☢ test - Í

new trial). In the case at bar, appellant demonstrated an actual conflict of interest under Edwards v. Lewis by establishing that counsel's duty of loyalty to her client was in conflict with her duty of loyalty to her employer, and that counsel's performance was adversely affected thereby in that counsel declined to pursue appellant's desire to enter a guilty plea in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment. In this case, however, counsel's actual conflict did not render the verdict unreliable since appellant wished to plead guilty and the jury trial resulted in a guilty verdict. The prejudicial effect of counsel's conflict in this case is limited to the thirteen additional years appellant was sentenced to serve following the jury's verdicts that he would not have had to serve had he entered the guilty plea he would have entered but for counsel's actual conflict of interest. The trial court recognized the available remedy – to modify appellant's sentence to impose the life imprisonment sentence he would have received had he pled guilty-but appellant declined that remedy and asserted instead his entitlement to a new trial. However, the grant of a new trial is not an available option since the circumstances of the actual conflict established in this case are not of the magnitude that render the likelihood of an unreliable verdict so high that we abandon the case-by-case inquiry of the Strickland prejudice prong. Since appellant has not established an actual conflict of interest that would entitle him to a new trial and declined the remedy available to him, the trial court did not err in holding that appellant did not establish he received ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rabie v. State, 294 Ga.App. 187, 668 S.E.2d 833 (October 22, 2008). No ineffective assistance shown where defense counsel was forced to choose between continuing to represent defendant or becoming a witness (to impeach witness whose testimony varied from statement made to counsel). As in Ford v. State , 275 Ga.App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262 (2005), “counsel's decision to continue representation and cross-examine [witness] about the phone conversation rather than withdraw as counsel was a reasonable tactical decision.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, this type of “conflict of interest” is not evaluated under the standard for conflicts based on multiple representations set out in Cuyler v. Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335, 345(IV) (100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333) (1980). Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 668 S.E.2d 651 (October 6, 2008). No showing of conflict of interest, or ineffective assistance, upon mere showing of large caseload by defendant’s indigent defender. “Whatley argues that trial counsel was forced to choose between representing Whatley and representing counsel's other clients.” However, “Whatley's case is not a case involving the joint representation of co-defendants and because it appears not to be a case involving other factors that make prejudice both highly probable and exceptionally difficult to prove. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174-175(III) (122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291) (2002).” Thus, no presumption of prejudice as in these more traditional conflict of interest cases. “Given the time counsel actually dedicated to Whatley's case and the quality of representation that the record shows that counsel provided, Whatley's vague statistics are not sufficient to show the existence of an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's performance.” Holsey v. State, 291 Ga.App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (April 17, 2008). Counsel had no conflict of interest requiring withdrawal merely because defendant file bar complaint against him. “Holsey argues that his loss of trust and confidence in his trial counsel, which culminated in his filing of a bar grievance, created a conflict of interest that should have resulted in his counsel’s withdrawal. However, at the hearing on Holsey’s motion for new trial, his trial counsel testified that he was aware of the bar complaint but was not offended by it and that it did not undermine his ability to effectively represent Holsey. Thus, as evidence supported its determination, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that Holsey failed to carry his burden of proving that trial counsel’s refusal to withdraw constituted ineffective assistance. See [ Daguilar v. State, 275 Ga.App. 756, 759(2) (621 S.E.2d 846) (2005)]; Williams v. State, 273 Ga.App. 213, 218(3)(c) (614 S.E.2d 834) (2005) (defendant’s threat to sue trial counsel and dissatisfaction with trial counsel’s strategy did not constitute evidence that the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated such that counsel was unable to be effective).” Edwards v. Lewis, 283 Ga. 345, 658 S.E.2d 116 (February 25, 2008). In defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession, denial of habeas petition reversed based on actual conflict of interest of trial and appellate counsel. Counsel were employed by the Public Defender’s Office, which agreed with the superior court judges in Dekalb County in 2001 that the court would immediately begin using 2000 census data in creating and balancing the jury box; in return, public defenders would not challenge the jury arrays in “past” cases such as Edwards’s. Both trial counsel and appellate counsel testified in the habeas proceeding that they felt the challenge to the array was a strong issue, but were prohibited from raising it by their offices. “Edwards’s trial and appellate attorneys confronted a situation in which their duties to their employer, the public defender's office, directly conflicted with their duties of loyalty and zealous advocacy to their client, Edwards. See Ga. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 5.2(a) (‘A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.’). Worse yet, Edwards’s trial and appellate counsel were told by their employer that the instruction not to pursue the jury array issue in Edwards’s case was based on an agreement sanctioned by the judges of the DeKalb County Superior Court. We have no difficulty