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for trial if it is shown that the offenses charged therein are part of a single scheme or plan. See Swinney v. State, 217 Ga.App. 657, 659(2), 458 S.E.2d 686 (1995); Miller v. State, 214 Ga.App. 393(1), 448 S.E.2d 20 (1994); Langston v. State, 195 Ga.App. 873(2), 395 S.E.2d 74 (1990).” Scroggins v. State, 237 Ga.App. 122, 514 S.E.2d 252 (March 18, 1999). No error in refusing to sever charges of sexual abuse of two different child victims. “In this case, similar ‘conduct’ was involved even though the identical pattern of molestation was not used with both victims. Both victims were approximately the same age, both were molested while alone in a darkened room, and in both cases the victims alleged that Scroggins touched them with his penis. Moreover, because of the liberal extension of the rule allowing similar transaction evidence in sexual offense cases, the molestation of each victim would have been admissible as a similar transaction at the trial of the other even had the offenses been severed. Redding v. State, 219 Ga.App. 182, 184(3), 464 S.E.2d 824 (1995). Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Scroggins’s motion to sever.” Accord, Bluain v. State , 242 Ga.App. 125, 529 S.E.2d 155 (January 31, 2000) (trial court properly declined to sever rape and related charges involving two separate adult victims); Griffin v. State, 243 Ga.App. 282, 531 S.E.2d 175 (March 14, 2000) (kidnapping, rape and robbery charges involving two different victims “within a span of less than thirty-six hours in the same isolated area” properly joined for trial); Ray (September 4, 2014), above (separate rapes of different victims properly joined, based on common modus operandi). Selley v. State, 237 Ga.App. 47, 514 S.E.2d 706 (March 16, 1999). Defendant drove a stolen vehicle into Georgia from Alabama. The vehicle broke down, so defendant carjacked another victim. Defendant sought severance of the charges of armed robbery and bringing a stolen vehicle into the state. Held, trial court properly declined to sever the charges; the offenses “a series of acts constituting part of a single scheme or plan. Barber v. State, 176 Ga.App. 103, 104(2), 335 S.E.2d 594 (1985).” Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780, 514 S.E.2d 205 (March 8, 1999). Trial court properly declined to sever offenses; “the two shootings were similar, occurred only three days apart, involved the same gun, and were part of a single scheme or plan to rob convenience-type stores.” Anderson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 679, 513 S.E.2d 235 (February 26, 1999). Trial court properly denied severance of armed robberies which “occurred not only in the same county but in the same housing project two weeks apart. In both instances, the victims were robbed of money by a group of perpetrators of which defendant was conspicuously the aggressive leader, that is, the perpetrator who initiated and controlled the tenor of the encounters with the victims, the armed perpetrator, and the perpetrator who in each instance shot a victim, each time wounding the injured victim in the thigh.” Byrd v. State, 236 Ga.App. 485, 512 S.E.2d 372 (February 16, 1999). “The state met its burden of showing the offenses were not joined solely on the basis that they were of the same or similar character. The cases all involved financial institutions where only tellers were robbed. They all occurred within the city limits of Savannah. All three armed robberies occurred within forty days, with the earliest occurring at 10:30 a.m. and the latest at 12:45 p.m. Each robbery involved the use of a firearm. In each, the robbers brought their own bag for the money and only took U.S. currency. As in Smith [ v. State, 225 Ga.App. 553, 484 S.E.2d 515 (1997)] , the similarities among the bank robberies go beyond what would have to be similar simply because the charges are the same; the similarities are so extensive as to demonstrate a common course of conduct and bent of mind. Id. at 555, 484 S.E.2d 515. Accordingly, severance was not mandatory. See Dewinters v. State, 232 Ga.App. 318, 319(1), 501 S.E.2d 849 (1998).” Cobb v. State, 236 Ga.App. 265, 511 S.E.2d 522 (February 5, 1999). No error in joining defendant’s two cocaine trafficking charges for trial. “We do not agree with Cobb that the offenses were joined solely because they were alike in character. Although the offenses were separated in time by 17 months, the facts of each offense reveal that Cobb was engaged in a continuing and profitable criminal enterprise as a mid-level cocaine distributor. In each case, Cobb was found in possession of a large amount of relatively pure cocaine and the implements of the drug trade (scales, plastic bags, cell phones and pagers, and heavy-duty arms). Further, both offenses occurred in close proximity to each other in Cobb’s personal residences and in the presence of his business associates. Given this evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining the offenses. Villarreal v. State, 198 Ga.App. 501, 402 S.E.2d 104 (1991).” Accord, Sanders v. State , 236 Ga.App. 578, 512 S.E.2d 678 (February 19, 1999) (armed robberies occurring within days of each other, similarly committed, properly joined for trial).