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declining to sever defendant’s charges from co-defendant’s. “Contrary to appellant's contention, he was not harmed by the improper admission into evidence of testimony that an unidentified person at the crime scene stated that [co-defendant] Lindsey was the shooter.” Cox v. State, 242 Ga.App. 334, 528 S.E.2d 871 (January 28, 2000). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed. Trial court properly denied co-defendants’ motions to sever. 1. Trial court could deny severance motion from defendant who contended he only kicked the victim once, not multiple times like the other defendants. “Cox contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever because the extensive medical evidence regarding the victim's head injuries was likely to confuse the jury since Cox did not cause those injuries, citing Crawford v. State, 148 Ga.App. 523, 251 S.E.2d 602 (1978). … Viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, the evidence shows that Cox participated in the group attack on the victim. Therefore, he is criminally responsible for the injuries inflicted by all parties to the crime even if he personally delivered only one blow. Moore v. State, 216 Ga.App. 450-451(1), 454 S.E.2d 638 (1995); Johnson v. State, 188 Ga.App. 411, 412(2), 373 S.E.2d 93 (1988); see OCGA § 16-2-20. We find it unlikely that the jury was confused by the medical evidence of the severity of the victim's injuries.” 2. No requirement to sever co- defendants from defendant who told police, “‘that he knows now what everyone meant about you only get in trouble with your so-called friends.’ We find that the trial court correctly concluded that Chappell's statement did not clearly inculpate Cox and Cooper because it did not identify them either by name or by description and did not attribute any specific acts to them. Owen v. State, 266 Ga. 312, 314(4), 467 S.E.2d 325 (1996).” 3. No severance required where co-defendants made “statements which admitted minimal involvement in the beating thereby implying that Chappell, who had admitted kicking the victim 30 times, was responsible for the majority of the victim's injuries. We find no prejudice in the joint trial where, despite Chappell's greater degree of admitted culpability, the jury convicted him of the same crime as those with minimal admitted culpability-one count of aggravated assault. Lewis v. State, 147 Ga.App. 794, 796(3), 250 S.E.2d 522 (1978). York v. State, 242 Ga.App. 281, 528 S.E.2d 823 (January 21, 2000). Convictions of some co-defendants for armed robbery and related offenses, and of armed robbery victims at same trial for cocaine trafficking, affirmed; no error in joining all defendants for trial although there was no “common scheme” between the robbers and their drug- dealing victims. “‘[C]ommon scheme’ is not the only rationale for joinder and, thus, not the only rationale for denying severance. ‘The trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a severance motion where evidence of one charge would be admissible in the trial of the other.’ Hunter v. State, 237 Ga.App. 803, 804-805(1), 517 S.E.2d 534 (1999). In that regard, evidence that Crawford kept large quantities of cocaine in his home went to the motive for the other co- defendants' armed invasion of that home and the subsequent shooting of Crawford. Such evidence showing motive is relevant and admissible. Coker v. State, 207 Ga.App. 482, 483, 428 S.E.2d 578 (1993). Likewise, the police investigation of the acts of McCall, York, Hill, and Mathis explains the way in which Crawford was arrested for the trafficking offenses and is, thus, admissible: ‘Testimony of the arresting officer with reference to the legal investigation and circumstances surrounding the arrest is authorized as original evidence under OCGA § 24-3-2.’ Ward v. State, 193 Ga.App. 137, 138- 139(2), 387 S.E.2d 150 (1989). Since Crawford's offenses would have been admissible upon the trial of the other co- defendants' offenses, and vice versa, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance. Dennis v. State, 263 Ga. 257, 260(6), 430 S.E.2d 742 (1993).” Slaughter v. State, 240 Ga.App. 758, 525 S.E.2d 130 (November 10, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to severance from co-defendant who “threatened the life of one of the arresting officers” while awaiting trial. “Slaughter contends that the refusal to sever prejudiced him because it caused the jury to associate him with a co-defendant who threatened the life of a witness. This contention asserts no more than the possibility of prejudice. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury to consider the evidence and the law independently as to each defendant. Under the circumstances, we find no showing of actual prejudice, no denial of due process, and no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying the motion to sever.” Mathis v. State, 238 Ga.App. 218, 517 S.E.2d 578 (May 11, 1999). Severance was not demanded as to two co-defendants in convenience store robbery. “The issues in the instant case for jury resolution were simple and straightforward. Neither the number of defendants nor their trial tactics created any confusion as to either the evidence or the applicable law. There were only two defendants on trial and the primary issue was the identity of the robbers. Neither defendant testified so no issue exists as to conflicting co-defendant testimony. Mathis made no showing that [co-defendant] Kelly would have been more likely to testify if they had been tried separately and that if Kelly had testified, his testimony would have tended to exculpate Mathis. Although Kelly’s statement was introduced in evidence, his and Mathis’ defenses were not antagonistic and, as determined above, the Bruton error did not affect the verdict. The trial court did not abuse its