☢ test - Í

Jones v. State, 277 Ga.App. 185, 626 S.E.2d 142 (January 9, 2006). Fact that defendants were charged with different offenses did not require severance, where “the overall criminal conduct for which they were accused involved the same general place of occurrence, the same general conduct, as well as the same undercover officers. Such evidence, in the absence of a showing of prejudice, warranted a joint trial. [Cit.]” Thornton v. State, 279 Ga. 676, 620 S.E.2d 356 (October 3, 2005). Trial court had no obligation to sever sua sponte. “‘The right to a severance under ... Georgia law ... arises only upon an appropriate motion. No motion to sever having been made in the trial court, the contention is without merit.’ Coachman v. State, 236 Ga. 473(1) (224 S.E.2d 36) (1976).” Rhodes v. State, 279 Ga. 587, 619 S.E.2d 659 (September 19, 2005). “To the extent that Rhodes’ defense may have been antagonistic to that of her co-defendant, that factor in itself is insufficient to warrant the grant of a separate trial absent a showing of harm. Holmes v. State, 272 Ga. 517(2), 529 S.E.2d 879 (2000). Rhodes has failed to make any showing that antagonism between Collum and herself was harmful to her. Evidence offered by Collum that arguably could be construed as implicating Rhodes was merely cumulative of the State’s evidence against her. See Loren v. State, 268 Ga. 792(2), 493 S.E.2d 175 (1997). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to sever.” Clark v. State, 279 Ga. 243, 611 S.E.2d 38 (March 28, 2005). “Co-defendant[’s] use of testimony showing him to be less culpable than Clark does not make their defenses antagonistic and prejudicial. Liggins v. State, 239 Ga. 452, 453(1), 238 S.E.2d 34 (1977).” Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 611 S.E.2d 3 (March 28, 2005). “ We are unable to perceive how the assertion of an alibi defense by Howard was harmful to Durham who admitted his participation in the crimes. It follows that Durham did not make a clear showing that he was prejudiced by an antagonistic defense of his co-defendant which amounted to a denial of due process.” Accord, Marquez v. State , 298 Ga. 448, 782 S.E.2d 648 (February 8, 2016). Styles v. State, 279 Ga. 134, 610 S.E.2d 23 (February 21, 2005). No abuse of discretion in refusing to sever co- defendants’ trials: “there was no likelihood of confusion because there were only two defendants who acted in concert and the defenses they put forward were not antagonistic in that both denied any involvement in the crimes. Severance would not have limited the introduction of the evidence Styles contends was unduly prejudicial to him, e.g., incriminating statements made by [co-defendant] to police, because such statements would have been admissible against him in a separate trial as the statements of a co-conspirator. OCGA § 24-3-5; Copeland v. State, 266 Ga. 664(2)(b), 469 S.E.2d 672 (1996). Styles’ claim that the physical and testimonial evidence against Sampson was overwhelming in comparison to the evidence of his own guilt is belied by the record. Under these facts, we see no abuse of discretion in the denial of severance. See Burgess v. State, 276 Ga. 185(4), 576 S.E.2d 863 (2003).” Grant v. State, 278 Ga. 536, 604 S.E.2d 515 (October 25, 2004). No severance required: “the two co-defendants each consistently denied his own participation in crimes without directly implicating the other, and … both equally sought to place responsibility on (third co-defendant/state’s witness). See Kelley v. State, 248 Ga. 133, 135(3) (281 S.E.2d 589) (1981). Under these circumstances, the defenses were not antagonistic.” Rhodes v. State, 267 Ga.App. 673, 601 S.E.2d 139 (June 3, 2004). “The decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Broomfield v. State [264 Ga. 145 (442 S.E.2d 242) (1994)] stands as authority for the proposition that a defendant facing a multi-defendant trial has no right to oppose a co-defendant’s motion for severance . [Id. at 147] It follows that Rhodes lacks standing to complain of the trial court’s decision to sever his trial from that of the co-indictees at the request of the state. … Furthermore, ‘[a] motion for severance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The ruling of the trial court is subject to reversal only for an abuse of that discretion.’ [Cit.] A trial court’s grant of a severance in order to avoid violation of a co-indictee’s constitutional rights under Bruton is not an abuse of discretion. [Cit.]” Baskin v. State, 267 Ga.App. 711, 600 S.E.2d 599 (May 5, 2004). Defendant contends he was entitled to a severance from trial with his co-defendant because their defenses were antagonistic, and co-defendant elected to testify, thus prejudicing defendant for exercising his right to remain silent. “‘No prejudice amounting to a denial of [defendant’s] due process protection is demonstrated by the circumstance that an accomplice, who is subject to cross-examination, takes the stand and blames the [defendant] or attributes to him a greater degree of culpability than the accomplice himself bears.’” [Cit.] [Co-defendant’s] testimony would have been admissible even if Baskin had been tried separately.” Accord, Mosley v. State , 296 Ga.App. 746, 675 S.E.2d 607 (March 19, 2009).