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State v. Serio, 257 Ga.App. 369, 571 S.E.2d 168 (August 27, 2002). State Court had no power to transfer DUI prosecution to recorder’s court where solicitor elected to file charges in state court. “State was entitled to shift defendant’s prosecution to state court after her arraignment in recorder’s court,” as recorder’s court consented to nolle pros of charges there. Fact that charges were pending simultaneously in both courts for one day in no way makes solicitor’s actions “improper.” “[P]roposition that ‘[w]here courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court to take jurisdiction will retain it’” did not prevent recorder’s court from surrendering jurisdiction via nolle pros. “Serio also complains that the prosecutor engaged in unethical forum and judge shopping, but OCGA § 40-6-376(a) expressly grants the prosecutor the discretion to select the forum.” Accord, State v. West , 258 Ga.App. 269, 574 S.E.2d 365 (November 6, 2002). State v. Johnson, 257 Ga.App. 162, 570 S.E.2d 627 (August 23, 2002). A solicitor has authority to request the traffic charges be transferred from recorder’s court to state court. OCGA § 40-6-376(b), giving a defendant a right to request such a transfer, does not impliedly deny that power to the solicitor. The recorder’s court may also effect such a transfer on its own motion. Moody v. State, 256 Ga.App. 65, 567 S.E.2d 709 (June 21, 2002). When a case is transferred from municipal court to state court for jury trial, transfer back to municipal court upon waiver of jury trial is unauthorized by law and a nullity. 2. BETWEEN JUDGES Griffith v. State, 286 Ga.App. 859, 650 S.E.2d 413 (July 30, 2007). No error if transferring case from one judge to another without a hearing. Case was transferred pursuant to USCR 3.2, “[w]hen practical, all actions involving substantially the same parties, or substantially the same subject matter, or substantially the same factual issues, whether pending simultaneously or not, shall be assigned to the same judge.” “[T]he rule … does not require a hearing.” 3. JUVENILES See JURISDICTION – JUVENILES, above GGGG. TRIAL CALENDAR Prince v. State, 299 Ga.App. 164, 682 S.E.2d 180 (July 15, 2009). District attorney’s input into scheduling of cases for trial was not improper, distinguishing Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464 (519 S.E.2d 687) (1999). Defendant, who was released on bond, was passed over for trial in favor of those awaiting trial in jail. Defendant contended that the district attorney was allowed to control the calendar and did so by holding defendant’s case until original judge retired and another judge took office. However, “[t]he record reveals that the decision to create a ‘priority calendar’ originated with the trial judge who requested the assistance of the assistant district attorney to help determine which cases to calendar. See Cobb v. State, 254 Ga.App. 48, 51(4) (561 S.E.2d 124) (2002) (finding no Cuzzort violation when decision to create a priority calendar was made by trial court). The assistant district attorney did not independently calendar the cases nor call them for trial. Under these circumstances, there was no violation of Cuzzort. ” Kuykendoll v. State, 278 Ga.App. 369, 629 S.E.2d 32 (March 9, 2006). “[A]lthough ‘[t]he cases on the criminal docket shall be called in the order in which they stand on the docket,’ the trial court retains discretion to call them out of order. OCGA § 17-8-1. Here, the record reflects that the case before Kuykendoll’s was not called for trial because the defendant in that case was expected to enter a plea following his sentencing in another matter. Because Kuykendoll has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion, this claim of error is without merit.” Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (September 13, 1999). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion challenging the circuit’s method of assigning cases to judges, and calling cases for trial. 1. Case assignment. Circuit’s case assignment method allowing the District Attorney to assign cases, violates USCR 3.1 and due process. “The precise method of assigning and calendaring cases adopted by a multi-judge circuit … must comport with the notion of due process under the State and Federal constitutions, as well as the spirit and purpose of the uniform rules and applicable statutes. [Cit.] The purpose of the assignment system in multi-judge circuits is to ‘prevent any person's choosing the judge to whom an action is to be assigned.’ USCR 3.1. … In the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit, however, it is not the chief or other circuit judge who makes case assignments and sets the calendar but the district attorney. Because the district attorney is clearly within the category of persons directed to refrain from affecting case assignments under USCR 3.1, we find the method of case assignment employed in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit violates the clear mandate of that rule.” 2. Selection of cases for trial. “OCGA § 17-8-1 requires that cases on a criminal docket be ‘called in the order in which they stand on the docket unless the defendant is in jail or, otherwise, in the sound discretion of the court.’ Although OCGA § 17-8-1 is a discretionary rule rather than a mandatory one, this discretion lies with the trial judge and not the district attorney. Rosenbrook v. State, 78 Ga. 111(2) (1886); Williams v. State, 188 Ga.App. 496(3), 373 S.E.2d 281