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Ga. 767(5) (573 S.E.2d 73) (2002)), and the lack of evidence of both error and harm renders the enumeration of error meritless.” Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 48, 610 S.E.2d 26 (February 21, 2005). State cured its failure to give notice of intent to seek death penalty at arraignment, as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 34(c) by re-indicting, re-arraigning, and giving the notice at the time of the new arraignment. “See Terry v. State, 257 Ga. 473, 474, 360 S.E.2d 588 (1997) (‘nothing in the Unified Appeal Procedure forbids re-arraignment to cure the failure to begin following the Unified Appeal Procedure prior to the original arraignment.’).” Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 532 S.E.2d 677 (July 5, 2000). Capital murder conviction affirmed. “The Unified Appeal Procedure exists to protect the rights of capital defendants and is not unconstitutional. Jackson v. State, [270 Ga. 494, 498-499(10), 512 S.E.2d 241 (1999)].” Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed. “Pace argues that 27 of his pretrial motions were denied without an evidentiary hearing, and that the failure of the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on each motion abridged his ‘right to be heard.’ The record shows that Pace was allowed to file any motions he desired accompanied by supporting briefs. The trial court also held hearings at which Pace's counsel was afforded the opportunity to argue each motion. Contrary to Pace's assertion, the trial court is not required by the Unified Appeal Procedure to hold an evidentiary hearing on every motion but is required to hold a hearing where each motion previously filed is heard. Unified Appeal Procedure Rule II(B). The trial court complied with the Unified Appeal Procedure and Pace was given the opportunity to be heard on every motion. Also, Pace could have made an evidentiary proffer with regard to each motion and did make proffers for some of these motions. See Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255(2), 304 S.E.2d 882 (1983). We further note, as did the trial court, that most of these motions have been repeatedly decided adversely to similarly situated defendants by this Court. [fn] Id. We find no error.” Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (July 6, 1999). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s attempt to cross-examine the District Attorney on the reasons for his decision to seek the death penalty against defendant. “Johnson wanted to question the district attorney and former district attorney regarding cases in which the district attorney did not seek the death penalty that Johnson alleges were more ‘heinous’ than his case, but the trial court quashed the subpoenas. We find no error. ‘[D]istrict attorneys do not have unfettered discretion to seek the death penalty, and the decision to impose it rests with the jury and cannot be upheld absent a finding of an aggravating circumstance. [Cit.]’ McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 389(12), 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996). ‘[P]olicy considerations ... argue against requiring district attorneys to defend their decisions to seek the death penalty.’ (Footnote omitted.) Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 794(2), 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998). We note that the trial court allowed Johnson to file a written proffer to support his argument that the district attorney had not sought the death penalty in more ‘heinous’ cases, but he failed to do so.” Benham and Sears concur in judgment only. Accord , Wagner v. State , 282 Ga. 149, 646 S.E.2d 676 (June 11, 2007). XVI. SEARCH AND SEIZURE A. ARREST 1. ARREST WARRANTS, FORM OF Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 689 S.E.2d 293 (February 1, 2010). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress; arrest warrant was not invalid though it incorrectly alleged that the last call received by the murder victim came from a phone belonging to defendant. In fact, the phone belonged to defendant’s father, but was possessed by defendant. “[T]he ‘slight discrepancy [in] the affidavits ... does not suggest an intentional or reckless falsehood on the part of the affiant. Besides, the allegedly false statement was not necessary to a finding of probable cause. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667) (1978); Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 796 (312 S.E.2d 40) (1983).’ Stanford v. State, 272 Ga. 267, 271(10) (528 S.E.2d 246) (2000).” Golden v. State, 299 Ga.App. 407, 683 S.E.2d 618 (July 17, 2009). Following guilty plea to child molestation, trial court properly denied motion to withdraw plea. Arrest warrant was not invalid due to typographical error resulting in reference to “OCGA § 16-76-4, as opposed to OCGA § 16-6-4.” “OCGA § 17-4-41 requires that an affidavit given in support of an arrest warrant must contain “as nearly as practicable, the following facts: (1)[t]he offense, including the time, date, place of occurrence, against whom the offense was committed, and a statement describing the offense; and