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properly denied motion to sever mother’s charges from father’s, though father faced additional child molestation charges (for which he was acquitted). Garcia v. State, 319 Ga.App. 751, 738 S.E.2d 333 (February 14, 2013). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to sever, first raised “shortly before his trial began. See OCGA § 17–7–110 (‘All pretrial motions ... shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court.’).” Even if timely filed, no severance required with just two defendants, no antagonistic defenses, and only similar transaction evidence against one defendant raising any issue. As that evidence clearly pointed only to co-defendant Calderon, “the notion that Garcia was somehow prejudiced by an evidentiary showing made by the State against Calderon strains credulity and can in no sense be considered to have prejudiced Garcia's defense.” Accord, Brooks v. State , 332 Ga.App. 396, 772 S.E.2d 838 (May 21, 2015). Fisher v. State, 317 Ga.App. 761, 732 S.E.2d 821 (October 3, 2012). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying motion to sever co-defendants’ trial, though Fisher was only involved in one of the two robberies on trial. “‘It is not an abuse of discretion in the interest of justice for the judge to refuse a motion for severance of the trial of multiple charges where the crimes alleged were part of a continuous transaction conducted over a relatively short time, and from the nature of the entire transaction, it would be almost impossible to present to a jury evidence of one of the crimes without also permitting evidence of the other.’ Stewart v. State, 239 Ga. 588, 589, 238 S.E.2d 540 (1977).’ See also Padgett v. State, 239 Ga. 556, 558, 238 S.E.2d 92 (1977) (although acting individually, defendants had a single criminal purpose, which was to engage in the business of prostitution).” Garmon v. State, 317 Ga.App. 634, 732 S.E.2d 289 (September 18, 2012). Aggravated battery and related convictions affirmed; in denying motion to sever defendant’s trial from his co-defendant, trial court wasn’t required to “expressly articulate in its ruling its specific findings on those factors. … The statute authorizing the defendants to be tried jointly requires only that the trial court exercise its discretion without specifying any specific findings that the court must make in that regard.” Brooks v. State, 311 Ga.App. 857, 717 S.E.2d 490 (October 4, 2011). Physical precedent only; rape and related convictions reversed, as trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to sever his trial from co-defendant Johnson. Brooks and Johnson were jointly indicted on all charges arising from an attack on a certain victim; Johnson also faced charges arising from a later armed robbery. The jury found both defendants guilty on all charges arising from both incidents. “[I]t is hard to imagine a clearer showing of prejudice and consequent denial of due process than jurors unanimously finding a defendant guilty of offenses for which only his co-defendant had been indicted. The joint trial obviously created confusion of evidence and law for the jury, and evidence implicating Johnson was clearly considered against Brooks since he was found guilty of Johnson's crimes.” Andrews concurs in judgment only, finds no error on this point but would reverse based on faulty verdict form which asked jury to pass on Brooks’s guilt on those counts charging on Johnson. Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 706, 715 S.E.2d 85 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever co-defendants’ cases. “The familial and personal inter-relationships of the three defendants and one of the victims were not so confusing as to warrant separate trials given that the relationships went to motive for the shootings and would have been admissible had the co-defendants been tried separately. Appellant also contends that he and the co-defendant who testified had antagonistic defenses. Both appellant and the testifying co- defendant each testified he was not at the scene of the crimes; however the co-defendant implicated appellant by testifying that appellant borrowed the co-defendant's car the afternoon of the shooting and drove off in it with the co-defendant's younger brother. Antagonism between co-defendants is not enough by itself to require severance ( Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. 767(2), 700 S.E.2d 346 (2010)), and the co-defendant's testimony implicating appellant is not a sufficient reason to grant a severance since the testifying co-defendant was subject to cross-examination by appellant's trial counsel and the testimony would have been admissible had appellant been tried separately. Green v. State, [274 Ga. 686, 688, 558 S.E.2d 707 (2002)]. Appellant not having shown the requisite prejudice from the denial of the motion to sever, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. See Rivers v. State, 283 Ga. 1(2), 655 S.E.2d 594 (2008).” Holland v. State, 310 Ga.App. 623, 714 S.E.2d 126 (July 7, 2011). Shoplifting conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying severance of defendant’s charges from her husband/co-defendant. “In support of her … argument, Holland points to OCGA § 24–9–23, which provides that ‘[h]usband and wife shall be competent but shall not be compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other.’” However, “ Holland cites no authority prohibiting