☢ test - Í

Jackson v. State, 276 Ga.App. 77, 622 S.E.2d 423 (October 24, 2005). Defendant’s original charges, and attempt to escape while incarcerated awaiting trial, could be tried together. “Where a defendant escapes from jail while awaiting trial on another charge, the original offense and the escape charge may, under certain circumstances, be deemed a series of connected acts such that the trial court may in its discretion deny the defendant’s motion to sever. Bland v. State, [264 Ga. 610, 611(2), 449 S.E.2d 116 (1994)]; Carter v. State, 155 Ga.App. 840, 842(2) (273 S.E.2d 417) (1980). This is because evidence of flight would be admissible at a separate trial as to the original charge to show consciousness of guilt, and evidence of the defendant’s alleged commission of the original charge would be admissible at a separate trial on the escape charge to show the lawfulness of the confinement from which the defendant escaped. Bland v. State, 264 Ga. at 611(2); Strozier v. State, 145 Ga.App. 566, 568(3) (244 S.E.2d 89) (1978). In this case, although the State was not required to prove the lawfulness of the confinement because Jackson was not charged with attempted escape, the jury would be authorized to infer that Jackson committed the October 13, 2001 offenses in an attempt to escape from jail and avoid prosecution for the September 19, 2001 armed robbery. After reviewing the record and transcript, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever. Bland v. State, 264 Ga. at 611(2); Carter v. State, 155 Ga.App. at 843(2); Strozier v. State, 145 Ga.App. at 568(3).” Barker v. State, 275 Ga.App. 213, 620 S.E.2d 457 (August 24, 2005). “[W]hen offenses are ‘based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, severance lies within the discretion of the trial court.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 249 Ga.App. 857, 861(2) (549 S.E.2d 813) (2001).” Sampson v. State, 279 Ga. 8, 608 S.E.2d 621 (February 7, 2005). “[A] defendant does not have the automatic right of severance if the offenses are based on a single transaction or the crimes evidence a common plan or scheme. Shiver v. State, 276 Ga. 624(3) (581 S.E.2d 254) (2003); Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896(3) (252 S.E.2d 397) (1979). In this case, the false statement charges Sampson sought to sever stemmed from conduct involving his continuing efforts to conceal his participation in the robbery and murder. The trial court, therefore, did not err in refusing to sever these charges at trial.” Owens v. State, 271 Ga.App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (January 21, 2005). “‘Joinder of offenses is allowed when two or more offenses (1) have the same or similar character, even though they are not part of a single scheme or plan; (2) are based on the same conduct; (3) are based on a series of connected acts; or (4) constitute parts of a single scheme or plan.’ Sanders v. State , 236 Ga.App. 578, 579-580, 512 S.E.2d 678 (1999). Here, Owens’s acts in committing the residential burglary and robbery, which took place within hours of the convenience store robbery and in the vicinity of Owens’s escape therefrom, were part and parcel of his continuing escape, thus intertwining the offenses as a series of connected acts. See Carter v. State , 192 Ga.App. 726, 728, 386 S.E.2d 389 (1989) (offenses occurring during or immediately after escape attempt are connected for joinder purposes to earlier offense from which escape was being attempted).” Accord, Fields v. State , 283 Ga.App. 208, 641 S.E.2d 218 (January 5, 2007) (trial court properly refused to sever robbery and attempted robbery committed on same day, at businesses near each other, in similar manner); Sampler v. State , 294 Ga.App. 174, 669 S.E.2d 195 (October 21, 2008) (remanded to trial court for consideration of severance pursuant to this test); Jones v. State , 318 Ga.App. 342, 733 S.E.2d 400 (October 19, 2012) (trial court properly declined to sever rape and ensuing escape). Gibson v. State, 267 Ga.App. 473, 600 S.E.2d 417 (May 19, 2004). Trial court was not required to sever the 21 charges of burglary against defendant despite defendant’s contention that “the large number of burglaries for which he was on trial led to a ‘smear effect,’ even if the evidence was insufficient as to each count individually.” Evidence was sufficient to support each count. Johnson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 777, 595 S.E.2d 625 (February 23, 2004). “Where two or more offenses are joined only because they are of the same or similar character, the trial court, upon motion of the defendant, must order separate trials for each of the offenses. [Cit.] But when they are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, the court has discretion to decide whether to sever the offenses. [Cit.] When the similarity of the crimes reaches the level of a pattern, severance of the crimes is not required. [Cit.] And where the evidence of one crime would be admissible in the trial of the other crime, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for severance. [Cit.]” No error here: defendant charged with robbing two women of their SUV’s at gunpoint in the same neighborhood, with other similarities, albeit months apart. Accord, Dailey v. State , 271 Ga.App. 492, 610 S.E.2d 126 (February 3, 2005) (no error in joinder of similar robberies of two hotels near one another, about a month apart; defendant was acquitted of one of the offenses).