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Howerton v. Danenberg, 279 Ga. 861, 621 S.E.2d 738 (November 7, 2005). Habeas court properly granted defendant’s petition based on defense counsel’s conflict of interest. At time of defendant’s death penalty trial, defense counsel represented the DA “in a well-publicized federal challenge to [DA’s] use of preemptory strikes to remove minorities from his juries. The concurrent representation was not disclosed to the trial court or Danenberg.” “We conclude under the unique facts of this case that an actual conflict of interest existed because of defense counsel’s concurrent representation of Danenburg and the district attorney, and given the enormity of the penalty, the conflict was completely impermissible,” citing Sallie v. State , 269 Ga. 446, 499 S.E.2d 897 (1998) (“defense counsel’s simultaneous employment as counsel for the defendant and as a law clerk within the judicial circuit engendered, by itself, a disabling conflict”). “While there is no evidence in this case that defense counsel consciously performed deficiently or dishonorably as a result of his divided loyalties, even the performance of the most honorable attorney under similar circumstances could be subtly or unknowingly affected in ways difficult to detect on review. The mere existence of such an obvious and deleterious conflict undermines the adversarial process and calls into question the reliability of the outcome of proceedings.” Daguilar v. State, 275 Ga.App. 756, 621 S.E.2d 846 (October 6, 2005). Trial counsel’s assistance was not made ineffective by conflict of interest, although public defender’s office initially represented both defendant and his co- defendant. “[T]he record shows that once it was clear that a conflict existed based on the state’s evidence, the public defender representing Daguilar’s co-defendant withdrew from representing the co-defendant and a conflict attorney was appointed. In order for a criminal defendant to prevail on a claim that his attorney was ineffective due to a conflict of interest, he must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. See Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 854(3) (507 S.E.2d 419) (1998). The conflict of interest ‘must be palpable and have a substantial basis in fact. A theoretical or speculative conflict will not impugn a conviction which is supported by competent evidence.’ Id Here, Daguilar can show nothing other than the fact that the public defender’s office represented both he and his co- defendant prior to arraignment. As soon as the conflict was recognized, the public defender’s office withdrew from representing Daguilar’s co-defendant. Daguilar’s assertions of conflict are mere conjecture and are insufficient to support a finding of actual conflict. We find no violation of Daguilar’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Accord, Burns v. State , 281 Ga. 338, 638 S.E.2d 299 (November 30, 2006). Thomas v. State , 305 Ga.App. 801, 701 S.E.2d 202 (September 1, 2010). Ford v. State, 274 Ga.App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262 (July 11, 2005). Defendant was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor. Pre-trial, the minor allegedly told defense counsel that defendant didn’t know she was only 16. Counsel considered whether he should withdraw so she could testify about victim’s statement, but, “[r]ecognizing that withdrawing from representation would work a hardship on his client, counsel opted to remove himself as a witness in the case. Ultimately, the trial court permitted Ford’s attorney to ask C.W. whether she had made the statement to him about Ford not knowing that she was only 16. When counsel asked the question, C.W. responded, ‘And then I said no comment, I wasn't going to answer your questions.’ Ford argues that if an attorney may be called as a potential witness, then the attorney has an actual conflict of interest and can no longer represent the defendant. According to Ford, his counsel was hampered by an actual conflict and thus rendered ineffective assistance. ‘A trial court’s finding that a defendant has not been denied effective assistance of trial counsel will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.’ [Cit.] Here, the trial court found that Ford’s counsel ‘made the reasonable tactical decision to forego additional, cumulative impeachment of [C.W.] by not withdrawing and remaining as the experienced advocate moving forward with Mr. Ford’s pending demand for a speedy trial.’ Accordingly, the trial court found that counsel did not render ineffective assistance. This finding is not clearly erroneous…. Ford essentially contends that, given the actual conflict, his attorney could not reasonably decide to continue representation. We disagree. As this Court recently held, ‘[b]y actual conflict, the law means more than the bare possibility that a conflict may have developed. The conflict must be palpable and have a substantial basis in fact.’ [Cit.] In this case, counsel at most could have provided additional evidence to impeach C. W.’s testimony. As noted by the trial court, however, the record contained other evidence that tended to impeach the girl’s credibility, …. In view of the ample impeachment evidence, trial counsel could reasonably conclude that his additional testimony was not substantial enough to warrant his withdrawal from the case; in other words, that the conflict was not palpable. Moreover, had the trial court disqualified counsel, it would have implicated Ford’s right to freely chosen counsel; ‘an important interest which requires that any curtailment ... be approached with great caution.’ The record shows that the attorneys, the trial court, and Ford were aware of the conflict. Blumenfeld v. Borenstein, 247 Ga. 406, 408 (276 S.E.2d 607) (1981). Nonetheless – for tactical reasons – counsel opted to continue representation and withdraw his name from the witness list. And Ford and his trial counsel certainly were in the best position to balance the competing interests and determine that counsel should remove his name from the witness list rather than withdraw from representation and testify. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s conclusion that, in so doing, counsel rendered effective assistance is not clearly erroneous.” Accord, Wheat v. State , 282 Ga.App. 655, 639 S.E.2d 578 (November 30, 2006) (counsel not