☢ test - Í

Bowe v. State, 288 Ga.App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (November 9, 2007). Bowe and co-defendant Baker were both convicted at joint trial for series of armed robberies and one burglary. Both appeal on failure to sever their trials. Held, no error as to Bowe, but error as to Baker, as Baker was prevented from using exculpatory portions of his prior statements because they incriminated Bowe. No error as to Bowe: portions of Baker’s statements admitted into evidence did not incriminate Bowe; their only relevance to Bowe was brought out on cross-examination by Bowe’s own attorney. “Bowe cannot now complain of testimony he himself elicited. Sullens v. State , 239 Ga. 766, 767(2) (238 S.E.2d 864) (1977) (‘self-induced error is not grounds for reversal’).” As to Baker, however, Bruton rule prevented him from tendering exculpatory portions of his prior statements because they alleged that Bowe had coerced him into helping with the robberies. “[H]ad the trial been severed, and the Bruton issue thereby avoided, Baker would have been able to provide the full context of the admissions offered by the State, in which Baker explained in both the 911 call and his custodial statement that he feared Bowe and was forced to participate in the robberies.” Taylor v. State, 285 Ga.App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381 (June 6, 2007). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions affirmed. “Because the trial court gave appropriate instructions to the jury that evidence of co-defendant Hall’s prior similar offense could be considered only in regard to Hall, and the evidence objected to by Taylor did not directly implicate him in the prior offense, no severance was mandated. Banks v. State, 230 Ga.App. 881, 882-883 (497 S.E.2d 821) (1998).” Appling v. State, 281 Ga. 590, 642 S.E.2d 37 (February 5, 2007). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. “A defendant seeking severance must show clearly that he will be prejudiced by a joint trial; in the absence of such a showing, the trial court’s denial of a motion to sever will not be disturbed. Rhodes v. State , 279 Ga. 587 (3), 619 S.E.2d 659 (2005).” Cites to factors set out in Castillo (February 5, 2007), below. “Appling claims that he was prejudiced by his inability to impeach [co-defendant] Flowers with a prior conviction, relying on Morris v. State , 204 Ga.App. 437(1), 419 S.E.2d 733 (1992) (State not entitled to secure conviction at proceeding where its witnesses are not subjet to impeachment). However, we agree with the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeals in Woods v. State , 255 Ga.App. 265, 267, 564 S.E.2d 853 (2002) ( Morris , supra , applicable only when co-defendant called as witness for State), and find this argument unavailing).” Co-defendant here wasn’t called as State’s witness, hence Morris not applicable. Accord, Metz v. State , 284 Ga. 614, 669 S.E.2d 121 (November 3, 2008) ( reversed on other grounds, State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (November 7, 2011)) ( citing Appling, Rhodes ). Castillo v. State, 281 Ga. 579, 642 S.E.2d 8 (February 5, 2007). “It is not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to deny a motion to sever where the number of defendants tried together is not so great as to create confusion of evidence, the law applicable to each defendant is substantially the same and there is no showing the jury was confused, and there was no Bruton problem. Isaac v. State , 269 Ga. 875 (7), 505 S.E.2d 480 (1998).” Here, trial court originally granted severance, but after first trial was mistried, rescinded the severance “because there had been no issue under Bruton .” No abuse of discretion. Accord, Appling v. State , 281 Ga. 590, 642 S.E.2d 37 (February 5, 2007). Adkins v. State, 281 Ga. 301, 637 S.E.2d 714 (November 20, 2006). Severance was not mandated “‘solely because each of the three defendants shared the same last name. See Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 605(9) (481 S.E.2d 203) (1997); Haynes v. State, 199 Ga.App. 288(7) (404 S.E.2d 585) (1991),’” quoting Adkins v. State, 279 Ga. 424, 426-427 (614 S.E.2d 67) (2005). White v. State, 281 Ga. 276, 637 S.E.2d 645 (November 20, 2006). No error if failing to sever co-defendants’ trials; “White … asserts that she was harmed by her inability to call Walker to testify, that evidence against Walker might have ‘spilled over’ to her and been considered against her, and that she was forced, by virtue of the chance of a coin toss, to give her closing argument before Walker. But, White makes no showing that Walker would have been more likely to testify if their trials had been severed. See Owen v. State, 266 Ga. 312, 314(2) (467 S.E.2d 325) (1996). … As to the spillover effect of evidence, the mere fact that the evidence against Walker might have been stronger than the evidence against White does not mandate severance. See Strozier v. State, 277 Ga. 78, 81(5)(b) (586 S.E.2d 309) (2003). Nor is there any harm shown by the order of closing arguments. Of necessity, in a joint trial, even when there are antagonistic defenses, one defendant must argue first. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying White’s motion to sever.” Accord, Maldonado v. State , 284 Ga.App. 26, 643 S.E.2d 316 (March 7, 2007); Taylor v. State , 285 Ga.App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381 (June 6, 2007); Lankford v. State , 295 Ga.App. 590, 672 S.E.2d 534 (January 16, 2009) (fact that evidence stronger against one defendant doesn’t require severance); Garmon v. State , 317 Ga.App. 634, 732 S.E.2d 289 (September 18, 2012); Griffin v. State , 292 Ga. 321, 737 S.E.2d 682 (January 22, 2013) (“There is no evidence in the record that [co- defendant] Boyd's co-defendants would have been willing to testify at a separate trial, let alone that their testimony would