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continue representing him. Bly thereby waived the issue. See Golden v. State, 250 Ga.App. 288, 289-291(2) (551 S.E.2d 398) (2001).” McClain v. State, 284 Ga.App. 187, 643 S.E.2d 273 (February 28, 2007). No ineffective assistance where trial court substituted one public defender for another in the same office who had a conflict of interest; the conflict of one did not automatically create a conflict for the other. “‘To be successful in his appeal based on ineffective counsel due to a conflict of interest, [McClain] would have to show an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his attorney’s representation of him.’ (Citation omitted.) Porter [ v. State, 278 Ga. 694, 697(6) (606 S.E.2d 240) (2004)]. McClain has failed to meet his burden. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the replacement counsel possessed or withheld any information relevant to the impeachment of Bennett [witness who created first counsel’s conflict]. Moreover, Bennett was actually cross-examined by McClain’s lead counsel. Because McClain cannot show an actual conflict or prejudice, his claim lacks merit. See Porter [ v. State, 278 Ga. 694, 697(6) (606 S.E.2d 240) (2004)]; Turner v. State, 273 Ga. 340, 342- 343(2) (541 S.E.2d 641) (2001); Hill v. State, 269 Ga. 23, 24-25(2) (494 S.E.2d 661) (1998).” Garvin v. State, 283 Ga.App. 242, 641 S.E.2d 176 (December 13, 2006). No ineffective assistance based on conflict of interest in representing both co-defendants, although trial counsel testified at hearing on motion for new trial “that had he represented only Garvin, he would have brought up the fact that [co-defendant] Roberts’s relative rented the vehicle. That did not prejudice Garvin, however, because the record reveals that the defense theory was that neither Garvin nor Roberts rented the vehicle and that it was rented by a third party. Counsel therefore did not ‘slight the defense of one defendant for another.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Barnes [v. State, 160 Ga.App. 232, 233 (286 S.E.2d 519) (1981).] ‘A mere possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction amply supported by competent evidence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.” Accord, Mitchell v. State , 312 Ga.App. 293, 718 S.E.2d 126 (October 28, 2011) (no evidence that representation of co-defendants at trial suffered from “actual conflict of interest.”). Burns v. State, 281 Ga. 338, 638 S.E.2d 299 (November 30, 2006). Affirming 274 Ga.App. 687, 618 S.E.2d 600 (2005); burglary and related convictions affirmed. “Given that multiple representation alone does not amount to a conflict of interest when one attorney is involved, it follows that counsel from the same PDO [Public Defender’s Office] are not automatically disqualified from representing multiple defendants charged with offenses arising from the same conduct. We therefore decline to adopt any presumed or per se rule of conflict of interest involving attorneys in the same PDO [cit.], and hold that two attorneys from the same PDO can represent criminal co-defendants in those cases where no conflict exists.” No evidence of conflict here. “Accordingly, we do not reach the issue whether public defenders should be automatically disqualified or be treated differently from private law firm attorneys when actual or possible conflicts arise in multiple defendant representation cases.” Accord, Thomas v. State , 305 Ga.App. 801, 701 S.E.2d 202 (September 1, 2010) (“It is well settled that counsel from the same public defender office are not automatically disqualified from representing multiple defendants charged with offenses arising from the same conduct.”); Lytle v. State , 290 Ga. 177, 718 S.E.2d 296 (November 21, 2011); Perry v. State , 314 Ga.App. 575, 724 S.E.2d 874 (March 5, 2012) (noting that defendant confirmed on record pre-trial that he had discussed the conflict issue with counsel “and expressed his desire to waive the possible conflict and to proceed to trial.”); Pryor v. State , 333 Ga.App. 408, 776 S.E.2d 474 (May 19, 2015) (co-defendant represented by another lawyer in same public defender’s office; no ineffective assistance as “Pryor has not even argued that any conflict significantly affected his trial counsel's representation of him.”). Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253, 626 S.E.2d 102 (January 30, 2006). Grant of habeas relief following murder convictions reversed. Appellate counsel in same public defender’s office as prior appellate counsel were free to prosecute ineffective assistance of counsel claim, since trial counsel were no longer with that office. Distinguishing Ryan v. Thomas , 261 Ga. 661, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991) where “we recognized that one member of a public defender’s office could not reasonably be expected to assert or argue the ineffective assistance of a fellow member from the same office.” “It is well established that ‘[c]ounsel prosecuting an ineffective assistance claim must be free to operate independently of the attorney whose performance is in question. [Cits.]’ Davis v. Turpin, 273 Ga. 244, 248(3), 539 S.E.2d 129 (2000). The habeas court, however, overlooked the crucial fact, established by [appellate counsel] Phillips’ testimony, that all of Mancill’s prior FCPDO [Fulton County Public Defender’s Office] appellate counsel had left the office by the time Phillips was appointed to represent Mancill. [fn] The rationale in Ryan was not applicable to Mancill’s post-trial counsel who were no longer members of the FCPDO. [fn] ‘Since they were no longer practicing together, the conflict that arose in [ Ryan ], supra, was not present in this case.’ Glick v. Arkansas, 263 Ark. 679, 566 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Ark.1978).” Court notes that it does “not address whether Ryan applies where the attorney alleged to have rendered ineffective assistance was a former member of counsel’s law firm ” (emphasis added).