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girls home from same MARTA bus on consecutive days and sexually assaulted them); Williams v. State , 269 Ga.App. 673, 605 S.E.2d 83 (September 21, 2004) (three armed robberies commited within one week, in same area, in similar manner, properly joined for trial). Moss v. State, 245 Ga.App. 811, 538 S.E.2d 876 (September 7, 2000). Theft by taking and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying motion to sever offenses. After being charged with theft, defendant made numerous harassing and obscene phone calls to the DA, demanding that his theft charges be dropped. He was then charged with harassing phone calls, indecent phone calls, and obstruction of an officer. Held, the two sets of charges were properly joined for trial. “In this case, it is clear that the offenses were not joined solely because they are of the same or similar nature, and severance therefore was not mandatory. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever. If the telephone call charges were tried separately, evidence of the theft charges would be admissible to explain why Moss was making the calls. The reverse is true, as well. In any separate trial on the theft charges, evidence of the phone calls and obstruction would be admissible, because ‘[e]vidence of an act by an accused, intended to obstruct justice or avoid punishment for the crime for which he or she is on trial, is admissible if the act constitutes an admission by conduct.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Larocque v. State, 224 Ga.App. 92, 93, 479 S.E.2d 450 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, State v. Larocque, 268 Ga. 352, 489 S.E.2d 806 (1996). See also Bain v. State, 239 Ga.App. 696, 699(2), 521 S.E.2d 832 (1999); Payne v. State, 152 Ga.App. 471, 473(3), 263 S.E.2d 251 (1979). When evidence of one crime is admissible in the trial of another crime, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for severance. Dennis v. State, 263 Ga. 257, 259-260(6), 430 S.E.2d 742 (1993).” Carter v. State, 245 Ga.App. 275, 537 S.E.2d 706 (July 21, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly joined for trial offenses arising out of separate, but related, incidents. “Offenses may be joined for trial if they are based on conduct which is so similar that it shows a common scheme, plan, bent of mind, or modus operandi. Smith v. State, 225 Ga.App. 553(1), 484 S.E.2d 515 (1997) (physical precedent); Johnson v. State, 213 Ga.App. 194(1), 444 S.E.2d 334 (1994). Here, Carter's conduct during both the September and November incidents was sufficiently similar to show a common scheme, plan, bent of mind, and modus operandi. Both incidents occurred late at night near Carter's home. Both times Davis was walking with a male companion when Carter stopped beside them in a car. And in both incidents Carter got out of the car and attacked Davis with a knife. Because Carter's similar conduct during both incidents evinced his common scheme, plan, bent of mind, and modus operandi, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining the indictments for trial. See Smith v. State, 199 Ga.App. 410, 411(2), 405 S.E.2d 107 (1991). Moreover, offenses may be joined for trial where they constitute a series of connected acts. Wilcox v. State, 271 Ga. 544, 545–546(2), 522 S.E.2d 457 (1999). In the instant case, Davis testified that during the November incident, Carter threatened to kill her and others because he was going to jail anyway for the September stabbings. Thus, the November attack on Davis was connected to the prior attack, and the court properly exercised its discretion in joining a series of connected acts for trial. See id. at 546(2), 522 S.E.2d 457.” Roman v. State, 245 Ga.App. 225, 537 S.E.2d 684 (July 18, 2000). Armed robbery convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to sever six offenses which occurred “within a one-month period.” “In this case, the separate acts of armed robbery are strikingly similar. As the trial court found, the separate acts of robbery appear to be a spree of criminal activity involving a common modus operandi . In each robbery, the perpetrator, as described by the victims, had similar physical characteristics, wore the same type of clothing, and used the same means of pretending to make a purchase to get the victim to open the cash register. Furthermore, due to the similarity of the robberies, even if they were tried separately, each act would have been admissible in the trial of each other act as evidence of a similar transaction. Weaver v. State, 206 Ga.App. 560, 561(1), 426 S.E.2d 41 (1992).” Mangrum v. State, 244 Ga.App. 559, 536 S.E.2d 217 (June 22, 2000). Trial court erred, but harmless, in denying motion to sever cocaine trafficking and marijuana possession charges. “In the instant case, the cocaine and marijuana charges against Mangrum were not based on the same conduct, a series of connected acts, or a series of acts constituting parts of a single plan. Instead, the charges were based on different, unrelated incidents occurring at separate places and times. The charges were similar only in that they both involved illegal drugs. Compare Williams v. State, 186 Ga.App. 266, 267, 367 S.E.2d 92 (1988) (separate incidents properly joined because they constituted parts of a single scheme to sell marijuana). Because the cocaine trafficking and marijuana possession charges were joined solely because of their similar character, Mangrum had the right to have them severed for trial. The trial court therefore erred in failing to grant Mangrum's motion to sever the offenses. See Davis v. State, 159 Ga.App. 356-359(1), 283 S.E.2d 286 (1981) (court should have severed armed robbery counts that were joined solely because they were similar offenses).” Harmless, however, as defendant was acquitted of the marijuana charge, and evidence of cocaine trafficking was