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(2)[t]he county in which the offense was committed.’ OCGA § 17-4-41(a). OCGA § 17-4-45 provides the form for such an affidavit and indicates that the affidavit should include ‘all information describing [the] offense as required by [OCGA § ] 17-4-41....’ The affidavit at issue complied with these statutes, because it contained all of the required information. The fact that the affidavit mis-cited the statute that Golden was accused of violating is irrelevant. The plain language of OCGA § 17-4-41 did not require the affidavit to identify or otherwise reference the specific statute which Golden allegedly violated. See also Turner v. State, 233 Ga. 538 (212 S.E.2d 370) (1975) (noting that even indictments are not constitutionally required to ‘cite or name the statute’ under which the accused is charged). Rather, the affidavit had to contain information sufficient to inform Golden ‘of the specific charge against him and of all basic pertinent particulars pertaining thereto.’ OCGA § 17-4-41(c). ‘The affidavit which served as the basis for the arrest warrant issued against [Golden] satisfies the statutory requirements of, and is in conformity with, [OCGA § 17-4-41 and § 17-4- 45]. The arrest [warrant] was not, therefore, illegal on the ground that the affidavit was improper.’ Hammond v. State, 157 Ga.App. 647(1) (278 S.E.2d 188) (1981).” 2. AUTHORITY TO ARREST See also JURISDICTION – VARIOUS SUBSECTIONS, above . Suluki v. State, 302 Ga.App. 735, 691 S.E.2d 626 (March 9, 2010). Conviction for possession of firearm by convicted felon reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance where counsel failed to file motion to suppress. Officers were hiding in hotel room awaiting a murder suspect, Head. When Suluki approached, officers took him down and handcuffed him. “One officer testified that after Suluki was handcuffed in the hallway, the officer ‘went there to pick the person up off the floor.’ As he was picking up Suluki, the officer ‘noticed what I felt may have been a handgun in his waistband, rear waistband. He was laying face down when I went to pick him up and I grabbed it and pulled it out and definitely it was a handgun.’ We find that the evidence presented at trial satisfies Suluki's burden of demonstrating ‘a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion. [Cit.]’ Richardson [ v. State, 276 Ga. 548, 553(3) (580 S.E.2d 224) (2003)]. ‘An arrest warrant is valid only against the person named in it. An officer arresting one not bearing the name set forth in the warrant acts at his peril. And even though he acted in good faith in arresting another than the person named, the warrant will not justify the action.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Grant v. State, 152 Ga.App. 258(1) (262 S.E.2d 553) (1979).” Trial court properly found that defendant was effectively arrested, not merely detained: “the trial testimony demonstrates a strong showing that a person in Suluki's position would have believed that his detention would not be temporary. The police surprised him from inside his room, he either fell or was taken down to the floor by police officers, placed in handcuffs, and questioned about a murder before the gun was located by the police.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (April 23, 2008). Reversing Virginia Supreme Court; in Moore’s drug prosecution, trial court properly denied motion to suppress. After defendant’s arrest for driving while license suspended, officers searched him and found drugs. Virginia Supreme Court held that trial court should have suppressed results of search under Fourth Amendment, as Virginia law requires an officer to only issue a citation, not arrest, someone charged with driving while suspended (except in limited circumstances not applicable here). U.S. Supreme Court reverses, holding that Fourth Amendment allows arrest whenever an offense is committed in the presence of an officer; Virginia’s statutory limitation on officers’ arrest powers does not enlarge the defendant’s constitutional rights, and Virginia law does not provide a statutory exclusionary rule as a remedy for a wrongful arrest in this context. “In a long line of cases, we have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable,” citing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001), and others. “Our decisions counsel against changing this calculus when a State chooses to protect privacy beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires. We have treated additional protections exclusively as matters of state law. [Cits.]” Distinguishing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (no right to search where issuing citation without arrest). “The interests justifying search are present whenever an officer makes an arrest. A search enables officers to safeguard evidence, and, most critically, to ensure their safety during ‘the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station. [ United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-235, 94 S.Ct 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).] Officers issuing citations do not face the same danger.” State v. Torres, 290 Ga.App. 804, 660 S.E.2d 763 (March 18, 2008). In drug prosecution, trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his illegal arrest. Officer arrested defendant after he refused to sign traffic citation for “failure to obtain a Georgia driver’s license within thirty days of becoming a state resident, as required by OCGA § 40-5-20.” Search of vehicle incident to arrest uncovered three bags of marijuana. Officer “admitted that he did not advise Torres that signing the citation would not be an admission of guilt or that, if he refused to sign, he would need to post a cash bond.” Held, officer thus violated mandatory procedure for arrest where