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a spouse from having to choose between not testifying or testifying against her husband. In essence, she argues that she was compelled not to testify, which is not safeguarded by OCGA § 24–9–23 and is not a denial of due process.” Citing Rimmer v. State, 197 Ga.App. 294, 296(5) (398 S.E.2d 282) (1990) (“no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever wife's trial from trial of co-defendant husband”). Norris v. State, 289 Ga. 154, 709 S.E.2d 792 (April 26, 2011). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no harm shown from failure to sever defendant’s trial from co-defendant’s, where defendant was able to elicit exculpatory testimony from co-defendant at their joint trial. Flores v. State, 308 Ga.App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (March 10, 2011). In prosecution for trafficking in methamphetamine, no severance of co-defendants required. “Flores argues that he was prejudiced when Garcia-Maldonada's attorney asked a state's witness about Flores's efforts after his arrest to assist the state in ‘taking down further dope dealers’ and on Flores's alleged flight attempt before trial. He also argues that he was prejudiced by the admission of Garcia-Maldonada's statements to police and at trial that implicated Flores. The existence of antagonistic defenses in and of itself does not require severance, and Flores has not demonstrated any clear prejudice and denial of due process which might have been avoided by severing the trials. Kennedy v. State, 253 Ga. 132, 135(2) (317 S.E.2d 822) (1984). For instance, the testimony of Garcia-Maldonada implicating Flores would be admissible in a separate trial, see OCGA § 17-8-4(a); Kennedy, supra, as would evidence of Flores's attempted flight, see generally Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 517- 518(3)(b) (397 S.E.2d 683) (1990), and, under certain circumstances, statements Flores made while cooperating with the state. See generally OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(1) (providing for the state's use at trial of the defendant's relevant statements to law enforcement officers or members of the prosecuting attorney's staff under certain circumstances). … Moreover, because Garcia-Maldonada testified at trial, Flores had ample opportunity to cross-examine him, see Durham v. State, 240 Ga. 203(1) (240 S.E.2d 14) (1977) (no prejudice shown by denial of motion to sever where all defendants testified and were cross-examined); Kennedy, supra; we note that no prejudice amounting to a denial of due process rights is shown where an accomplice, who is subject to cross-examination, takes the stand and blames the appellant or attributes to the appellant a greater degree of culpability than the accomplice himself bears. Chandler v. State, 213 Ga.App. 46, 47(1) (443 S.E.2d 679) (1994).” Accord, Ardis v. State , 290 Ga. 58, 718 S.E.2d 526 (November 7, 2011) (antagonistic defenses alone not sufficient to warrant severance); Smith v. State , 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892 (January 23, 2012) (no prejudice where co-defendant takes stand and blames defendant or attributes greater culpability to defendant); McLean v. State , 291 Ga. 873, 738 S.E.2d 267 (November 5, 2012) (antagonistic defenses alone not sufficient); Barge v. State , 294 Ga. 567, 755 S.E.2d 166 (February 24, 2014); Hicks v. State , 295 Ga. 268, 759 S.E.2d 509 (June 2, 2014) (antagonistic defenses not sufficient); Dorsey v. State , 331 Ga.App. 486, 771 S.E.2d 167 (March 24, 2015). Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 705 S.E.2d 649 (February 7, 2011). Convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; no severance required with only two co-defendants; “the danger of spillover evidence was minimal because the bulk of the evidence equally implicated both defendants as the two gunmen”; the court instructed the jury not to consider similar transaction evidence introduced as to co-defendant Martin against Moon; and defenses were not antagonistic, as both defendants denied being present at scene and didn’t implicate each other. Accord, Billings v. State , 293 Ga. 99, 745 S.E.2d 583 (June 3, 2013) (similar transaction evidence against Billings didn’t require severance on co-defendant Ross’s motion, given appropriate limited instructions by trial court); Nwakanma v. State , 296 Ga. 493, 768 S.E.2d 503 (January 20, 2015). Brinson v. State, 288 Ga. 435, 704 S.E.2d 756 (January 10, 2011). Defendant’s murder and related convictions affirmed; no severance required because of co-defendant’s testimony pinning the crimes on defendant. “[If defendant] and Johnson had been tried separately, Johnson still could have testified at Brinson's trial during the State's case or in rebuttal. See Appling v. State, 281 Ga. 590, 591 (642 S.E.2d 37) (2007) (holding that the defendant failed to show harm from the fact that his co-defendant testified to an antagonistic defense, because at a separate trial the co-defendant could have offered the same testimony).” Anderson v. State, 306 Ga.App. 423, 702 S.E.2d 458 (October 13, 2010). Conviction for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; no error in joining for trial offenses by two defendants who attacked each other on successive days. Defendants may have been antagonistic toward each other, but their defenses were not “legally antagonistic.” Westmoreland v. State, 287 Ga. 688, 699 S.E.2d 13 (June 28, 2010). Defendants’ felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in refusing to sever defendants’ trials, though Williams claimed that he needed Westmoreland to testify for him. “In order to be entitled to a severance on the ground that a co-defendant would give exculpatory evidence in a