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remember it, and defendant didn’t raise it. Williams v. Moody, 287 Ga. 665, 697 S.E.2d 199 (July 5, 2010). Habeas court erred in granting petition for relief from defendant’s armed robbery and aggravated battery convictions; 1. contrary to court’s findings, defendant’s right to challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel wasn’t foreclosed by fact that trial counsel represented defendant on appeal. “Where, as here, the defendant is represented by trial counsel through completion of the appellate process,[fn] the failure to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel prior to the direct appeal does not constitute a waiver of the ability to raise the claim since the defendant is able to raise the claim in a habeas proceeding. See Arthur v. Walker, 285 Ga. 578 n. 1 (679 S.E.2d 13) (2009) (where appellate counsel served as trial counsel, convicted defendant's claims in habeas petition of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were not barred); Gibson v. Head, 282 Ga. 156(2) (646 S.E.2d 257) (2007) ( where trial counsel serves as appellate counsel the conflict of interest claim supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is exempt from the procedural default rule of habeas corpus ). Compare White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 (401 S.E.2d 733) (1991) (a convicted defendant pursuing habeas relief was procedurally barred from raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel because appellate counsel who did not serve as trial counsel had not raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel ‘at the first possible stage of post-conviction review.’). Consequently, it was error for the habeas court to rely on the theory that Moody would lose his right to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if it were not raised prior to his direct appeal.” 2. “ The alternate finding of actual conflict of interest – that counsel was in a state of constitutional conflict when he did not withdraw from the case upon Moody's assertion that he believed himself to be a victim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel – is not supported by the record because the motion in which it was raised was unauthorized and without effect. Moody expressed his contention that trial counsel's representation fell below the constitutional standard in a pro se motion he filed while he was represented by trial counsel. [fn] As we noted in Garland [ v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 203 (657 S.E.2d 842) (2008)] , a convicted defendant is not authorized to assert a pro se claim of ineffective assistance while represented by counsel. ‘[T]he Sixth Amendment right does not afford the defendant the hybrid right to simultaneously represent himself and be represented by counsel. [Cit.]’ ( Hance v. Kemp, 258 Ga. 649(1) (373 S.E.2d 184) (1988)), and under the 1983 Georgia Constitution, ‘a layperson does not have the right to represent himself and also be represented by an attorney....’ Seagraves v. State, 259 Ga. 36(2) (376 S.E.2d 670) (1989). A pro se motion filed by a convicted defendant while represented by counsel is ‘unauthorized and without effect.’ Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358(5) (613 S.E.2d 628) (2005); Ditman v. State, 301 Ga.App. 187(2c) (687 S.E.2d 155) (2009). Because Moody's motion was unauthorized and without effect, its contents are without force to support any viable claim of an actual conflict of interest on the part of counsel. [fn] Consequently, there was no impediment to counsel's continued representation of Moody on appeal.” Accord, Bell v. State , 287 Ga. 670, 697 S.E.2d 793 (July 12, 2010) (“trial court erred by requiring appellate counsel to raise claims of ineffective assistance even though counsel found no merit to them, simply because the defendant wanted the claims to be asserted. Appellate counsel controls the issues to be raised on appeal; a defendant's pro se motion seeking to raise an ineffectiveness claim while still represented by counsel is a nullity; and the defendant does not waive review of an ineffectiveness claim against the lawyer whose ineffectiveness is at issue as long as that lawyer's representation continues,” citing Williams v. Moody .); Horne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012) (pro se motion filed while still represented was “unauthorized and without effect,” quoting Williams v. Moody ). White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 699 S.E.2d 291 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder, concealing a death and evidence tampering affirmed; no ineffective assistance despite counsel’s actual conflict of interest. Counsel, an assistant public defender, had an actual conflict of interest because her office had a policy of not allowing their clients to accept a plea offer that called for a life sentence; after trial, defendant was sentenced to life plus 13 years. “The question of whether an attorney labors under an actual conflict of interest for purposes of the Sixth Amendment generally arises when the purported conflict stems from the attorney's representation of multiple defendants concurrently. See Mickens v. Taylor, [535 U.S. 162, 174-176 (122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291) (2002)]; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333) (1979). [fn] This Court has also found a Sixth Amendment actual conflict to occur when the attorney's duty of loyalty to his client conflicts with the attorney's duty to the attorney's employer. Edwards v. Lewis, 283 Ga. 345, 350 (658 S.E.2d 116) (2008). See also Sallie v. State, 269 Ga. 446(2) (499 S.E.2d 897) (1998) (actual conflict of interest arose where co-defense counsel served simultaneously as the law clerk for the judicial circuit in which his client was being tried). These cases have presented ‘circumstances of such magnitude’ that the defendant was relieved of the responsibility of establishing that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different because the likelihood was so high that the actual conflict of interest rendered the verdict or the outcome of the direct appeal unreliable. In such circumstances, to obtain relief, the defendant need only demonstrate that the conflict of interest existed and that it significantly affected counsel's performance. Edwards v. Lewis, supra, 283 Ga. 345(grant of habeas relief); Sallie v. State, supra, 269 Ga. 446(2) (grant of