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concluding that this situation rises to the level of an ongoing, actual conflict of interest between Edwards’s interests and the interests of his trial and appellate counsel. See Ga. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. [4] (‘Loyalty to a client is ... impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer’s other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.’). Furthermore, we find that the conflict of interest significantly affected the representation Edwards received from his trial and appellate counsel. It is undisputed that both attorneys believed the jury array issue was a strong one and that they did not pursue the issue as diligently as they otherwise would have because of the agreement between the public defender’s office and the DeKalb County Superior Court judges. Edwards was not required to prove anything more to demonstrate a significant effect on his trial and appellate attorneys’ representation of him.” “ A … limited presumption of prejudice arises where an attorney represents a client despite an actual conflict of interest. In this situation, the attorney ‘breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties.’ Strickland [ v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984)]. See Sallie v. State, 269 Ga. 446, 448 (499 S.E.2d 897) (1998) (‘Undivided loyalty is an essential element of the right to counsel.’); Ga. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. [1] (‘Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.’). Moreover, the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests can be exceedingly difficult to determine. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 (98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426) (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680) (1942). Requiring a showing of Strickland prejudice – i.e., a reasonable probability that but for the conflict of interest, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different – would set the bar for such claims too high. Thus, a defendant or habeas petitioner asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on an actual conflict of interest need only demonstrate that the conflict of interest existed and that it ‘significantly affected counsel’s performance .’ Mickens [ v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173 (122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291) (2002)]. Accord Cuyler [ v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-350 (100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333) (1980)].” No evidence here that defendant waived the conflict. Gardner v. State, 289 Ga.App. 359, 657 S.E.2d 288 (January 29, 2008). Appointed counsel moved to withdraw from representing defendant upon learning that counsel’s partner had been appointed to represent co-defendant, and the two defendants had antagonistic defenses. At hearing on motion to withdraw, however, counsel’s partner withdrew from the case, but defendant’s counsel stayed with the case at defendant’s express request, waiving any conflict. After conviction, defendant contends he received ineffective assistance because of the conflict. Held, because defendant expressly waived any conflicts, there was no ineffective assistance. “‘Where [a] defendant[ ] state[s] on the record that [he has] discussed the case with counsel, that there is no conflict of interest and that [he is] satisfied to proceed ..., any error was induced by the defendant[’]s statements, and induced error is impermissible. A party can not during the trial ignore what he thinks to be an injustice, take a chance on a favorable verdict, and complain later.’ Miller v. State, 271 Ga.App. 524, 525(2) (610 S.E.2d 156) (2005), citing Brumelow v. State, 239 Ga.App. 119, 123(6) (520 S.E.2d 776) (1999).” Gibbs v. State, 287 Ga.App. 694, 652 S.E.2d 591 (October 1, 2007). Defendant received ineffective assistance at his child molestation trial, from counsel who also served as guardian ad litem for the victim in juvenile court. Counsel’s representation of the victim prevented him from attacking her credibility with defendant’s contention that she had falsely accused defendant, as well as three other men previously. “[T]rial counsel was ethically barred from requesting access to the confidential juvenile records of [alleged victim] A.S. … for the purpose of gaining information to attack A. S.’s motives and credibility when cross-examining her in defense of Gibbs, her accused molester. See Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7; Hill [ v. State, 269 Ga. 23, 24(2) (494 S.E.2d 661) (1998)] (actual conflict existed and defense counsel barred from cross-examining prosecution witness, a former client, ‘where [there exists] the possibility that privileged information obtained ... in the earlier representation might be relevant to cross-examination.’) (punctuation and footnote omitted.)” “That conflict placed trial counsel squarely between the proverbial Scylla and Charybdis, in that he could either zealously defend Gibbs or protect the interests and confidential information of A.S. He could not, however, do both. In light of that fact, the conflict of interest under which trial counsel labored could not help but adversely impact his representation of Gibbs.” Bly v. State, 286 Ga.App. 43, 648 S.E.2d 446 (June 20, 2007), reversed on other grounds, 283 Ga. 453, 660 S.E.2d 713 (April 21, 2008). Defendant expressly waived any conflict. “Bly … alleges that his trial counsel had an impermissible conflict at the time he represented Bly. Specifically, he complains that his counsel served concurrently as a part-time city judge for the local recorder’s court, where he often heard Officer Hawk give testimony and where he had Bly arrested for contempt for cursing during a proceeding involving a relative of Bly’s. Bly, however, waived this issue when in light of these matters, the court conducted a pre-trial hearing in which Bly’s counsel offered to withdraw and the court offered to appoint other counsel. Bly declined the offers, explaining that he nevertheless wanted his counsel to