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separate trial ‘the movant must demonstrate: (1) a bona fide need for the testimony; (2) the substance of the testimony; (3) its exculpatory nature and effect; and (4) that the co-defendant will in fact testify if the cases are severed. (Cits.) Given such a showing, the court should (1) examine the significance of the testimony in relation to the defendant's theory of defense; (2) assess the extent of prejudice caused by the absence of the testimony; (3) pay close attention to judicial administration and economy; [and] (4) give weight to the timeliness of the motion.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Keener v. State, 215 Ga. App 117, 118(1) (449 S.E.2d 669) (1994). Other than bare conclusory assertions, Williams proffered no evidence at the pretrial hearing, at trial, or on motion for new trial demonstrating that Westmoreland would in fact testify at a separate trial. Thus, he has not made the threshold showing under Keener. ” Accord, Long v. State , 287 Ga. 886, 700 S.E.2d 399 (October 4, 2010). Krause v. State, 286 Ga. 745, 691 S.E.2d 211 (March 22, 2010). Defendants’ murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly refused to sever trials, despite antagonistic defenses – each accused the other of being the shooter. “[Co- defendant] Chesser has shown no specific prejudice from the presentation of the antagonistic defenses.” Accord, McLean v. State , 291 Ga. 873, 738 S.E.2d 267 (November 5, 2012) (no specific prejudice shown); Flournoy v. State , 294 Ga. 741, 755 S.E.2d 777 (March 10, 2014) (no specific prejudice from antagonistic defenses). Harper v. State, 300 Ga.App. 757, 686 S.E.2d 375 (November 5, 2009). At five defendants’ trial for armed robbery and related offenses, severance not required despite antagonistic defense raised when one defense attorney claimed in opening statement that his client would testify that he was coerced into participating in the robbery, but then the defendant, like all the others, elected not to take the stand or present any evidence. Based on Owen v. State , 266 Ga. 312, 467 S.E.2d 325 (1996): “‘No such evidence [as mentioned during the opening statement] was introduced at trial. Of course, the opening statement was not evidence (and the trial court so instructed the jury). Thus, it cannot be said that [the co-defendant] introduced an antagonistic defense; or that [appellant] was harmed by her inability to cross-examine [her co-defendant].’” In any event, harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Character v. State , 285 Ga. 112, 674 S.E.2d 281 (2009). Thorpe v. State, 285 Ga. 604, 678 S.E.2d 913 (June 29, 2009). Murder and related convictions affirmed. No error in denying severance of defendants’ non-capital murder trials: “There is … no indication that the jury confused the evidence or law; all three defendants were charged with identical crimes, and the jury, in reaching different verdicts as to each co-defendant, proved itself amply capable of distinguishing the evidence relevant to each.” Accord, Hicks v. State , 295 Ga. 268, 759 S.E.2d 509 (June 2, 2014). Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. 312, 677 S.E.2d 76 (April 28, 2009). Severance not required because defendants had to share jury strikes at joint trial. “Both defendants contend that their trials should have been severed because each defendant would have received a greater number of peremptory strikes if they had been tried separately rather than together. [fn] The defendants, however, have failed to show that they were harmed by not receiving more peremptory strikes than they did. The defendants were entitled to be tried by an impartial jury, and they have not shown that the jury they received was not impartial or that any of the jurors who considered their case were unqualified. Moreover, ‘[i]f one defendant on trial could have a fair and impartial jury by the exercise of [14] peremptory challenges, how then could another defendant on trial with him not have a fair and impartial jury merely because the crime for which they were on trial was allegedly committed by both defendants?’ Albert v. State, 235 Ga. 718, 719(1) (221 S.E.2d 413) (1975). Therefore, irrespective of the number of peremptory strikes each of the defendants received, they received an impartial jury made up of qualified jurors. As such, there was no harm.” Troutman v. State, 297 Ga.App. 196, 676 S.E.2d 836 (March 30, 2009). In defendants’ trial for robbery of cab driver, evidence showed that cab company’s phone number was found on co-defendant’s cell phone. Held, this evidence was properly admitted against both defendants: “It is well established that ‘[a]ny testimony against one conspirator which showed the furtherance of the conspiracy is relevant as to the other conspirators.’ Satterfield v. State, 256 Ga. 593, 597(3) (351 S.E.2d 625) (1987). As a result, evidence of a phone call made from Aikens' phone would have been admissible against Troutman even if Troutman and Aikens had been tried separately.” Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 674 S.E.2d 280 (March 9, 2009). 1. Severance was not demanded where co-defendant’s girlfriend testified that co-defendant made statement placing defendant at murder scene, where “numerous” other witnesses also placed defendant at the scene. Accord, White v. State , 308 Ga.App. 38, 706 S.E.2d 570 (February 22, 2011). 2. Prior difficulty evidence between co-defendant and victim, even without limiting instruction from court, “was harmless considering the overwhelming evidence that [defendant] participated as a party to the crimes in question.”