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driver refuses to sign traffic citation. “OCGA § 40-13-2.1(a) provides ‘A person who is issued a citation as provided in this chapter ..., shall sign the citation to acknowledge receipt of the citation and of his or her obligation to appear for trial. The officer shall advise the person that signing the citation is not an admission of guilt and that failure to sign will result in the person having to post a cash bond. If the person refuses to sign the citation, it shall constitute reasonable cause to believe that the person will not appear at trial and the officer may bring the person before a judicial officer or traffic violations bureau to post a bond as is otherwise provided by law.’ (emphasis supplied.) This language makes clear that once an officer issues a citation, he is obligated to follow the procedures set forth in the statute.” Note, “[t]he issue before this court, … is not whether Dyer could have arrested Torres instead of issuing him a citation; he could have. See, e.g., State v. Lowe, 263 Ga.App. 1, 1 (587 S.E.2d 169) (2003). Rather, the question is whether, having elected to issue a citation, Dyer could make a custodial arrest of Torres when he refused to sign the citation, rather than following the procedures set forth in OCGA § 40-13-2.1(a). We find that he could not.” “The State argues that an officer is entitled to ‘change his mind’ and effectuate an arrest in lieu of issuing a citation where a motorist refuses to sign such a citation. This logic, however, would allow a law enforcement officer to circumvent the requirements of OCGA § 40-13- 2.1(a) by arresting anyone who refuses to sign a traffic citation without informing them that signing is not an admission of guilt and that failure to sign constitutes reasonable cause to bring such person before a judicial officer to post bond. Neither police officers nor this Court can nullify a legitimate statute by interpreting it so that compliance with the same is optional. See Trench Shoring Services of Atlanta v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 274 Ga.App. 850, 852 (619 S.E.2d 361) (2005) (‘It is the right of the General Assembly to pass all laws and it is the duty of the court to neither add to nor take away from the laws as thus passed, but to enforce them as written.’) (Citation and punctuation omitted.)” Not clear whether suppression here is based on Fourth Amendment or other grounds; to the extent based on Fourth Amendment, Torres appears to be superseded by Virginia v. Moore (April 23, 2008), above. Lopez v. State, 286 Ga.App. 873, 650 S.E.2d 430 (July 30, 2007). Drug and traffic convictions affirmed. Officer had authority to arrest for minor traffic offense; OCGA § 17-4-23(a) does not restrict police to issuance of a citation. “‘OCGA § 17-4-23(a) ... reads in pertinent part: “A law enforcement officer may arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation, licensing, registration, maintenance, or inspection of motor vehicles by the issuance of a citation, provided the offense is committed in his presence....”’ Brock v. State, 196 Ga.App. 605, 606(1) (396 S.E.2d 785) (1990). The question raised in Brock v. State, id., was whether a police officer is restricted to making an arrest for a traffic violation solely by means of a citation or whether OCGA § 17-4-23(a) simply provides police an alternative to custodial arrest for such violations. Brock held ‘that OCGA § 17-4-23(a) simply gives police the discretion to write a citation but does not preclude physical arrest. OCGA § 17-4-20 permits a police officer to make a warrantless arrest for a crime committed in his presence. This power extends to misdemeanor offenses. The language of OCGA § 17- 4-23(a) that an officer ‘may arrest’ for a traffic violation by means of a citation clearly is discretionary. For the convenience of the motoring public and the police, the Code section gives the officer the option of issuing a citation rather than going through the time-consuming ordeal of a custodial arrest. It does not mandate a citation. Id. (citation omitted).” Lucas v. State, 284 Ga.App. 450, 644 S.E.2d 302 (March 22, 2007). Conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Officer arrested defendant based on report from dispatch about an outstanding arrest warrant. Search incident to arrest revealed illegal drugs on defendant’s person. Defendant contends the search was invalid because State has failed to prove validity of warrant. “However, the proven accuracy or validity of the warrant is immaterial. [ Buchanan v. State, 259 Ga.App. 272, 275 (576 S.E.2d 556) (2002).] Instead, the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer at that time are material, and if they ‘are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused had committed or is committing an offense, the warrantless arrest passes constitutional muster.’ Harvey v. State, 266 Ga. 671, 672 (469 S.E.2d 176) (1996), citing Callaway v. State, 257 Ga. 12, 13-14(2) (354 S.E.2d 118) (1987). Since ‘[a] radio transmission that confirms an outstanding warrant establishes the necessary probable cause to arrest[,]’ Buchanan, supra at 274, citing Singleton v. State, 194 Ga.App. 423(1) (390 S.E.2d 648) (1990), [Officer] Taylor was authorized to arrest Lucas and search him incident to arrest. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied Lucas’s motion to suppress the evidence produced as a result of the search.” Accord, State v. Edwards , 307 Ga.App. 267, 704 S.E.2d 816 (November 16, 2010) (physical precedent only); Coney v. State , 316 Ga.App. 303, 728 S.E.2d 899 (June 20, 2012) (where computer check indicates outstanding warrant, arrest thereon and search incident thereto are valid, even if it is later determined that no valid warrant existed); State v. Lucas , 332 Ga.App. 463, 773 S.E.2d 419 (June 10, 2015) (officer had probable cause to arrest pursuant to GCIC report of arrest warrant; trial court erred in suppressing evidence based on failure of State to produce arrest warrant at hearing). State v. Pinckney, 255 Ga.App. 692, 566 S.E.2d 325 (May 22, 2002). In drug prosecution, trial court erred by granting motion to suppress. An officer who has allowed his POST certification to lapse may still effect citizen arrests. “OCGA §