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have corroborated his defense of alibi.”). Denny v. State, 281 Ga. 114, 636 S.E.2d 500 (October 16, 2006). “A defendant who seeks a severance must show clearly that he will be prejudiced by a joint trial, and in the absence of such a showing, this Court will not disturb the trial court’s denial of a severance motion. Rhodes v. State, 279 Ga. 587, 589(3) (619 S.E.2d 659) (2005).” Evidence tying co- defendant to crime scene did not require severance, nor did co-defendant’s “longer criminal history.” “As to other criminal acts and any ‘guilt by association,’ the trial court instructed the jury about the limited purposes of such evidence and also that it was not authorized to find a person guilty of a crime who was ‘merely associated’ with other involved persons. [Cit.] Nor can it be said that the [co-defendants’] defenses were antagonistic to each other because both denied being at the crime scene. [Cit.]” Jordan v. State, 281 Ga.App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (September 1, 2006). No error in trial court’s refusal to sever defendant’s armed robbery trial from co-defendants. “When the death penalty is not sought, the severance of defendants’ trials is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its decision will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of that discretion. OCGA § 17-8-4. The burden is on the defendant moving for severance to demonstrate more than the possibility that a separate trial would provide him with a better chance of acquittal; he must establish a clear showing of prejudice. (Citation and footnote omitted.) Moore v. State, 261 Ga.App. 752, 753(1), 583 S.E.2d 588 (2003). See also Rust v. State, 264 Ga.App. 893, 898(2), 592 S.E.2d 525 (2003). In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider the following factors: (1) whether the number of defendants creates confusion as to the law and evidence to be applied to each; (2) whether a danger exists that evidence admissible against one defendant might be considered against the other notwithstanding instructions to the contrary; and (3) whether the defenses are antagonistic to each other or each other’s rights. See Robinson [ v. State, 259 Ga.App. 555, 557(1), 578 S.E.2d 214 (2003)]. Jordan has offered no evidence that the jurors were confused, that the defendants’ defenses were antagonistic to each other, or that evidence admitted against her co-defendants was improperly considered against her. Contrary to Jordan’s claim that the evidence against her was minimal, two witnesses placed her vehicle at the scene of the robbery and speeding away from the scene; within minutes of the robbery, [witness] Keefe observed Jordan’s vehicle in the vicinity of Zales, traveling at a high rate of speed; [other witnesses] observed her vehicle speeding and driving erratically on Interstate 85; and Jordan was in the presence of all four co-defendants and the stolen jewelry when officers finally stopped her vehicle. [Cit.] But see Price v. State, 155 Ga.App. 844, 845(1), 273 S.E.2d 225 (1980) (reversing denial of motion to sever where little or no evidence connected defendant to robbery and overwhelming evidence, i.e., five witness identifications, connected co-defendant to robbery). Furthermore, Jordan has not shown that the failure to sever the trials precluded a fair determination of her guilt or innocence. See Moore, supra at 754(1), 583 S.E.2d 588, citing Ledbetter v. State, 202 Ga.App. 524, 525(2), 414 S.E.2d 737 (1992). Indeed, the jury acquitted Jordan of kidnapping with bodily injury and aggravated assault of [victim] Glenn, indicating the ability to decide each case separately. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Jordan’s motion to sever.” Accord, Cartledge v. State , 285 Ga.App. 145, 645 S.E.2d 633 (April 18, 2007); Bowe v. State , 288 Ga.App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (November 9, 2007); Nelms v. State , 285 Ga. 718, 681 S.E.2d 141 (June 29, 2009) (citing same three factors); Butler v. State , 290 Ga. 412, 721 S.E.2d 876 (January 23, 2012); Williams v. State , 316 Ga.App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (July 12, 2012); Hicks v. State , 295 Ga. 268, 759 S.E.2d 509 (June 2, 2014). Diaz v. State, 280 Ga.App. 413, 634 S.E.2d 160 (July 11, 2006). “[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Diaz’s motion to sever. The offenses were a series of continuous acts connected together both in time and the area in which committed and there was no likelihood of confusion. See Morrow v. State, 226 Ga.App. 833, 834(1) (487 S.E.2d 669) (1997). ‘Furthermore, the mere fact that co-defendants’ defenses are antagonistic is not sufficient in itself to warrant separate trials. ’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hill [ v. State, 212 Ga.App. 448, 449(1) 442 S.E.2d 298 (1994)]. ‘ A showing of harm is necessary .’ (Citation omitted.) Cain v. State, 235 Ga. 128, 129 (218 S.E.2d 856) (1975). As Diaz ‘fails to point to any testimony or other evidence introduced at the joint trial he received that could not have been introduced against him in a separate trial,’ he has failed to meet his burden of showing harm. Williams v. State, 213 Ga.App. 458, 460(2) (444 S.E.2d 831) (1994).” Accord, Maldonado v. State , 284 Ga.App. 26, 643 S.E.2d 316 (March 7, 2007); Jackson v. State , 284 Ga.App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491 (March 28, 2007); Hendrix v. State , 284 Ga. 420, 667 S.E.2d 597 (October 6, 2008); Bailey v. State , 295 Ga.App. 480, 672 S.E.2d 450 (January 8, 2009); Dixon v. State , 285 Ga. 312, 677 S.E.2d 76 (April 28, 2009); Daniels v. State , 306 Ga.App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (October 26, 2010); White v. State , 308 Ga.App. 38, 706 S.E.2d 570 (February 22, 2011); Ward v. State , 288 Ga. 641, 706 S.E.2d 430 (February 28, 2011); Williams v. State , 308 Ga.App. 464, 708 S.E.2d 32 (March 16, 2011); Scruggs v. State , 309 Ga.App. 569, 711 S.E.2d 86 (May 13, 2011).