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overwhelming. Camphor v. State , 272 Ga. 408, 529 S.E.2d 121 (May 1, 2000). Malice murder, aggravated stalking and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined “to sever the aggravated stalking charge from the other indicted offenses for purposes of trial. [Defendant] submits that severance was required because the evidence offered to convict him of aggravated stalking was ‘wholly unrelated’ to the remaining counts of the indictment and was unduly prejudicial. We disagree. Where two or more offenses are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single plan or scheme, severance is discretionary with the court. Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 653(1), 278 S.E.2d 386 (1981). The act of aggravated stalking formed part of a single continuing plan to gain unlawful entrance to the Henderson home, culminating in the death of Tony Leslie. Thus, the evidence used to convict Camphor of aggravated stalking was inextricably bound to the essential elements of the burglary charge as well as intent and bent of mind for the murder charges. Watson v. State, 176 Ga.App. 610(2), 337 S.E.2d 54 (1985).” Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to sever the four murder counts. “‘Two or more offenses may be joined in one charge when the offenses are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan and where it would be almost impossible to present to a jury evidence of one of the crimes without permitting evidence of the other.’ Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265(7), 455 S.E.2d 37 (1995). See also Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749(16), 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983); Dingler v. State, 233 Ga. 462, 211 S.E.2d 752 (1975). Even if severed, evidence of all four murders would have been admissible in the same trial to show identity. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).” Four murders here were committed on separate occasions by strangling and sexually assaulting female victims, most of them elderly, after entering their homes through windows late at night. Wilcox v. State, 271 Ga. 544, 522 S.E.2d 457 (October 18, 1999). Trial court properly declined to sever defendant’s charges of murder and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. “The State's theory of the crime was that Wilcox killed Pridgeon as a result of a soured cocaine deal. In a statement made to a fellow inmate, Wilcox revealed that the killing ‘was over dope, it wasn't over nothing but dope.’ Wilcox further told that inmate that he went to the rooming house to attempt to collect money from the victim; and when the victim failed to pay, Wilcox shot and killed him. Thus, the possession charge was so connected to the murder as to constitute a series of connected acts. See Bland v. State, 264 Ga. 610(2), 449 S.E.2d 116 (1994) (cocaine use and homicide were part of the same continuous scheme to obtain drugs where defendant spent the day of the murders engaged in a series of acts to obtain money for drugs).” Collins v. State, 240 Ga.App. 289, 523 S.E.2d 359 (October 6, 1999). No abuse of discretion where trial court refused to sever defendant’s two armed robbery charges. “Even overlooking the similarities in the DaVinci's and Bell's Grocery crimes, i.e., the use of the shotgun and a disguise and the entry into businesses during hours when they were closed, there is another basis upon which the evidence was admissible. The same weapon was used in both crimes. Therefore, evidence relating to the earlier use of this shotgun and recovery of a part of it from Collins' possession upon his arrest for the DaVinci's incident and recovery of the other part from Bell's was admissible. Morrow v. State, 226 Ga.App. 833, 834(1), 487 S.E.2d 669 (1997); see Dennis v. State, 263 Ga. 257, 259(6), 430 S.E.2d 742 (1993).” Accord, Parker v. State , 242 Ga.App. 10, 528 S.E.2d 530 (January 20, 2000) (two separate armed robberies of retail businesses in Sandersville, committed five days apart, properly joined for trial). Hunter v. State, 237 Ga.App. 803, 517 S.E.2d 534 (April 28, 1999). No abuse of discretion in failing to sever cocaine possession, child molestation charges; condom containing cocaine residue was found on defendant upon his arrest for child molestation. “‘Where, as here, the joinder of charges is based on the fact that the charges comprise a series of connected acts, whether to sever the charges for trial is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. The trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a severance motion where evidence of one charge would be admissible in the trial of the other. Evidence of the circumstances of a defendant’s arrest is admissible in the trial of the charge for which he was arrested. When the circumstances of that arrest result in additional criminal charges, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to sever the trial of those charges from the trial of the charge for which [defendant] was arrested. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever the charges,’” quoting Miller v. State, 270 Ga. 741, 744, 512 S.E.2d 272 (1999). Jones v. State, 237 Ga.App. 715, 515 S.E.2d 431 (April 1, 1999). No error in consolidating for trial “two separate indictments containing separate counts occurring at different times. … Jones contends that only separate counts of the same indictment can be consolidated. This contention is contrary to Georgia law. Separate indictments may be joined