). 1. No abuse of discretion in requiring defendant to wear shock belt at trial, unseen by jury. “A shock belt is prejudicial to a defendant only when it is visible to the jury. Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 354, 359(7), 490 S.E.2d 75 (1997); see Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478, 479(2), 499 S.E.2d 60 (1998). Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion by requiring Hardy to wear a shock belt at trial or in denying Hardy a new trial on this ground.” 2. No prejudice where one juror saw defendant “in the sheriff's patrol car one morning before trial. Hardy claims the judge should have asked the juror if he discussed seeing Hardy with any of the other jurors and should have instructed him not to let it influence his decision. Because the juror testified only that he saw Hardy in the patrol car and did not mention seeing him wearing shackles, there was no reason to inquire about discussions with other jurors. When asked if the event would cause him not to be completely fair and impartial in the case, the juror said no. No further action was required by the judge or trial counsel.” Brown v. State, 240 Ga.App. 321, 523 S.E.2d 333 (September 16, 1999). Trial court didn’t abuse discretion in allowing uniformed officers to sit directly behind defendant at trial. “It is in the court's discretion whether to allow restraints on the defendant or the presence of officers in order to protect the safety of those in the courtroom or the public. [Cit.] The [defendant] has the burden of showing the safety and security measures caused a violation of his constitutional rights. [Cit.] Here Brown's attorney acknowledged the sheriff's office had concerns about courtroom security but asked that the officers be positioned away from his client to avoid the suggestion of the need for the officers. However, he did not make a showing of how many officers there were or what the sheriff's security concerns were. The court indicated it had received reports from the sheriff's department about Brown, and that it was not going to interfere with the sheriff's security measures. Without more we cannot say the court abused its discretion. See Thrasher v. State, 204 Ga.App. 413, 414(3), 419 S.E.2d 516 (1992); see also Massey v. State, 220 Ga. 883, 895(6), 142 S.E.2d 832 (1965) (officers allowed to remain in courtroom for reasons of security).” Thomas v. State, 238 Ga.App. 42, 517 S.E.2d 585 (May 11, 1999). Kidnapping and armed robbery convictions affirmed. “We reject Thomas’ claims that the trial court improperly permitted a prejudicial show of force by law enforcement officers. Thomas bore the burden of establishing that the security measures which were utilized were so excessive and so inherently prejudicial as to have posed an unacceptable threat to his right to a fair trial. Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478, 479(2), 499 S.E.2d 60 (1998). This he failed to do. The fact that two law enforcement officers provided an escort to a defense witness did not constitute an excessive showing of force, especially since this witness was under a ten-year sentence for armed robbery and kidnapping. See Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 435(9), 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986).” XXX. SCHEDULING Conway v. State, 281 Ga. 685, 642 S.E.2d 673 (March 19, 2007). No abuse of discretion in holding long court sessions. “[Co-defendant] Bates contends that the trial court set an unreasonable schedule, holding court late into the evening each day. After jury selection, the court announced all persons involved in the trial should be prepared ‘to open early and stay late,’ that court would begin at 9:00 a.m. each morning, and go into the evening as necessary.” “A ‘trial court retains the discretion to determine how late to hold court before recessing for the evening.’ Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 38(1)(b) (427 S.E.2d 770) (1993) (Citation and punctuation omitted). In Hill, id., the trial court recessed each day’s proceedings between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., after jury voir dire had gone until 11:00 p.m., and no abuse of discretion was found. Id. at 37. Here, court was recessed between 6:30 p.m. and 7:05 p.m. daily, until deliberations began. And as in Hill, Bates was represented by more than one attorney. Bates fails to show that the trial schedule was so oppressive as to leave counsel insufficient time to review each day’s proceedings, or to prepare for the next day’s, and there was no abuse of the court’s discretion. See Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 59(4) (414 S.E.2d 5) (1992).” Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (September 13, 1999). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion challenging the circuit’s method of assigning cases to judges, and calling cases for trial. 1. Case assignment. Circuit’s case assignment method allowing the District Attorney to assign cases, violates USCR 3.1 and due process. “The precise method of assigning and calendaring cases adopted by a multi-judge circuit … must comport with the notion of due process under the State and Federal constitutions, as well as the spirit and purpose of the uniform rules and applicable statutes. [Cit.] The purpose of the assignment system in multi-judge circuits is to ‘prevent any person's choosing the judge to whom an action is to be assigned.’ USCR 3.1. … In the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit, however, it is not the chief or other circuit judge who makes case assignments and sets the calendar but the district attorney. Because the district attorney is clearly within the category of persons directed to refrain from affecting case assignments under USCR 3.1, we find the method of case assignment employed in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit violates the clear mandate of that rule.” 2. Selection of cases for trial. “OCGA § 17-8-1 requires that cases on a criminal docket be ‘called in the order in