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Howard v. State, 266 Ga.App. 281, 596 S.E.2d 627 (February 6, 2004). Defendant’s peeping Tom indictment, and later burglary and aggravated assault, etc., indictment, were properly joined for trial. “‘Separate indictments may be joined for trial if it is shown that the offenses charged therein are part of a single scheme or plan.’ Jones v. State, 237 Ga.App. 715 (515 S.E.2d 431) (1999). ‘The underlying consideration regarding the issue of a joint trial on two or more indictments is whether undue or great risk of prejudice from a joint disposition of charges would result.’ (Citation omitted.) Langston v. State, 195 Ga.App. 873, 874 (395 S.E.2d 74) (1990). ‘Where the joinder is based upon the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, severance lies within the discretion of the trial judge.’ (Citation omitted.) Jones, supra at 716.” Offenses involved similar victims “in the same apartment complex within a three-week period,” and “[t]he offenses involved the invasion of their privacy.” Stewart v. State, 277 Ga. 138, 587 S.E.2d 602 (September 22, 2003). In considering motion to sever trial on separate offenses, analysis doesn’t end just because offenses would be admissible even though not on trial; Georgia Supreme Court has adopted ABA Standards on Joinder of Offenses, which require that court must still consider prejudicial effect. See Dingler v. State, 233 Ga. 462, 211 S.E.2d 752 (1975). “If the charges are joined solely because they are of the same or similar character, a defendant has an absolute right to sever. (Cits.) But that is not to say that severance will not lie when offenses are not joined solely because they are of the same or similar character. In that circumstance, severance may still be appropriate, although not mandated, because the trial court must determine whether the trier of fact will be able to fairly and intelligently judge each offense.” Reverses Court of Appeals decision at 259 Ga.App. 117, 576 S.E.2d 93 (2003). Accord, Quenga v. State , 270 Ga.App. 141, 605 S.E.2d 860 (October 20, 2004). On remand: 268 Ga.App. 243, 601 S.E.2d 755 (July 1, 2004): Sexual assaults against three different women “were perpetrated in a manner that shared important common elements and could be considered as a series of acts connected in their manner of execution ….. Nor do the factual circumstances surrounding the separate charges appear so complicated as to have confused the jury.” Trial court thus properly denied motion to sever. Accord, Green v. State , 279 Ga. 455, 614 S.E.2d 751 (June 16, 2005); Grimes v. State , 280 Ga. 363, 628 S.E.2d 580 (March 27, 2006) (murder committed to prevent revelation of armed robbery; both properly tried together); Dills v. State , 281 Ga.App. 484, 636 S.E.2d 166 (September 6, 2006). Strozier v. State, 277 Ga. 78, 586 S.E.2d 309 (September 15, 2003). “In ruling on a severance of offenses, ‘[t]he court should consider whether, in light of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of the evidence, the fact-trier will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently to each offense.’” Morgan v. State, 276 Ga. 72, 575 S.E.2d 468 (January 13, 2003). Defendant was arrested for marijuana possession. After defendant learned who gave police the information, he made various threats against informant, and later killed him. Defendant was tried and convicted in one trial for the series of acts: marijuana possession, witness influencing, and murder. “Where, as here, two or more charges are joined together because they constitute a series of acts connected together, severance of the charges is within the trial court’s sound discretion.” Wright v. State, 259 Ga.App. 74, 576 S.E.2d 64 (January 3, 2003). Child molestation charges, alleging that defendant “pinched, kissed, and slapped his grandson's rear end as well as fondled the child's penis” were combined in indictment alleging that he committed sexual battery against his adult daughter, the child’s mother, by touching her breast. “The conduct … reflected a pattern of deviant conduct toward family members. There was no abuse of discretion in denying severance.” “Severance is required if offenses are joined solely because they are similar in nature. Severance is not mandated, however, where the similarity of the offenses is coupled with evidence of a pattern which shows a common motive, plan, scheme, or bent of mind. Where the modus operandi of the perpetrator is so strikingly alike, that the totality of the facts unerringly demonstrate and designate the defendant as the common perpetrator, the offenses may be joined – subject to the right of the defendant to severance in the interests of justice. Severance in this particular kind of circumstance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. [Cit.]” Accord, Murray v. State , 293 Ga.App. 516, 667 S.E.2d 382 (September 11, 2008) (two similar counts of cruelty to children, same victim, less than one month apart, properly combined for trial). Noble v. State, 275 Ga. 635, 570 S.E.2d 296 (September 30, 2002). Defendant’s two separate DUI charges, from dates four months apart, were properly tried together over defendant’s motion to sever. “A trial court ‘does not abuse its discretion in denying a severance motion where evidence of one charge would be admissible in the trial of the other.’… Further, the factual circumstances surrounding the two separate incidents were not so complicated that they could confuse the finder of fact.” Accord, Shabazz v. State , 265 Ga.App. 64, 592 S.E.2d 876 (January 7, 2004) (Defendant followed