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– not for use at the hearing, but for inspection and copying. State objected, arguing that “under Georgia's Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, OCGA § 17–16–1 et seq., it had complied with the statutory requirements for reciprocal discovery by making the evidence available for his inspection at another time and place.” Trial court agreed with State that “because Walker had opted into reciprocal discovery pursuant to the Act, his counsel was required to contact the appropriate agency and schedule an appointment at their mutual convenience to inspect and photograph the tangible objects. See OCGA § 17–16–4(a)(3)(A) (Except as otherwise provided, ‘the prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the defendant at a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court to inspect and ... photograph ... tangible objects ... which are within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution and are intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief or rebuttal at the trial or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.’).” Majority of Court of Appeals disagrees: “[i]t does not follow … that a defendant who elects to have the Act apply thereby waives the right to use means of discovery that are otherwise available to any party, such as the subpoena power.” Rather, trial court should have considered (and on remand will consider, as necessary), “proponent's burden of showing relevancy and, if that burden is met, the opponent's burden of showing that the subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive.” Branch, writing for Andrews and Ray, dissents, would hold that trial court did apply the correct standard and found that defendant failed to show that the evidence was relevant to the motion hearing. Accord, Gregg (March 30, 2015), above. Sheppard v. State, 297 Ga.App. 806, 678 S.E.2d 509 (May 13, 2009). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed. Pro se defendant was not denied the opportunity to compel the attendance of witnesses at trial. “‘[H]aving elected to represent himself, it was [Sheppard's] responsibility, not the trial court's to ensure the presence of his witnesses by issuance of subpoenas. OCGA §§ 24-10-20(b); 24-10-21.’ Kegler v. State, 267 Ga. 147, 148(4) (475 S.E.2d 593) (1996); see also Byron v. State, 229 Ga.App. 795, 799(6) (495 S.E.2d 123) (1997) (‘Although Byron had a constitutional right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of his witnesses, it was his duty to ensure the presence of such witness by the issuance of subpoenas.’) (citations omitted). The record does not disclose that Sheppard ever requested issuance of subpoenas or the trial court's assistance in enforcing them, and, as such, his right to compulsory process was not violated.” Adams v. State, 282 Ga.App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (November 27, 2006). State served defendant with a subpoena to produce the gun he waved at victims. Defendant produced the gun the day before trial, but sought to quash the subpoena at the beginning of the trial, contending it was not timely served pursuant to OCGA § 24-10-25(a) (subpoena must be served 24 hours in advance of appearance to be enforced). Held, defendant “waived any challenge to the subpoena’s timeliness” when he “voluntarily produced the pistol prior to moving to quash the subpoena.” DDDD. SUMMARY JUDGMENT Rader v. State, 300 Ga.App. 411, 685 S.E.2d 405 (October 8, 2009). “A motion seeking to dismiss an indictment on the ground that the state cannot prove facts essential to the charge is analogous to a motion for summary judgment in a civil case, see State v. Givens, 211 Ga.App. 71, 72 (438 S.E.2d 387) (1993), and ‘[t]here is no basis in Georgia criminal practice for what, in civil practice, would be termed a motion for summary judgment.’ [ State v. Henderson, 283 Ga.App. 111, 112(2) (640 S.E.2d 686) (2006)] (footnote and punctuation omitted). The court did not err in denying Rader's motion to dismiss.” Ewell v. State, 245 Ga.App. 610, 538 S.E.2d 523 (August 21, 2000). Interlocutory appeal in county ordinance prosecution; trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, as county prosecuted defendant without first giving notice and opportunity to cure required by the ordinance. Defendant developer was charged with violating county land-disturbance ordinance by failing to provide adequate soil erosion control, but ordinance required “written notice to comply” and opportunity to do so before citing for violation. County failed to give such notice. Procedure. “[W]e note that Ewell's motion to dismiss did not attack the validity of the accusation, but essentially asserted that the county could not prove an element of the offense. Thus, Ewell treated the motion to dismiss as if it were a motion for summary judgment in a civil case. See Schuman v. State, 264 Ga. 526, 448 S.E.2d 694 (1994); Jackson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 391, 392(1), 430 S.E.2d 781 (1993); State v. Givens, 211 Ga.App. 71, 72, 438 S.E.2d 387 (1993). While recognizing that ‘[t]here is no authority for this procedure’ in a criminal case, the Supreme Court noted in Schuman v. State that ‘[t]here is no statutory proscription’ against it, either, and that the parties could agree to such a procedure. Schuman, supra. In State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n. 4, 477 S.E.2d 575 (1996), the State failed to object when Brannan's attorney argued at the motion to dismiss hearing that the stipulated facts did not constitute an offense, nor did it raise the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court thus held that ‘the parties consented to the trial court's determination of whether the facts stipulated to ... were sufficient to support the charges alleged in the indictment. Id. In this case, it is undisputed that no written notice or opportunity to cure was ever given, and it is clear that the parties agreed to allow