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discretion when it denied the motion to sever.” Accord, Marquez v. State , 298 Ga. 448, 782 S.E.2d 648 (February 8, 2016) (“the inability to compel the testimony of a codefendant in a joint trial does not require severance in the absence of a showing that the co-defendant would, in fact, have been more likely to testify if they were tried separately and that the testimony of the co-defendant would have been exculpatory.”). Whitehead v. State, 237 Ga.App. 551, 515 S.E.2d 866 (April 8, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for severance. “The fact that the evidence as to one of two co-defendants is stronger does not demand a finding that denial of a motion to sever is an abuse of discretion, where there is evidence showing they acted together. See Strickland v. State, 212 Ga.App. 170, 172(2), 441 S.E.2d 494 (1994). The same evidence would have been presented had the two defendants been tried separately.” Here, co-defendant took purse from shopping cart, on videotape, but other evidence showed that defendant was acting in concert with him. Accord, Davis v. State, 244 Ga.App. 345, 535 S.E.2d 528 (June 7, 2000). Adorno v. State, 236 Ga.App. 588, 512 S.E.2d 703 (February 22, 1999). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; no error in denying severance. “‘This case involved only two defendants. The trial court instructed the jury to consider the guilt or innocence of each defendant separately, and the jury acquitted [Adorno’s] co-defendant. Therefore, we find no danger that the number of defendants was so great as to cause confusion of the evidence and the law. Although a custodial statement [co-defendant Rodriguez] made was introduced at trial, the trial court cautioned the jury to consider that statement only against [Rodriguez].’ (Citations omitted.) Skidmore v. State, 226 Ga.App. 130(1), 485 S.E.2d 540 (1997). Moreover, antagonistic defenses alone do not require severance. Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 801, 802(3), 471 S.E.2d 191 (1996). Rather, Adorno must show harm. Id. Adorno contends that severance was warranted, claiming he was harmed by the admission of Rodriguez’s statement at their joint trial in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Pretermitting the question of whether Rodriguez's statement was inadmissible under Bruton (an issue which Adorno does not raise on appeal), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the trial. The State did not base its case against Adorno upon Rodriguez’s statement. To the contrary, the case against Adorno was based on the fact that the police caught him carrying well over 800 grams of cocaine. Accordingly, Adorno is unable to show harm by the introduction of Rodriguez’s statement. See Guimond v. State, 259 Ga. 752, 755(3), 386 S.E.2d 158 (1989); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 805(4), 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998).” Accord, Pryer v. State , 245 Ga.App. 279, 537 S.E.2d 717 (July 21, 2000) (antagonistic defenses alone not enough to mandate severance); Bowe v. State , 288 Ga.App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (November 9, 2007) (same); Griffin v. State , 292 Ga. 321, 737 S.E.2d 682 (January 22, 2013) (same); Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 773 S.E.2d 254 (June 1, 2015) (neither two defendants, nor antagonistic defenses were sufficient to mandate severance). 2. SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES Harrell v. State, 297 Ga. 884, 778 S.E.2d 196 (October 5, 2015). Conviction for animal cruelty reversed; trial court erred in failing to sever the charge from other, unrelated charges of intimidating court officers (also reversed on First Amendment grounds). “Of course, cruelty to an animal and endeavoring to intimidate a court officer are not, judging by their statutory elements, similar crimes. Nor do the facts surrounding the commission of the acts alleged exhibit the basis for a proper joinder of charges. The indictment alleged that animal cruelty was committed on April 16, 2013, and that Harrell endeavored to intimidate the court officers on April 29, 2013. Although the acts were alleged to have been committed in close proximity of time, the record is devoid of any indication that they were committed in pursuit of some common scheme or that they had some connection. As alleged, they were simply separate crimes of different character, committed 13 days apart. … As there was no showing that the crimes alleged were based on the same conduct, were part of a single scheme or plan, or were a series of connected acts, joinder was not authorized.” Daughtry v. State, 296 Ga. 849, 770 S.E.2d 862 (March 27, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to seek severance of offenses. When arrested for murder, almost three months after the crime, defendant was found in possession of cocaine. The murder, cocaine possession, and other related charges were all tried together. “[G]iven the role that crack cocaine played in the death of the victim, the trial court would not have been required to grant a motion to sever, and Appellant's counsel cannot be said to have performed deficiently in failing to file such a motion.” “In severance cases, we have generally ‘“upheld joinder of two crimes when one crime is a circumstance of the arrest on the other crime.”’ Woolfolk v. State, 282 Ga. 139, 140(2), 644 S.E.2d 828 (2007). We have said that, in these circumstances, the crime committed at the time of arrest is a related offense to the other crimes. See Roundtree v. State, 270 Ga. 504(3), 511 S.E.2d 190 (1999). But we have on occasion examined the circumstances of the arrest to determine if the crimes committed then are directly related and relevant to the original crimes other than for the reason that the crimes occurred at the time of arrest. See Woolfolk, 282 Ga. at 140–141, 644