☢ test - Í

co-defendants present antagonistic defenses, and as we noted earlier, ‘the presence of antagonistic defenses alone’ is not enough to require severance.” Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 773 S.E.2d 254 (June 1, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant “‘will not be heard to complain of the trial court's denial of a co-defendant's motion to sever’ in which he did not join. Way v. State, 239 Ga. 316, 317(2) (236 S.E.2d 655) (1977).” Taylor v. State, 331 Ga.App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (March 26, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied severance where “there were only two defendants at trial and no difference in the law applied to the two defendants. … Additionally, … the jury addressed the defendants' indictments separately and returned a separate verdict for each defendant, in which Taylor was acquitted of the murder charges while Kitchens was convicted of felony murder.” Accord, Zamudio v. State , 332 Ga.App. 37, 771 S.E.2d 733 (April 13, 2015). Nwakanma v. State, 296 Ga. 493, 768 S.E.2d 503 (January 20, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in failure to sever co-defendants’ trials. “There was little likelihood of actual juror confusion in this case, however, because only four defendants were tried and the law and evidence that applied to each of them were substantially the same. See Hicks [ v. State, 295 Ga. 268, 278(4) (759 S.E.2d 509) (2014)]. They were jointly tried for almost the same offenses, which involved the same witnesses, whose credibility the codefendants jointly attacked, and the State's evidence indicated that they acted in concert. See Flournoy v. State, 294 Ga. 741, 748(5) (755 S.E.2d 777) (2014); Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 510(2) (705 S.E.2d 649) (2011).” Alston v. State, 329 Ga.App. 44, 763 S.E.2d 504 (September 10, 2014). Defendants’ convictions for criminal street gang activity and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to sever trials as to co-defendants. Contrary to Alston’s contention, record didn’t require finding that co-defendant Perkins’s facial tattoos of gang symbols prejudiced jurors against all defendants. “The transcript shows that 11 potential jurors were excused for cause, but that the majority of jurors who were excused said they had formed an opinion or were biased because the appellants had been charged with numerous crimes, or other reasons unrelated to Perkins' tattoos. [fn] And of the four jurors who did indicate that Perkins' tattoos, or even more generally appellants' appearance, would affect their impartiality, one juror stated that her bias against Perkins would not ‘spillover’ over to Alston, and another juror indicated that his impartiality might not spillover to Alston.” Barge v. State, 294 Ga. 567, 755 S.E.2d 166 (February 24, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. 1. No severance required though co-defendant was a convicted felon, charged with felon in possession of a firearm and felony murder in addition to the charges he shared with Barge. “Other than his own supposition, appellant has failed to show the jury was confused by Henderson's status as a prior convicted felon or the extra charges pending against him.” 2. No severance required by co-defendant’s impeachment of Barge’s testimony. When defendant denied being known by the nickname “Little Yo,” co-defendant Henderson “introduced a videotape his father had recorded showing appellant performing a rap song in which he refers to himself as ‘Little Yo.’ … The fact that appellant's testimony denying he was known as “Little Yo” was effectively impeached by Henderson's introduction of the videotape is not tantamount to the denial of due process.” Also, two other witnesses had already testified about defendant’s nickname. Coleman v. State, 325 Ga.App. 700, 753 S.E.2d 449 (January 14, 2014). Bank robbery conviction affirmed; no error in denying motion to sever cases against co-defendants. “Coleman argues that [co-defendant] McDougald's out-of-court statement to police would not have been admissible if he had been tried separately, which would have eliminated the risk of the jury improperly considering the statement as evidence against him. However, … the introduction of McDougald's statement in the joint trial did not constitute a Bruton violation. Thus, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's limiting instruction and only considered the statement as evidence against McDougald. Because McDougald's statement could be introduced in the joint trial without posing a Bruton problem, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Coleman's motion to sever. See Ham [ v. State, 303 Ga.App. 232, 243(5)(a) (692 S.E.2d 828) (2010)].” Accord, Flournoy v. State , 294 Ga. 741, 755 S.E.2d 777 (March 10, 2014). Dulcio v. State, 292 Ga. 645, 740 S.E.2d 574 (March 25, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to move for severance from co-defendant. “The fact that evidence against a co-defendant is more substantial than against the movant for severance does not itself warrant severance.” Moore v. State, 319 Ga.App. 766, 738 S.E.2d 348 (February 14, 2013). Child cruelty convictions affirmed. Trial court