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the court to resolve the issue of whether Ewell could be convicted of violating the ordinance in the absence of such notice and opportunity to cure. Accordingly, we conclude that the parties consented to the use of such a procedure.” EEEE. TRAFFIC OFFENSES State v. Cooper, 271 Ga.App. 771, 611 S.E.2d 90 (February 24, 2005). Where there was no accident and no officer observed defendant driving, trial court properly concluded that OCGA § 17-4-23(a) prohibits officer from charging defendant with DUI (or any other traffic offense) by citation without custodial arrest. Trial court thus properly dismissed citation for DUI where record did not affirmatively show that defendant was arrested at time citation was issued. “To issue a citation under OCGA § 17-4-23(a), either the arresting officer must witness the act constituting the offense, or another officer who observed the offense must convey the information to the arresting officer, ‘except that, where the offense results in an accident, an investigating officer may issue citations regardless of whether the offense occurred in the presence of a law enforcement officer.’ In the case at bar, the offense did not result in an accident, and the information regarding Cooper’s erratic driving came from another motorist, not another officer. It appears, therefore, that the trial court correctly determined that his arrest was invalid under OCGA § 17-4-23(a).” Court of Appeals notes that officer could have effected custodial arrest of defendant pursuant to OCGA § 17-4-20, as probable cause for DUI arrest clearly existed; but record does not show that such an arrest took place, so trial court’s ruling must be presumed to be correct. Court of Appeals suggests that State can cure this defect by re-arresting defendant, since jeopardy hasn’t attached. Jeter v. State, 269 Ga.App. 266, 603 S.E.2d 783 (August 26, 2004). Trial court forfeited defendant’s cash bond when he failed to appear for his trial on charges of DUI and open container. The forfeiture was treated as a final disposition pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-8. More than a year later, Defendant filed his “motion to reopen the case.” Held, defendant’s motion was barred by OCGA § 40-13-33(a), which “‘limits such attacks to within the first 180 days after the conviction has been finally adjudicated, even if a habeas petition could be brought and would be successful.’ Earp v. Brown , 260 Ga. 215, 216(2)(a), 391 S.E.2d 396 (1990).” Davis v. State, 261 Ga.App. 539, 583 S.E.2d 214 (June 5, 2003). Where one officer makes an arrest for a traffic offense occurring in the presence of another officer, OCGA § 17-4-23(a) requires that both officers be present when the charges are heard. But where neither officer observed the offense, and the second officer merely completed the investigation of an auto accident begun by the first officer, the code section does not demand the presence of the first officer. FFFF. TRANSFERS 1. BETWEEN COURTS Green v State, 288 Ga.App. 854, 655 S.E.2d 615 (October 10, 2007). Superior Court properly transferred misdemeanor prosecution to State Court. “In Dismuke v. State, 105 Ga. 589 (31 SE 561) (1898), our Supreme Court concluded that superior court judges were authorized to transfer misdemeanor cases from the superior court to the county court for trial. See Id. at 591(1). Explaining its reasoning, the court stated that ‘[o]ne of the great purposes of the establishment of county courts was to relieve the superior courts of the trial of misdemeanor cases by providing a tribunal wherein such cases might be disposed of more promptly and with less expense to counties.’ Id. We held in Towns v. State, 28 Ga.App. 500 (111 S.E. 692) (1922), that ‘[w]hen a judge of the superior court passes an order which is placed on the minutes of the court, transferring a case from that court to a county court, the case becomes immediately and automatically, for all jurisdictional purposes, a case pending in the county court, and the superior court has no further jurisdiction over it.’ (Citations omitted.) Id. See generally K.G.W. v. State, 140 Ga.App. 571, 575 (231 S.E.2d 421) (1976) (superior court was authorized to transfer jurisdiction to juvenile court, after which case was no longer pending in superior court).” Also based in part on local law creating the State Court of Clarke County: “Ga. L. 1878-79, p. 297, Section XXX empowered judges in the Superior Court of Clarke County to transfer cases to the city courts. Pursuant to Ga. L.1970, p. 680, Section 3, each city court was renamed ‘State Court of (whatever county in which the court is located) County.’” State v. Harper, 271 Ga.App. 761, 610 S.E.2d 699 (February 23, 2005). Trial court was not authorized to transfer armed robbery charge to juvenile court. “After indictment, OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) authorizes a superior court to transfer to the juvenile court ‘after investigation and for extraordinary cause ... any offense enumerated in [OCGA § 15-11- 28(b)(2)(A)] which is not punishable by loss of life, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or confinement for life in a penal institution.’ [Cit.]”